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Abstract
Employees often have to decide whether to conform to or deviate from the status quo. Exhibiting
consistent preferences for either preserving or maintaining the status quo (i.e., conformity biases) or for
challenging or rejecting the status quo (i.e., deviation biases) can be costly. Conformity biases prevent
employees from adapting to changing task demands and deviation biases hamper the predictability and
reliability of decisions. It is therefore important for scholars and practitioners to understand how to
engineer work environments that, to the degree possible, enable employees to bring down both types of
risks. However, our understanding of this issue is limited because organizational behavior researchers to
date have focused on reducing conformity biases but slighted the opposing risks of deviation biases. This
dissertation is dedicated to filling this gap. Challenging research on the benefits of congruent work
environments that send consistent normative signals, I demonstrate how congruity can push employees
into stable patterns of conformity or deviation whereas incongruity can trigger more flexible thinking that
enables employees to reduce both biases. Chapter 1 examines how incongruent combinations of
distributive justice systems and cultural values--egalitarian-individualist and meritocratic-collectivist-tamp down both risks by encouraging employees to fluidly shift between loss-minimizing and gainmaximizing frames. Chapters 2 and 3 present two laboratory experiments that demonstrate how
incongruent combinations of cultural values and accountability systems-- collectivist values / outcome
systems and individualist values / process systems--can also control exposure to both risks by
encouraging decision makers to iterate between the micro details and big picture. Finally, Chapter 4
investigates how blends of cultural values and accountability systems shape managerial tolerances for
employees who exhibit conformity or deviation biases. In a field study of working supervisors, I show that
managers in congruent combinations--collectivist values / process systems or individualist values /
outcome systems--either prefer conforming employees or deviating employees, respectively, but
managers in incongruent combinations have no discernible preference. Overall, this dissertation offers
novel ways to offset the risks of various organizational systems and encourages the field to reassess the
benefits of intrapsychic conflict in light of the clashing demands employees confront today.
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ABSTRACT
SYSTEMIC INCONGRUITY:
BRINGING DOWN THE RISKS OF CONFORMITY AND DEVIATION BIASES

Shefali V. Patil

Dr. Philip E. Tetlock

Employees often have to decide whether to conform to or deviate from the status quo.
Exhibiting consistent preferences for either preserving or maintaining the status quo (i.e.,
conformity biases) or for challenging or rejecting the status quo (i.e., deviation biases)
can be costly. Conformity biases prevent employees from adapting to changing task
demands and deviation biases hamper the predictability and reliability of decisions. It is
therefore important for scholars and practitioners to understand how to engineer work
environments that, to the degree possible, enable employees to bring down both types of
risks. However, our understanding of this issue is limited because organizational behavior
researchers to date have focused on reducing conformity biases but slighted the opposing
risks of deviation biases. This dissertation is dedicated to filling this gap. Challenging
research on the benefits of congruent work environments that send consistent normative
signals, I demonstrate how congruity can push employees into stable patterns of
conformity or deviation whereas incongruity can trigger more flexible thinking that
enables employees to reduce both biases. Chapter 1 examines how incongruent
combinations of distributive justice systems and cultural values—egalitarian-individualist
vii

and meritocratic-collectivist—tamp down both risks by encouraging employees to fluidly
shift between loss-minimizing and gain-maximizing frames. Chapters 2 and 3 present two
laboratory experiments that demonstrate how incongruent combinations of cultural values
and accountability systems— collectivist values / outcome systems and individualist
values / process systems—can also control exposure to both risks by encouraging
decision makers to iterate between the micro details and big picture. Finally, Chapter 4
investigates how blends of cultural values and accountability systems shape managerial
tolerances for employees who exhibit conformity or deviation biases. In a field study of
working supervisors, I show that managers in congruent combinations—collectivist
values / process systems or individualist values / outcome systems—either prefer
conforming employees or deviating employees, respectively, but managers in
incongruent combinations have no discernible preference. Overall, this dissertation offers
novel ways to offset the risks of various organizational systems and encourages the field
to reassess the benefits of intrapsychic conflict in light of the clashing demands
employees confront today.
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CHAPTER 1
BLENDING DISTRIBUTIVE AND CULTURAL SYSTEMS

Employees often have to decide whether to conform to or deviate from the status
quo. The decision is not easy—and can carry serious consequences. Sometimes the status
quo is inappropriate for the situation at hand. That is, current work methods and
routines (Morrison & Phelps, 1999; Staw & Boettger, 1990), decision making protocols
(Feldman & March, 1981; Sutcliffe & McNamara, 2001), and bureaucratic rules (Canales,
2014; Morrison, 2006) are inadequate for a given task. In these instances, employees
who exhibit conformity biases—or tendencies to favor preserving or strengthening the
status quo—run the risk of failing to bring about appropriate or necessary change. But
sometimes current work methods and routines, decision making practices, and
bureaucratic rules are adequate (Arkes, Dawes, & Christensen, 1986; Dean & Sharfman,
1993; Hackman & Wageman, 1995). In these instances, employees who exhibit deviation
biases—or tendencies to favor challenging or rejecting the status quo—run the risk of
bringing about inappropriate or unnecessary change.
Both biases can be costly for organizations (Leana & Barry, 2000). Conformity
biases hamper learning and adjustment in changing task environments (Grant &
Ashford, 2008; Griffin, Neal, & Parker, 2007). Microsoft’s recent history under former
CEO Steve Ballmer is replete with instances of senior executives who exhibited strong
conformity biases (Eichenwald, 2012). These executives frequently strangled “innovative
ideas that might threaten the established order of things” (Eichenwald, 2012: 1). In the
eyes of some critics, one of the reasons why Microsoft continues to lag behind the likes of
1

Facebook, Google, and Apple is that these executives exhibited an unflagging loyalty to
the status quo. But deviation biases can also be costly. Deviation biases hamper routine
learning, predictability, and efficiency in stable task environments (Canales, 2014; Levitt
& March, 1988). The actions of Donald Burr, former CEO of People Express Airlines, are
a case in point (Prokesch, 1986). In the 1980s, People Express enjoyed roaring success as
the fifth largest carrier. However, Burr began rapidly overturning all the practices and
routines the organization had been following for years. Among other things, he broke
with tradition and bought a heavily unionized carrier, took on operations that were
typically contracted out, and suddenly refused to reimburse travel agents for lost
passenger tickets. People Express soon became “People Distress”. The carrier no longer
exists.
Given these costs, it is important for scholars and practitioners to understand
which types of work contexts increase employees’ vulnerabilities to one bias or the
other—and whether it is possible to design work settings that bring down the risks of
both biases. At present, our understanding of this issue is quite limited. The primary
reason why our understanding is limited is that organizational behavior scholars have
focused quite exclusively on reducing only one of the two opposing risks: conformity
biases. For example, they have examined ways to encourage proactivity (Grant &
Ashford, 2008), creativity (Miron-Spektor, Gino, & Argote, 2011b), creative deviance
(Mainemelis, 2010), experimentation (Lee, Edmondson, Thomke, & Worline, 2004),
individual innovation (Scott & Bruce, 1994), de-escalation of commitment (Ross & Staw,
1993), and adaptivity (Pulakos, Arad, Donovan, & Plamondon, 2000). All these
behaviors are change-oriented—they involve challenging prevailing ways of doing things
(Griffin et al., 2007).
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Among other reasons, organizational behavior scholars may be preoccupied with
reducing conformity biases because of the field’s social psychological underpinnings.
Classic findings in social psychology have found that people are prone to deferring to the
beliefs and opinions of others, sometimes even when those opinions are clearly wrong
(Asch, 1951, 1956). People are especially prone to conforming to accepted ways of doing
things because they look to others as reliable sources of information and want to avoid
social disapproval (Deutsch & Gerard, 1955). Organizational scholars also tend to be
particularly suspicious of social forces that encourage conformity, which they find to be
particularly pernicious (e.g., O'Reilly & Chatman, 1996).
I do not contest these findings and arguments—or the value of exploring ways to
mitigate conformity biases in organizations. However, the skewed emphasis on reducing
conformity biases precludes us from having a more balanced conversation about the
different types of risks to which employees are exposed. And because of this skewed
emphasis, organizational behavior research continues to significantly lag behind its
macro counterparts in organizational theory and strategy. For the past two decades,
macro researchers have argued that organizations face competing pressures to balance
the analogous tradeoffs of exploitation and exploration, standardization and flexibility,
and stability and change (e.g., Adler et al., 2009; Farjoun, 2010; March, 1991). But due to
the relative silence of organizational behavior scholars on the issue, we have very limited
insights on how individual managers manage similar conformity-deviation tradeoffs
(Lavie, Stettner, & Tushman, 2010).
My objective in this chapter is to correct for these limitations. I do so by
examining how different types of organizational cultures elevate or attenuate the risks of
conformity or deviation biases at the individual level. Organizational culture is a form of
social control—a system of shared values, norms, and expectations (O'Reilly & Chatman,
3

1996). I approach my focal question from an organizational culture perspective because
these cultural systems fundamentally shape how employees approach internal and
external problems (Schein, 1992b)—and how they ultimately think and act (Hofstede,
Neuijen, Ohayv, & Sanders, 1990; Schein, 1983; Trice & Beyer, 1993). In particular,
scholars have argued that organizational culture affects the degree to which employees
attempt to protect or challenge the status quo (Flynn & Chatman, 2001; Goncalo & Staw,
2006). As such, organizational culture is a particularly relevant—and important—lens to
explore how work environments can be designed to bring down the risks of conformity
and deviation biases.
The remainder of this chapter proceeds as follows. First, I specify my
conceptualization of conformity and deviation biases. Next, I present my model by
distinguishing among different types of organizational cultures and explaining how and
why these cultural systems elevate or attenuate the risks of conformity and deviation
biases. Following this section, I explain why organizational cultures that elevate the risks
of either bias are likelier to be sustained in organizations. Finally, I discuss the
theoretical implications of my model. Of note, my model challenges prevalent notions in
organizational behavior scholarship that work contexts that trigger the same
psychological states are more beneficial than those that trigger conflicting psychological
states (cf. Erez, 1986; Lee et al., 2004; O'Reilly, Chatman, & Caldwell, 1991). By contrast,
I highlight the benefits of work contexts that trigger clashing psychological states in
reducing exposure to both opposing sets of risks. I also discuss the implications that my
model has for more macro theories on how organizations balance exploitation and
exploration—and identify a number of directions for future research.

4

CONFORMITY AND DEVIATION BIASES
To reiterate, employees can exhibit tendencies to continuously preserve or
maintain the status quo (conformity bias)—or employees can exhibit tendencies to
continuously challenge or alter the status quo (deviation bias).There are three aspects of
conformity and deviation biases that should be further specified.
First, “status quo” broadly refers to current ways of thinking in the organization.
Certainly, the term “status quo” has been used in a variety of different literatures. For the
purposes of building this theoretical model, it generally refers to: (a) standard decision
making practices and protocols (Edmondson, 2008; March & Simon, 1958; Sutcliffe &
McNamara, 2001); (b) current work methods, routines, and policies (Detert & Burris,
2007; Grant & Parker, 2009; Staw & Boettger, 1990); and, (c) existing bureaucratic rules
(Canales, 2014; Morrison, 2006; Tyler & Blader, 2005). Standard decision practices,
current work methods, and bureaucratic rules all reflect prevailing beliefs about how
work activities should be conducted—and how the organization should function (Levitt &
March, 1988). They serve a variety of instrumental and symbolic functions. On the
instrumental end, standard practices stabilize decision making, increasing the
predictability and reliability of decisions (Dean & Sharfman, 1996; Hackman &
Wageman, 1995). On the symbolic end, standard practices help organizations signal to
scrutinizing constituencies that they are complying with socio-political values and norms
(Edelman, 1992; Meyer & Rowan, 1977).
Second, for each situation, employees often have to decide whether to preserve or
reject the status quo. My model proposes that certain cultural systems increase employee
tendencies to consistently preserve—or reject—the status quo across a series of
situations over time. Employees who continuously exhibit conformity biases risk failing
to adapt to changing task demands (Grant & Ashford, 2008). Employees who
5

continuously exhibit deviation biases risk bringing about unnecessary change to stable or
routine task demands (March & Simon, 1958). But employees who simultaneously bring
down the risks of both conformity and deviation biases learn when to conform and when
to deviate—and thus achieve a more productive balance between conformity and
deviation as tasks fluctuate between stability and change over time (Canales, 2014).
Compared to those who exhibit either extreme biases, employees who bring down the
risks of both biases essentially incur a fewer number of situations in which they
inappropriately conformed to or inappropriately deviated from the status quo.
Third, I acknowledge that task predictability caps the degree to which employees
can reduce the risks of both conformity and deviation biases. Sometimes there is so
much uncertainty that employees can simply do not better than incur the risks of
conformity biases or incur the risks of deviation biases—and adjust between these
preferences depending on what is being rewarded (Taleb, 2010; Taleb, Goldstein, &
Spitznagel, 2009). Certainly there are tasks in which this uncertainty may exist. But my
model seeks to explain outcomes when there are sufficient levels of task certainty—and
there are opportunities to push out the tradeoff frontier—such that exposure to both
risks are reduced (Tetlock & Mellers, 2011a).
ORGANIZATIONAL CULTURAL SYSTEMS, REGULATORY FOCUS, AND
VULNERABILITIES TO CONFORMITY AND DEVIATION BIASES
There are many dimensions along which organizational cultures can be
distinguished (Hofstede et al., 1990). But scholars have argued that one major dimension
along which cultural systems in organizations can be differentiated is collectivism vs.
individualism (Chatman & Jehn, 1994; Earley, 1993). A number of studies have
examined the effects of collectivist vs. individualist cultural systems on a variety of work
processes and outcomes in organizations particularly relevant to issues of conformity
6

and deviation (e.g., Chatman & Barsade, 1995; Chatman, Polzer, Barsade, & Neale, 1998;
Goncalo & Staw, 2006). In collectivist cultural systems, employees view themselves as
interdependent with others—and are motivated by their obligations to each other
(Wagner, 1995). By contrast, in individualist cultural systems, employees view
themselves as independent of others—and are motivated by their own attitudes and
preferences (Chatman et al., 1998).
However, the collectivism-individualism dimension is not without its critics.
Some have argued that the dimension conflates important differences among types of
collectivist systems and types of individualist systems (e.g., Chen, Meindl, & Hunt, 1997;
Schwartz, 1990; Vandello & Cohen, 1999). Note that these criticisms are in reference to
collectivist and individualist systems at the national or societal level of analysis—not at
the organizational level. But these criticisms have implications for collectivist and
individualist systems at the organizational level. Indeed the collectivist-individualist
dimension for organizational cultures was inspired by research on national cultures (e.g.,
Hofstede, 1980). Organizational scholars argued that the same cultural patterns at the
national level can also emerge at the level of more local, discrete social units such as
firms (Chatman & Jehn, 1994). In other words, they argued that cultural frames are
malleable—and can be primed by more immediate situational influences (Brockner,
2003).
As such, criticisms of the collectivism-individualism at the national level may also
indicate analogous limitations of the construct at the organizational level. To correct for
these limitations, I draw on a cultural framework advanced by Triandis and colleagues
(Singelis, Triandis, Bhawuk, & Gelfand, 1995; Triandis, 1995; Triandis & Gelfand, 1998).
Again, this framework explains differences among national cultures. However, given that
cultural frames are malleable and organizations can assume similar cultural patterns
7

(Goncalo & Staw, 2006; Oyserman, Coon, & Kemmelmeier, 2002), I apply this
framework to the organizational level.
Triandis and colleagues argue that in addition to the collectivism-individualism
dimension, cultures can be further distinguished along a horizontal-vertical dimension
(Triandis, Chen, & Chan, 1998). Whereas the collectivism-individualism dimension
captures differences in interdependence, the horizontal-vertical dimension captures
differences in tolerance of hierarchies (Markus & Kitayama, 1991; Shavitt, Lalwani,
Zhang, & Torelli, 2006). Simply, horizontal cultures are less tolerant of hierarchies than
are vertical cultures. Of course, a variety of social hierarchies can emerge in
organizations (e.g., Magee & Galinsky, 2008). For the sake of theoretical precision, I
focus on hierarchies created by the distribution of resources. Distributive principles are
one indicator of horizontal or vertical tendencies—or the degree to which an organization
does or does not tolerate hierarchies (Deutsch, 1985; Erez, 1997; Kabanoff, Waldersee, &
Cohen, 1995). There are two prominent principles that guide resource distribution:
egalitarian vs. meritocratic (Wageman & Gordon, 2005). More egalitarian organizations
distribute rewards equally with no differentiation among individuals—and are thus
hierarchy-attenuating. More meritocratic organizations distribute rewards in proportion
to inputs (i.e., equitably) with much differentiation among individuals—and are thus
hierarchy-enhancing (Castilla & Benard, 2010).
Crossing these two dimensions yields four different types of organizational
cultural systems: egalitarian-collectivist, egalitarian-individualist, meritocraticcollectivist, and meritocratic-individualist. In the following sections, I explain how these
different types of cultural systems trigger different types of self-regulatory schemas—and
how these self-regulatory schemas in turn shape vulnerabilities to conformity and
deviation biases. Self-regulatory schemas constitute a fundamental element of human
8

motivation (Shah, Higgins, & Friedman, 1998). They refer to the different pathways
people take to achieve different end goals (Brockner & Higgins, 2001). There are two
basic self-regulatory states: prevention and promotion (Higgins, 1997, 1998). Prevention
states are characterized by loss-avoidance, vigilance, risk aversion, and a focus on duties
and obligations. Promotion states are characterized by gain-maximization, eagerness,
risk seeking, and a focus on hopes and aspirations.
My model appears in Figure 1.
Organizational Cultural Systems and Regulatory Schemas
Egalitarian-collectivist systems. The collectivist component of egalitariancollectivist systems emphasizes interdependence and communal relationships (Markus &
Kitayama, 1991; Triandis, 1995). People in collectivist systems are primarily concerned
with impression management: saving face, avoiding social disapproval, and adjusting to
normative constraints (Gelfand, Erez, & Aycan, 2007; Lalwani, Shrum, & Chiu, 2009;
Triandis & Suh, 2002). In other words, they are strongly driven by the need to fit in and
behave in socially-sanctioned ways (Crowne & Marlowe, 1964; Van Baaren, Holland,
Steenaert, & van Knippenberg, 2003). To fulfill this need, they are highly attentive to
negative information about the self—and use this information to avoid future social
mishaps (Heine & Lehman, 1999; Kitayama, Markus, Matsumoto, & Norasakkunkit,
1997). Furthermore, when people view themselves as interdependent, the ought-self
becomes more prominent—they regulate to others’, as opposed to their own, standards
of behavior (Cross, Morris, & Gore, 2002).
For these reasons, researchers have found close links between interdependent
cultural systems and prevention, avoidance-oriented schemas (Lee, Aaker, & Gardner,
2000). People in collectivist systems are essentially preoccupied with avoiding “rocking
the boat.” Some of the prevention-focused behaviors that these people tend to exhibit
9

include: being more sensitive to failure-avoidance events (not losing) than successforegone events (not winning) (Lee et al., 2000), pursuing more avoidance goals (Elliot,
Chirkov, Kim, & Sheldon, 2001), striving more to minimize potential losses than
maximize potential gains (Hamilton & Biehal, 2005; but see Hsee & Weber, 1999, for
boundary conditions), and being inspired by role models who convey the importance of
avoiding failures (Lockwood, Marshall, & Sadler, 2005).
Egalitarian systems, the other component of egalitarian-collectivist cultures, also
emphasize inclusion and shared membership (Wageman & Gordon, 2005). Egalitarian
organizations often utilize profit and gain sharing, fringe benefits, and other schemes
that compress salary differentials (Erez, 1997; Triandis, 2001). In egalitarian
environments, people value benevolence, universalism, and harmony over power and
achievement (Erez & Earley, 1987; Oishi, Schimmack, Diener, & Suh, 1998; Schwartz &
Bilsky, 1987). As such, they tend to adopt prevention focused mindsets, focusing on
avoiding conflict, standing out from others, or causing harm to solidarity goals (CutcherGershenfeld & Kochan, 1997; Kabanoff et al., 1995; Meindl, 1989). The priming of
prevention mindsets is perhaps one reason why researchers have found that people in
egalitarian systems are less likely to engage in risky activities such as thinking outside
the box (Goncalo & Kim, 2010; Wageman & Gordon, 2005)—or yielding to minority
viewpoints (Ng & Van Dyne, 2001).
In sum, both components of egalitarian-cultural systems are likely to trigger
prevention focused mindsets among employees:
Proposition 1: Employees are more likely to adopt predominantly prevention focused
mindsets in organizations with egalitarian-collectivist cultural systems.
Meritocratic-individualist systems. Meritocratic-individualist organizations
embrace the mirror-image set of values and beliefs. The individualist component of
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meritocratic-individualist systems emphasizes independence and distinction (Markus &
Kitayama, 1991; Triandis, 1995). Because they are focused on being positively distinct,
people in individualist systems are concerned with self-enhancement goals—and strive to
present themselves as self-reliant and skillful (Lalwani & Shavitt, 2009). As a result, they
tend to exhibit many egocentric biases in self-appraisals (Heine, Lehman, Markus, &
Kitayama, 1999). For example, they are unrealistically optimistic about their
invulnerability compared to that of others (Heine & Lehman, 1995), rate themselves as
above average on a variety of personal attributes (Chang, Asakawa, & Sanna, 2001), and
make self-serving attributions to justify their behaviors (Mezulis, Abramson, Hyde, &
Hankin, 2004).
For people in individualist systems, this preoccupation with distinguishing
oneself also translates into a strong focus on maximizing potential gains in various
situations (Lalwani et al., 2009). They are focused on proving their unique abilities. As
such, researchers have found a positive link between independent cultural systems and
promotion schemas. In addition to maximizing potential gains (Hamilton & Biehal,
2005), people in individualist systems are more sensitive to success-foregone events (not
winning) than failure-avoidance events (not losing) (Lee et al., 2000) and are more
motivated by success vs. failure feedback (Heine et al., 2001).
The meritocratic component of meritocratic-individualist cultural systems also
triggers promotion states. Equity-based systems essentially incentivize people to
compete for rewards, power, and influence (Erez, 1997). Employees under these systems
not only want to be distinct—they want to be the best (Triandis & Gelfand, 1998). To reap
the benefits of meritocratic systems, people want to develop superior expertise relative to
others, demonstrate their unique abilities, and gain public recognition of their individual
achievements (Galbraith, 1971; Mintzberg, 1984). As such, people under meritocratic
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systems are likely to adopt promotion focused mindsets to maximize their potential for
gains—and show little loyalty to the status quo. For example, people operating under
competitive, equity-based systems tend to embark on more gains-oriented, risky
initiatives such as challenging established decision practices (Arkes et al., 1986) or
thinking outside the box (Baer, Leenders, Oldham, & Vadera, 2010; Gordon, Welch,
Offringa, & Katz, 2000; Wageman & Gordon, 2005).
Proposition 2: Employees are more likely to adopt predominantly promotion focused
mindsets in organizations with meritocratic-individualist cultural systems.
Egalitarian-individualist and meritocratic-collectivist systems.
Whereas egalitarian-collectivist and meritocratic-individualist cultural systems push
employees into predominantly prevention focused or promotion focused zones,
respectively, egalitarian-individualist and meritocratic-collectivist systems trigger
clashing prevention and promotion regulatory states. In egalitarian-individualist
systems, the egalitarian component triggers prevention states and the individualist
component, promotion states. In meritocratic-collectivist systems, the meritocratic
component triggers promotion states and the collectivist component, prevention states.
Kaizen in Toyota’s Production System provides an example of an egalitarianindividualist system. Egalitarianism is promoted vis-à-vis gain-sharing systems that
“reward all workers for improvements in plant-wide quality and efficiency” (Adler,
Goldoftas, & Levine, 1999: 53). But the egalitarian system is embedded in an
individualist value system in which employees are encouraged and challenged to
improve work processes utilizing their unique skills and capabilities (MacDuffie, 1995).
This incongruous configuration is perhaps one reason why the organization as a whole is
able to achieve continuous improvement such that it is able to strike a balance between
efficiency and flexibility (Adler et al., 2009).
12

On the other end, brainstorming sessions at IDEO serve as an example of a
meritocratic-collectivist system. These sessions are meritocratic “status auctions” in
which design engineers strive to increase their standing on the technical hierarchy by
pitching creative ideas on which other designers are able to build their ideas (Sutton &
Hargadon, 1996). But the meritocratic system is embedded in a collectivist culture
characterized by interdependent information sharing and collaborative helping in which
engineers try to enhance each other’s projects (Amabile, Fisher, & Pillemer, 2014).
Design engineers in these brainstorming sessions “go out of their way to help one
another…[and] respect each other’s skills” (Sutton & Hargadon, 1996: 706).
Research suggests that when contexts prime different psychological states, people
shift into high-cognitive gear to resolve the contradictions (Schwarz, 1990). That is, they
think more flexibly—and shift between the psychological states that are primed. For
example, when people experience conflicting negative and positive emotions, they tend
to draw unusual connections between competing elements in their environments to
decrease the conflict (Fong, 2006). People exhibit similar behaviors when confronted
with paradoxical cognitive frames that cause conflict; they flexibly consider both
competing elements to resolve the conflict (Miron-Spektor et al., 2011b). Additionally,
when people are caught in “accountability cross-fire,” or are accountable to opposing
constituencies, they exhibit more integratively complex thought processes (Green,
Visser, & Tetlock, 2000). They shift between differentiating two opposing sets of ideas
and looking for ways to balance the competing concerns.
Based on this discussion, I propose:
Proposition 3: Employees are likely to flexibly shift between prevention and promotion
focused states when operating in organizations with (a) egalitarian-individualist or (b)
meritocratic-collectivist cultural systems.
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Regulatory Schemas and Vulnerabilities to Conformity and Deviation Biases
Regulatory schemas affect employees’ vulnerabilities to conformity and deviation
biases in at least three different ways. First, regulatory schemas affect the degree to
which employees are willing to take risks. Prevention focused individuals tend to be
more risk averse (Zhang & Mittal, 2007). Risk-aversion, in turn, is often linked to the
conservation of accrued gains (Jackson & Dutton, 1988; Kahneman & Tversky, 1979)—
and is one reason why employees tend to conform to the status quo in organizations. For
example, risk-aversion has been linked to reduced proactivity—or behaviors that involve
bringing about change to current practices and methods (Grant & Ashford, 2008).
Employees who engage in proactive initiatives risk threatening supervisor authority or
suffering serious repercussions if these initiatives result in negative outcomes (Frese &
Fay, 2001; Parker, Bindl, & Strauss, 2010). Prevention-focused employees are thus likely
to be especially vulnerable to conformity biases.
By contrast, promotion focused individuals are more risk-seeking—and riskseeking has been linked to tendencies to overturn the status quo (even to a point of
detriment). For instance, strong propensities to take risks can cause people to engage in
chaotic change initiatives (Bunderson & Sutcliffe, 2003; March & Shapira, 1987). During
these times of chaotic change, employees are unable to discriminate effective from
ineffective change (March & Olsen, 1976)—or understand causal relationships in a way
that meaningfully incorporates feedback from the changes being made (Weick, 1984).
Thus, promotion-focused employees are likely to be especially vulnerable to deviation
biases.
Second, regulatory schemas affect the degree to which employees are motivated
to engage in extensive hypothesis generation as they go about making decisions.
Employees with a prevention focus are motivated to generate fewer hypotheses or
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courses of action whereas those with a promotion focus are motivated to generate
multiple hypotheses or courses of action (Crowe & Higgins, 1997; Liberman, Molden,
Idson, & Higgins, 2001; Molden & Higgins, 2008; Woolley, 2011). The degree to which
people restrict hypothesis generation affects their tendencies to conform to or deviate
from the status quo. Because the status quo has been tried-and-tested and offers
security, managers who are motivated to restrict hypothesis generation often adopt the
status quo—and fail to consider options that challenge current ways of thinking (Nijstad
& De Dreu, 2012; Staw, Sandelands, & Dutton, 1981). However, managers who are
motivated to increase hypothesis generation are likelier to challenge the status quo in
search of better outcomes (Heath, Larrick, & Klayman, 1998; Nisbett, Zukier, & Lemley,
1981; Tetlock & Boettger, 1989).
Third, regulatory schemas affect the degree to which employees are overconfident
and optimistic. Generally, prevention schemas are linked to under-confidence and
pessimism whereas promotion schemas are linked to over-confidence and optimism
(Grant & Higgins, 2003; Hazlett, Molden, & Sackett, 2011; Semin, Higgins, de Montes,
Estourget, & Valencia, 2005). People’s level of confidence affects their propensities to
conform or deviate by shaping their sense of control. People who are under-confident
and pessimistic tend to perceive low levels of control—and those who are over-confident
and optimistic tend to perceive high, sometimes delusional, levels of control—over their
environments (Kahneman & Renshon, 2007). Proactivity researchers have long argued
that perceived control over one’s environment is one predictor of why some people more
so than others are likely to challenge the status quo (Grant & Ashford, 2008; Parker &
Sprigg, 1999). The less people feel in control of their environments, the less likely they
are to challenge the status quo—and the more they feel in control, the more likely they
are to challenge the status quo (Bell & Staw, 1989).
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In sum, different regulatory schemas trigger different motivations: either the
motivation for stability or the motivation for change (Kluger, Stephan, Ganzach, &
Hershkovitz, 2004; Van-Dijk & Kluger, 2004). Prevention-focused individuals are more
concerned with ensuring their safety and security—and are thus more sensitive to
negative deviations from the status quo (differences between “0” and “-1”) (Herzenstein,
Posavac, & Brakus, 2007; Higgins & Tykocinski, 1992). They would rather persist with
nonnegative, satisfactory current states than risk shifting from the status quo and
incurring losses (Chernev, 2004; Crowe & Higgins, 1997; Liberman, Idson, Camacho, &
Higgins, 1999). Thus, employees who approach their decisions predominantly through
prevention schemas are likelier to exhibit strong preferences to reinforce the status quo.
Promotion-focused individuals are more concerned with searching for better possibilities
and opportunities—and are thus more sensitive to positive deviations from the status
quo (differences between “0” and “+1”) (Higgins, 2008). They are more willing to take
risks to maximize and enhance current states (Zhang & Mittal, 2007). And the upside
gains of challenging the status quo loom larger than the downside risks of doing so
(Crowe & Higgins, 1997). Thus, employees who approach their decisions predominantly
through promotion schemas are likelier to exhibit strong preferences to reject the status
quo.
Proposition 4: Employees who are predominantly prevention focused are more
vulnerable to the risks of conformity biases.
Proposition 5: Employees who are predominantly promotion focused are more
vulnerable to the risks of deviation biases.
Propositions 4 and 5 inherently imply that regulatory schemas offset the risks of
the opposing biases. That is, prevention states tamp down the risks of deviation biases
and promotion states tamp down the risks of conformity biases (Scholer & Higgins,
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2008). Prevention states preclude employees from inappropriately challenging the status
quo and promotion states preclude employees from inappropriately conforming to the
status quo. So employees who flexibly shift between prevention and promotion focused
mindsets (as I predicted would occur under egalitarian-individualist and meritocraticcollectivist systems) are essentially equipped to achieve an optimal level of selfregulation: the advantages of each regulatory schema offset the disadvantages of the
other (Rosenzweig, 2014; Scholer & Higgins, 2012).
What makes shifting between prevention and promotion states “optimal”?
Research demonstrates that regulatory schemas fundamentally shape how we process
our information worlds (Trope & Liberman, 2010). The more prevention focused we are,
the more we process our environments concretely; we focus on the “trees” or low-level,
micro details and obstacles (Friedman & Förster, 2001; Lee & Higgins, 2009). Focusing
on the concrete enables prevention focused individuals to achieve their goal of being
vigilant—i.e., it enables them to reduce any potential for losses (Förster & Higgins,
2005). But the more people focus on the concrete, the more vigilant and risk-averse they
become (Liberman et al., 1999). They thus fall into the trap of being overly sensitive to
the costs of change and overly insensitive to the costs of stability—and are likely to
exhibit tendencies to maintain the status quo.
The opposite is true for promotion states. The more promotion focused we are,
the more we process our environments abstractly; we focus on the “forest” or high-level,
macro aspects and big picture (Semin et al., 2005). Focusing on the abstract enables
promotion focused individuals to achieve their goal of growth—i.e., it enables them to
not be bogged down by the details and look for ways to achieve advancement. But the
more people focus on the abstract, the more eager and risk-seeking they become
(Henderson, Trope, & Carnevale, 2006). They thus fall into the trap of being overly
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sensitive to the costs of stability and overly insensitive to the costs of change—and are
likely to exhibit tendencies to reject the status quo (Liberman et al., 2001).
However, people who fluidly shift between prevention and promotion states
iterate between concrete and abstract processing modes. That is, they see how the
concrete details fit into the abstract big picture—and how the abstract big picture puts
the small details into context. For example, advertising executives who iterate between
the concrete and abstract see how the concrete details of their advertisements (e.g., the
actors they hire, the colors they use) help them satisfy global consumer demands—and
how satisfying global consumer demands shapes how they should go about
implementing the concrete details of their advertisements. As people iterate between the
concrete and abstract, they also shift between prevention and promotion regulatory
states, exacerbating or attenuating preferences for stability and change. Thus, people
who shift between concrete and abstract processing modes—primed by shifts between
prevention and promotion states—are uniquely positioned to explicitly wrestle with the
pros and cons of conforming to or deviating from the status quo (Scholer & Higgins,
2012). As such, compared to employees who fixate on either prevention or promotion
states and on either the pros or cons of stability or change, employees who fluctuate
between the regulatory states are better enabled to reduce the risks of both conformity
and deviation biases.
Proposition 6: Employees who flexibly shift between prevention and promotion
focused states are likely to simultaneously bring down the risks of both conformity and
deviation biases.
THE SELF-REINFORCING NATURE OF EGALIATIRAN-COLLECTIVIST AND
MERITOCRATIC-INDIVIDUALIST SYSTEMS IN ORGANIZATIONS
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Egalitarian-collectivist and meritocratic-individualist cultural systems are
congruent: they trigger the same psychological state. I argued that these congruent
systems would either increase vulnerabilities to conformity biases—or deviation biases.
However, incongruent cultural systems that trigger clashing states—egalitarianindividualist or meritocratic-collectivist—would enable employees to bring down the
risks of both biases to the degree possible. But, to what extent are egalitarianindividualist or meritocratic-collectivist systems likely to be sustained in organizations? I
argue that that the likelihood is low—and that there are strong social forces that push
organizations towards congruity. Drawing on notions that social forces are bidirectional
(Deutsch, 1985), I examine how collectivist-individualist systems are likely to give rise to
their congruent egalitarian-meritocratic complements—and vice versa. As I will discuss
in the last section of this article, the propositions that follow raise a number of
interesting areas for future work on how incongruity, given its potential benefits, can be
sustained over time.
Collectivist/Individualist Systems Egalitarian/Meritocratic Systems
There are at least three different ways in which collectivist and individualist
cultural systems shape the degree to which organizational administrators under these
systems prefer implementing egalitarian vs. meritocratic distributive systems. First,
collectivist and individualist systems affect the extent to which people believe one or the
other distributive system is fundamentally fair. People in collectivist systems are more
likely to attribute responsibility to external, uncontrollable causes (e.g., luck or chance)
(Choi, Nisbett, & Norenzayan, 1999). And those who make external attributions are more
sensitive to penalizing others for things outside their control. As such, research suggests
that people who make external attributions prefer allocating resources in more
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egalitarian ways (Mitchell, Tetlock, Mellers, & Ordonez, 1993). In their eyes, meritocratic
systems may unfairly disadvantage people who suffer from bad luck.
By contrast, people in individualist systems adopt a more “Protestant work ethic”
perspective—and see successes and failures as tightly coupled with effort, hard work, and
other controllable causes (Miller, 1984; Morris & Peng, 1994; Newman, 1993). People
who make internal attributions lean in the opposite direction: they are more sensitive to
failing to reward people for achieving above and beyond. Thus, people who make
internal attributions tend to prefer more meritocratic ways of distributing rewards
(Skitka & Tetlock, 1992). In their eyes, egalitarian systems unfairly disadvantage people
who simply contributed more—and fail to motivate effort among those who contribute
less.
Second, collectivist and individualist systems affect the tradeoffs that people
make between social harmony and productivity (Triandis, 1995), and tradeoffs in social
harmony and productivity consequently shape distribution strategies (Deutsch, 1975;
Meindl, 1989). For people in collectivist systems, solidarity and reducing conflict take
center stage—and they are willing to trade off productivity (Casciaro & Lobo, 2005;
Fiedler, 1967; Hofstede, 1980). Too much differentiation of rewards is likely to increase
social conflict among people. Thus, to reduce this potential for conflict, people in
collectivist systems are likely to prefer egalitarian systems (Bond, Leung, & Wan, 1982).
But people in individualist systems are more concerned with increasing productivity—
and more willing to trade off social harmony (Triandis et al., 1998). They are therefore
more attuned to individual accomplishments—and prefer to utilize meritocratic systems
to reward those who accomplish a lot and penalize those who accomplish little (Kim,
Park, & Suzuki, 1990).
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Third, collectivist and individualist systems affect the degree to which people are
generous in their evaluations of others. Researchers have shown that people in
collectivist systems are, on average, more generous than those in individualist systems
(assuming the targets of evaluation are in their in-group, Gómez, Kirkman, & Shapiro,
2000). In collectivist systems, people want to foster relationships over the long-term—
and see more benefits in evaluating people in a positive light (Hui, Triandis, & Yee,
1991). By contrast, for people in individualist systems, these concerns of nurturing longterm relationships are fairly negligible. Generosity in evaluations may, in turn, shape
distributive structures. Because of their generosity, organizational administrators in
collectivist systems are less likely to discriminate among people—i.e., their evaluations
and subsequent allocation of rewards are likely to cluster together. However,
organizational administrators in individualist systems are more likely to discriminate
among people, naturally giving rise to a more hierarchal reward structure
Proposition 7a: Organizational administrators who operate in organizations with
collectivist systems are likely to implement more egalitarian distributive systems.
Proposition 7b: Organizational administrators who operate in organizations with
individualist systems are likely to implement more meritocratic distributive systems.
Egalitarian/Meritocratic Systems  Collectivist/Individualist Systems
How organizations distribute rewards can also shape whether employees exhibit
more collectivist or individualist behaviors and values, which consequently give rise to
broader collectivist or individualist systems in the organization (Schneider, Goldstein, &
Smith, 1995). Employees in egalitarian systems are inherently undifferentiated in terms
of power. That is, one is not more dependent on the other for resources (Pfeffer, 1981b).
When there are equal power relations, people tend to develop reciprocity norms: “each
party’s contributions are tied to those of the other party’s” (Kabanoff, 1991: 423). In
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reciprocity relationships, people tend to give back what they receive in order to retain a
balance between the parties (Deutsch, 1985). As Kabanoff (1991) argues, people in
reciprocity relationships may disagree about many issues such as how joint resources
should be allocated toward completing tasks. But, for the most part, these disagreements
occur within a relationship in which the parties value cohesiveness, pursue goals jointly,
and work together rather than withdraw from the relationship to remedy sources of
conflict (Pfeffer & Langton, 1988). All these attributes are reflective of more collectivist
tendencies, suggesting that more collectivist systems of norms are likelier to arise from
egalitarian systems.
The opposite occurs in meritocratic systems. Unequal distribution of rewards
inherently begets unequal distribution of power. Much research on power hierarchies
suggests that high relative power triggers a variety of different psychological processes
and behaviors (Keltner, Gruenfeld, & Anderson, 2003; Magee & Galinsky, 2008). [Note I
focus on people at the top of the power hierarchy because they are the ones who are the
most influential in shaping the norms that emerge in organizations (Hollander, 1958)].
For one, people with greater power exert their independence from others, especially their
subordinates—and, for better or worse, are more self-reliant (Kipnis, 1972). Additionally,
people with greater power are likely to express their personal opinions (Anderson &
Berdahl, 2002)—and are unfazed when others do the same (Galinsky, Magee, Gruenfeld,
Whitson, & Liljenquist, 2008). Finally, power reduces the attention that people pay to
other’s contributions (Kipnis, 1976), perspectives (Galinsky, Magee, Inesi, & Gruenfeld,
2006), and overall emotions and thoughts (Overbeck & Park, 2006). Powerful people do
this, though, only to the extent that others are not useful for achieving their goals. When
people are useful, powerful managers attend to them quite closely (Gruenfeld, Inesi,
Magee, & Galinsky, 2008; Overbeck & Park, 2001). Thus, the relationships here are
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instrumental: others are viewed merely as a means to an end. Overall, the behaviors that
managers exhibit in meritocratic systems are self-focused, exchange-oriented, and
individualistic. And these individualistic norms at the top are likely to trickle down to the
rest of the organization (Magee & Galinsky, 2008).
Proposition 8a: Employees who operate in organizations with egalitarian distributive
systems are likely to give rise to more collectivist systems.
Proposition 8b: Employees who operate in organizations with meritocratic distributive
systems are likely to give rise to more individualist systems.
DISCUSSION
My objective in this chapter was to examine how different types of work contexts
exacerbate or attenuate the risks of conformity and deviation biases. I argued that
whereas congruent cultural systems (egalitarian-collectivist and meritocraticindividualist) are likely to exacerbate vulnerabilities to the risk of either bias,
incongruent cultural systems (egalitarian-individualist and meritocratic-collectivist)
better enable employees to bring down the risks of both biases. Congruent systems
position individuals at either end of a prevention-promotion continuum but incongruent
systems prime individuals to flexibly shift between the regulatory states. Shifting
between the regulatory states, in turn, tamps down the risks associated with gravitating
towards either extreme. But I also argued that strong socio-normative forces strain
organizations towards congruent systems that exacerbate vulnerabilities to one bias or
the other.
As I noted at the onset, micro organizational behavior scholars to date have
predominantly focused on reducing conformity biases while slighting the risks of
deviation biases. In this vein, my theoretical framework provides a more balanced
dialectic of the types of risks employees are exposed to in organizations. My framework
23

also contributes to a number of diverse literatures that span the micro-to-macro
continuum—and leads researchers to a number of rewarding areas for future work.
Theoretical Contributions
Systemic incongruity. Organizational psychologists have typically argued that
work environments enhance individual-level performance when they are congruent—or
send consistent signals about what behaviors are encouraged or discouraged. These work
structures include norms, reward schemes, goals, training, and other managerial policies
(Lee et al., 2004). For example, researchers have found that individuals perform better
when their groups’ goal-setting strategies align with the groups’ socio-cultural values
(Erez, 1986), training methods match cultural systems (Earley, 1994), management
practices are consistent with broader cultural syndromes (Newman & Nollen, 1996),
types of goals and feedback match the structure and demands of the task (Saavedra,
Earley, & Van Dyne, 1993), and normative values mesh with rewards in highaccountability organizations (Lee et al., 2004). Additionally, scholars examining the
efficacy of single managerial practices—as opposed to combinations of managerial
practices—have advocated for congruency. For instance, researchers studying goalsetting have found that goal conflict decreases performance (Erez, Gopher, & Arazi,
1990; Locke, Smith, Erez, Chah, & Schaffer, 1994)—and so do hybrid individual and
group reward structures (Quigley, Tesluk, Locke, & Bortol, 2007; Wageman, 1995).
There have been a number of reasons advanced to explain why incongruent
systems that send different cues result in poorer performance. First, incongruity
engenders uncertainty and ambiguity about what is being rewarded or encouraged. Such
uncertainty puts people in a bind (Argyris, 1982), decreasing their motivation to perform
well (Vroom, 1964) and increasing their perception of unfairness (Lind & Tyler, 1988;
Tetlock, 1999). Uncertainty can also induce performance-debilitating levels of tension
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and anxiety (Argyris, 1990; Kahn, Wolfe, Quinn, Snoek, & Rosenthal, 1964; Leiter &
Maslach, 1988). Second, incongruity often places employees in contexts that clash with
their values, which decreases feelings of control and satisfaction (O'Reilly et al., 1991).
Third, incongruity stretches people’s limited cognitive resources. As such, people tend to
focus their attention on only one goal or objective when confronted with inconsistent
signals (Barnes, Hollenbeck, Jundt, DeRue, & Harmon, 2011).
Macro scholars have also argued that congruity—or fit and similarity among
organizational elements and strategy—is beneficial in enhancing performance at the
organizational level of analysis (e.g., Kotter, 1980; Nadler & Tushman, 1980; Quinn &
Hall, 1983). These scholars argue that incongruity can cause significant stresses and
strains in the organization that dampen its ability to meet organizational goals (Roberts,
2004), and sometimes even increases the hazards of organizational mortality (Hannan,
Pólos, & Carroll, 2003).
My model does not necessarily challenge these macro theories; it qualifies them.
If strategic decision makers (i.e., those who make the organizational design decisions)
assess that the environment is particularly punitive towards conformity biases and are
tolerant of incurring the risks of deviation biases, congruent meritocratic-individualist
systems are perhaps the most beneficial. If strategic decision makers assess that the
environment is particularly punitive towards deviation biases and are tolerant of
incurring the risks of conformity biases, congruent egalitarian-collectivist systems are
perhaps the most beneficial. However, to the extent that strategic decision makers
cannot assess which bias the environment is more punitive towards—and are not willing
to tolerate the risks of either bias—incongruent systems now become beneficial.
Incongruity prevents employees from erring too much in one direction or the other.
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But my model does fundamentally challenge the more micro, psychological work
on the debilitating effects of incongruity. Contrary to many micro scholars who argue
that consistency and congruity is beneficial, I argue that incongruity can be beneficial in
the instances noted above at the individual level. In this vein, my model falls in step with
recent macro work on the benefits of inconsistent formal and informal organizational
structures in increasing organizational ambidexterity (e.g., Gulati & Puranam, 2009). Of
course, given the vast research that incongruity can be debilitating for individuals, the
question that now remains is which types of individuals thrive or freeze under
incongruity and which conditions enhance or debilitate the benefits of incongruity. I did
note that the benefits of incongruity are likely to accrue in conditions under which there
exists enough task certainty such that the tradeoff frontier can be pushed out (boundary
conditions). But there certainly may be other considerations, and I return to this issue in
the Future Directions section.
My model also draws closer attention to what constitutes managerial or employee
“performance” in organizational behavior research. Many of the studies I cited, which
advocate the benefits of congruity, adopt a generic conceptualization of task
performance. My model adopts a more specific conceptualization of performance: the
balance of opposing sets of risks. This reconceptualization has the advantages of
capturing an important aspect of performance—balancing opposing risks are a
fundamental problem of organizational life at all levels of analysis (Smith & Lewis, 2011).
Organizational culture and regulatory focus. My model also makes more
specific contributions to the literatures on which it draws: organizational culture and
regulatory focus. In the organizational culture literature, many scholars have noted that
understanding how normative systems develop in organizations is deeply important—
but grossly under-theorized (e.g., Ehrhart & Naumann, 2004; Grant & Patil, 2012; Heath
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& Sitkin, 2001). Whereas researchers have typically focused on the consequences of
norms—e.g., the consequences of collectivist-individualist systems (Chatman & Barsade,
1995) or equality-equity distributive systems (Goncalo & Kim, 2010), my discussion on
how collectivist-individualist systems give rise to egalitarian-meritocratic systems—and
vice versa—provides fresh insights into how cultural elements emerge in organizations
(in congruent ways).
Additionally, most organizational psychologists to date have utilized the
collectivist-individualist dimension to examine cultural differences in organizations (e.g.,
Chatman & Jehn, 1994; Earley & Gibson, 1998; Wagner, 1995). But integration of the
horizontal-vertical dimension has been quite limited. The horizontal-vertical dimension
has been largely restricted to cross-border studies that examine cultural differences at
the national level (e.g., Bhagat, Kedia, Harveston, & Triandis, 2002). This oversight is
unfortunate given the number of critics who have drawn attention to the limits of the
collectivism-individualism construct (Schwartz, 1990)—and the number of scholars who
have drawn attention to the benefits of the horizontal-vertical dimension in enhancing
the precision of the construct (Triandis & Gelfand, 1998).
By importing the horizontal-vertical dimension to explain cultural differences at
the organizational level, I have contributed in two significant ways. First, “camps” of
scholars have emerged with some scholars supporting the organizational benefits of
collectivist systems (e.g., Chatman et al., 1998; Kaplan, Brooks-Shesler, King, & Zaccaro,
2009; Wagner, 1995) and others supporting the organizational benefits of individualist
systems (e.g., Goncalo & Staw, 2006; Kanter, 1988; Sutton, 2002a). Integrating work on
egalitarian and meritocratic systems provides one means of reconciling these arguments.
The downside risks of collectivist systems are likely to be further exacerbated under
egalitarian systems but offset under meritocratic systems. And the downside risks of
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individualist systems are likely to be further exacerbated under meritocratic systems but
offset under egalitarian systems. Second, the integration of the horizontal-vertical
dimension increased the precision by which different types of cultural systems can be
distinguished in organizations. And perhaps most importantly, I have drawn important
theoretical links between these four types of cultural systems and an important puzzle in
organizational life: balancing the risks of conformity and deviation biases.
For research on regulatory focus, my model sheds light on how situational factors
restrict—or enable—employees to shift between prevention and promotion states. Social
psychologists have previously argued that (a) both prevention and promotion regulatory
states have their downside risks, and (b) placing situational constraints on these states
optimizes self-regulation and performance (Higgins, 2011). But we know little about the
types of situational variables that can constrain individuals. Scholer and Higgins (2012:
79) state, “Exploring what factors…within environments make it more or less likely that
the dual strength of the systems can be utilized is an important question that remains to
be explored.” I take a step towards filling this gap by directly examining how different
types of organizational cultural systems trigger different types of regulatory responses.
Identity construction: Optimal distinctiveness. Furthermore, my model
contributes to issues of identity construction in organizations. Researchers argue that
people strive for “optimal distinctiveness”—or aim to construct identities that allow them
to simultaneously express their sense of distinctiveness and sense of assimilation
(Brewer, 1991; Hornsey & Jetten, 2004; Lee & Tiedens, 2001). When people feel that
they are too distinct—or too assimilated—they tend to disengage from the groups in
which they are embedded (Brewer, 1993; Sedikides & Brewer, 2001). But beyond group
engagement, we have a very limited understanding of what organizations can do to
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better enable employees to construct identities that strike a balance between assimilation
and distinctiveness (Grant, 2007: 407).
My model provides new insights in this arena. Collectivist and individualist
systems differ in the extent to which they fulfill needs for assimilation and
distinctiveness, with collectivist systems fulfilling needs for assimilation and
individualist systems, needs for distinctiveness (Brewer & Gardner, 1996). Cultural
emphases on interdependence trigger collective identities in which people’s personal self
is subsumed into a broader collective self, whereas cultural emphases on independence
trigger individual identities that bolster people’s personal self (Gardner, Gabriel, & Lee,
1999). Egalitarian and meritocratic systems fulfill needs for assimilation and
distinctiveness, respectively, in similar ways. Egalitarian systems are generally correlated
with solidarity goals and meritocratic systems, personal goals (Chen, Meindl, & Hui,
1998; Deutsch, 1975; Mannix, Neale, & Northcraft, 1995).
Building on these findings, the framework presented here suggests that
employees are more likely to achieve optimal distinctiveness in egalitarian-individualist
and meritocratic-collectivist systems. These organizational cultures enable employees to
construct identities that neither stray too far in the direction of fitting in—nor stray too
far in the direction of standing out. The framework also broadens the study of the
consequences of achieving optimal distinctiveness. Previous research has focused, for
example, on the consequences of optimal distinctiveness for group membership
(Hornsey & Jetten, 2004) and success of change initiatives (Meyerson & Scully, 1995).
My framework implicitly proposes that optimal distinctiveness can enhance the ability of
individuals to reduce the risks of conformity and deviation biases.
Macro puzzles of balancing exploitation and exploration. Macro
scholars have called for organizational psychologists to examine how individual-level
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decisions can translate into organizational-level outcomes in terms of striking a balance
between exploitation and exploration (e.g., Gibson & Birkinshaw, 2004; Mom, Van Den
Bosch, & Volberda, 2009; Smith & Tushman, 2005). Lavie et al. (2010: 143) state,
“Future research may be needed at the individual…levels to uncover the underlying
processes at different levels of analysis that support the balancing of exploration and
exploitation.” This article answers this call in at least two fundamental ways.
First, it provides a base framework for understanding how work contexts shape
individuals’ abilities to cope with competing pressures to conform or deviate. Successes
or failures in coping with conformity and deviation across individuals can translate into
successes or failures of organizations in coping with fluctuating external environments
(Meyer, 1982; Nelson & Winter, 1982). Specifically, it can translate into determining the
degree to which organizations change too much or too less when attempting to align
themselves with external environment demands (Zajac, Kraatz, & Bresser, 2000).
Employees who exhibit conformity biases are likely to shift their organizations towards
over-exploitation, or under-adaptation. Conformity biases across multiple employees
within an organization dampens an organization’s pursuit of new practices and beliefs
(Levinthal & March, 1993). On the other end, employees who exhibit deviation biases are
likely to shift their organizations towards over-exploration, or over-adaptation.
Deviation biases across multiple employees precludes organizations from stabilizing,
refining, and implementing existing practices and beliefs (March, 1991). Given these
assumptions, my model suggests that over-exploitation is likelier to occur in
organizations with egalitarian-collectivist systems—and over-exploration in
organizations with meritocratic-individualist systems. But organizations with
egalitarian-individualist or meritocratic-collectivist systems are likely to more adeptly
balance exploitation and exploration.
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However, this being said, researchers have argued that strategic decision making
at the individual level does not always have its intended benefits at the organizational
level (e.g., Beer & Eisenstat, 2000; Martin, 2010). In this vein, future research would not
only have to test the links between organization cultural systems and organizational
exploitation-exploration but also examine possible impediments in translating
individual-level behaviors to organizational-level outcomes. My model provides the
theoretical foundations from the micro perspective so that researchers can begin to build
these micro-to-macro links.
Second, some macro scholars have argued that the relationship between
conformity and deviation biases is zero-sum or hydraulic at the individual level. These
scholars argue that due to bounded rationality and experienced goal conflict (Simon,
1947), people can only sequentially allocate their attention to either reducing overtexploitation or reducing overt-exploration (Levinthal & March, 1993). That is, they have
argued that employees who reduce the risks of conformity biases automatically elevate
the risks of deviation biases—and employees who reduce the risks of deviation biases
automatically elevate the risks of conformity biases (Adler et al., 1999; Lavie et al., 2010).
These propositions at the individual-level likely stem from general assumptions that
exploitation-exploration tradeoffs are zero-sum at the organizational-level (however for
a counteragrument, see Farjoun, 2010). Because of this zero-sum relationship,
organizations are thought to be able to balance exploitation and exploration through
separation. For example, researchers have argued that organizations can achieve balance
via three means of separation: organizational (separate work units dedicated to
exploitation or exploration), temporal (sequential shifts between exploitation and
exploration), and domain (exploiting in one domain and exploring in another) (Lavie et
al., 2010).
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I did note that the relationship between conformity and deviation risks at the
individual level may be hydraulic when high degrees of uncertainty lurk in employees’
task environments. My model also implicitly posits that the risks are zero-sum in
egalitarian-collectivist systems (employees tamp down the risks of deviation biases but
are exposed to the risks of conformity biases)—and in meritocratic-individualist systems
(employees tamp down the risks of conformity biases but are exposed to the risks of
deviation biases). But I also challenge the assumption that these risks are always zerosum; the risks are not necessarily zero-sum in the incongruent egalitarian-individualist
and meritocratic-collectivist systems. Drawing from theories on regulatory focus
(Scholer & Higgins, 2012), I predicted that employees would be able to simultaneously
reduce both biases in these incongruent systems, given favorable task conditions. In
essence, my model urges future researchers to examine when and to what degree
employees can push out the conformity-deviation tradeoff function.
Future Directions
My model proposed that collectivist-individualist systems naturally beget their
congruent egalitarian-meritocratic counterparts—and vice versa (Propositions 8 and 9).
These propositions complement recurring themes that organizations tend to exhibit
strong tendencies toward homogenization (e.g., Schneider, Smith, Taylor, & Fleenor,
1998). But these propositions do not account for why some organizations may break out
of the self-reinforcing homogenization forces and embrace more complex strategies that
satisfy competing demands (e.g., Gulati & Puranam, 2009; Wright & Snell, 1998).
Indeed, my examples of kaizen in Toyota and IDEO serve as examples of real-world
egalitarian-individualist and meritocratic-collectivist systems. The major question for
future research concerns how and when incongruity can emerge and be sustained, such
that the benefits of reducing both conformity and deviation biases are reaped.
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For example, given that incongruity can be psychologically harmful and
cognitively depleting (e.g., Lee et al., 2004; O'Reilly et al., 1991), future research may
benefit from examining the sustainability and benefits of “punctuated incongruity”: long
intervals of congruity punctuated by short bursts of incongruity. That is, organizations
may shift to incongruent combinations when both risks are no longer tolerated. As
punctuated incongruity inherently involves internal organizational change, there are at
least three contingencies that may affect the sustainability and benefits of punctuated
incongruity. First, and most basically, organizational change is costly (Nickerson &
Zenger, 2002). There are up-front costs involved in planning the change—and
transitional losses in productivity as the change is implemented (Kanter, 1983). So the
benefits of punctuated incongruity will accrue only to the degree that the benefits
outweigh their costs. Second, some systems may be easier to shift than others.
Organizational theorists have argued that formal work structures (normative social
systems) can be more rapidly changed than informal work structures (emerging patterns
of social interactions) (Gulati & Puranam, 2009). To the extent that egalitarian vs.
meritocratic distributive systems constitute more formal structures—and collectivist vs.
individualist cultural systems, more informal structures—it may be easier for
organizations to shift distributive systems to achieve short intervals of incongruity.
Third, members of an organization are usually more receptive to change initiatives when
the initiatives are seen as legitimate. Perceptions of legitimacy are enhanced when
individuals see change initiatives as instrumental to achieving internalized goals,
conducive to their social identities and self-worth, and consistent with their moral and
ethical values (Tost, 2011).
Future research may also benefit from examining potential sources of resistance
to implementing punctuated incongruity. For instance, the ideologies of strategic
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decision makers may be a source of resistance. Researchers argue that ideologies play a
vital role in simplifying decision-making in stochastic environments (Barley & Kunda,
1992)—and, more relevantly, can have powerful effects on the types of work structures
and practices that strategic decision-makers prefer (Chin, Hambrick, & Trevino, 2013;
Tetlock, 2000; Tetlock, Vieider, Patil, & Grant, 2013). In particular, we may be able to
draw insights by examining political ideologies. Political ideologies are coherent sets of
beliefs about how a collective should be structured (Tetlock et al., 2013).
In general, liberals tend to support structures that emphasize interdependence
and equality (Haidt, 2007) whereas conservatives tend to support structures that
emphasize independence and equity (Jost, Blount, Pfeffer, & Hunyady, 2003; Skitka &
Tetlock, 1992). Therefore, we can expect liberal strategic decision makers to embrace
egalitarian-collectivist systems and conservative decision makers, meritocraticindividualist systems. Furthermore, value-monistic liberals and conservatives are at risk
of falling prey to motivated-reasoning effects (Kunda, 1999; Tetlock, 2005). That is,
liberal and conservative decision makers are unlikely to respond to feedback that their
favored structures are causing adverse effects by overturning their favored structures
(Tetlock et al., 2013). Instead, they are likely to experience moral aversion to shifting to
incongruous structures (Graham, Haidt, & Nosek, 2009), and instead attribute failures
in their favored structures to external factors (Tetlock et al., 2013). Taken together, it is
possible that liberal decision makers are more likely to bolster the self-reinforcing forces
of egalitarian-collectivist systems and conservative decision makers, meritocraticindividualist systems. And their values are likely to prevent them from shifting to periods
of punctuated incongruity, even in the face of feedback that egalitarian-collectivist
systems are exacerbating the risks of conformity biases or meritocratic-individualist
systems are exacerbating the risks of deviation biases.
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However, strategic decision makers who hold more pluralistic ideologies—i.e.,
integratively complex mixes of liberal and conservative beliefs—may be more likely to
break the self-reinforcing cycles and accommodate for periods of incongruity. Research
suggests that people with more value pluralistic ideologies think in more cognitively
complex ways, are self-critical, and more likely to resist motivating-reasoning effects
(Tetlock, 1983b, 1989). Thus, these decision makers may see the value of meshing
egalitarian systems with individualist cultures—or meritocratic systems with collectivist
cultures. Additionally, strategic decision-makers with more value pluralistic ideologies
may be more responsive to feedback that their employees are exhibiting strong
tendencies in one direction or the other—and shift to periods of punctuated incongruity
as necessary.
Finally, future research may benefit from examining the types of individuals who
thrive and who freeze under periods of punctuated incongruity. For instance, individuals
who strongly identify with their organizations—or internalize the organization’s values
such that they become benchmarks for what defines appropriate behaviors (Ashforth &
Mael, 1989)—are likely to be more receptive to changes from congruent to incongruent
systems. Employees who are socially identified with their organizations typically see
their organizational authorities as legitimate (Tyler, 1997), and therefore are less likely to
resist change initiatives that are seen as benefiting the organization. Additionally, based
on previous research, there may be dispositional factors that affect the degree to which
individuals successfully cope with punctuated incongruity. As examples, individuals are
likely to more successful cope when they have high tolerance for ambiguity (experience
less anxiety in coping with contradictory demands, Budner, 1962), openness to
experience (value intellectual curiosity, liberalism, and adventure, McCrae & Costa,
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1985), and integrative complexity (able to reconile contradictory elements, Tetlock,
Armor, & Peterson, 1994).
Practical Implications
My model offers at least three major practical implications. First, my model alerts
practitioners to the types of organizational cultures and structures that may be more
successful in realizing improvements in the current tradeoff function. Needless to say, we
live in an uncertain world. Thus, practitioners who gravitate towards consistently and
continuously implementing egalitarian-collectivist or meritocratic-individualist systems
may be leaving money on the table. These cultural systems allow employees to fall into
the mindset that the best they can do is increase one set of risks in exchange for reducing
the other set of risks. In the event a better tradeoff function exists, this assumption
becomes a self-fulfilling prophecy: employees do not attempt to reach a better tradeoff
function simply because they do not expect to do so.
Second, my model draws practitioners’ attention to the strong socio-normative
forces that reinforce egalitarian-collectivist and meritocratic-individualist systems within
organizations—systems that impede employees from improving tradeoff functions. It is
important that practitioners note these forces and actively search for ways to counteract
them when incongruity is necessary. As I discussed, fundamental values may be causing
resistance to incongruity.
Third, my model informs practitioners that they do not necessarily have to shy
away from placing their employees in contexts that trigger clashing psychological states.
Humans have a remarkable ability to creatively and complexly cope with contradictory
demands. Of course, this statement is more true for some people more so than for others.
But complexly coping with contradictory demands can bring benefits for the
organization. To ensure that these potential benefits are reaped, practitioners may
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benefit by ensuring that incongruity is implemented in short intervals, perceived as
legitimate, and implemented for employees who are particularly likely to thrive under
such conditions. Additionally, practitioners may benefit from deploying resources to help
employees in incongruent structures to develop their cognitive abilities to discern how
and when to shift between regulatory states. As indicated in my model, it is not sufficient
to merely shift between regulatory states. Employees must be equipped with fine-tuned
cognitive abilities to fully realize the benefits that shifting between regulatory states can
have in bringing down the risks of conformity and deviation biases.
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CHAPTER 2
BLENDING ACCOUNTABILITY AND CULTURAL SYSTEMS

Employees often have to decide whether to go with the status quo—or reject it
(Morrison & Phelps, 1999; Nemeth & Staw, 1989; Sutcliffe & McNamara, 2001). The
decision can be costly. Sometimes standard practices and beliefs are flawed and
employees are better off relying on their unique insights (e.g., Burris, 2012; Mainemelis,
2010; Staw & Boettger, 1990). In these situations, conforming to the status quo prevents
employees from flexibly coping with fluctuating task demands (Grant & Ashford, 2008;
Griffin et al., 2007). But sometimes standard practices and beliefs are “wiser” than any
one individual and employees are better off simply conforming (e.g., Bonabeau, 2009;
Dean & Sharfman, 1993; Peterson & Nemeth, 1996). In these situations, searching for
better practices that do not exist can actually decrease the quality and reliability of
decisions (Hackman & Wageman, 1995; March & Simon, 1958).
It is therefore important for scholars to understand the types of work
environments that exacerbate the risks of conformity or deviation biases—or enable
employees to simultaneously reduce both risks. Unfortunately our knowledge in this area
is quite limited. It is limited because for several decades, organizational behavior
researchers have focused on studying work contexts that encourage behaviors such as
proactivity (Parker & Collins, 2010), creativity (Amabile, 1996; Shalley, Zhou, & Oldham,
2004), creative deviance (Mainemelis, 2010), experimentation (Lee et al., 2004), and
individual innovation (Scott & Bruce, 1994). All these behaviors involve reducing
conformity biases (Grant & Ashford, 2008)—and in focusing near-exclusively on
reducing conformity biases, organizational behavior scholars have lost sight of the risks
of deviation biases and the question of how the opposing risks can be balanced in the
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workplace. Consequently, the micro field has fallen behind its more macro counterpart
which has long acknowledged that organizations have to balance the analogous risks of
exploration and exploitation (Farjoun, 2010; Lavie et al., 2010; March, 1991).
To remedy this situation and strengthen our understanding of when and why
individuals err in one direction or the other, I examine the interactive effects of two
prevalent norm-enforcement systems in organizations: organizational culture and
accountability. There are three reasons why I approach the focal question from this
integrative perspective. First, research suggests that organizational culture (O'Reilly &
Chatman, 1996; Schein, 1992b) and accountability systems (Lerner & Tetlock, 1999;
Simonson & Nye, 1992; Tetlock, 1992) greatly shape what and how people in
organizations think. As such, these contexts offer relevant insights into how work worlds
can be engineered to enable people to make better decisions about conforming or
deviating. Second, management scholars have argued that decision making is a
byproduct of social and task functions (Fiedler, 1967; Katz & Kahn, 1978)—and, in this
vein, organizational culture and accountability systems serve critical social and task
functions, respectively (Johns, 2006). Organizational culture serves social functions by
shaping how people relate to one another (Hofstede et al., 1990) whereas accountability
systems serve task functions by enforcing performance standards (Katz & Kahn, 1966).
Third, organizational culture and accountability systems are so intricately intertwined
such that it is difficult to examine their effects on behavior in isolation of one another
(Gelfand, Lim, & Raver, 2004). Consistent with combinational perspectives which state
that a particular context can have certain effects when configured with one context but
an opposite effect when configured with another (Lee et al., 2004; Meyer, Tsui, &
Hinings, 1993), I will demonstrate that different combinations of cultural norms and
accountability systems can have very different effects on behavior.
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Specifically, I show that decision makers fall prey to conformity or deviation
biases when operating in combinations of cultural values and accountability systems that
trigger the same patterns of thought. But decision makers are able to control exposure to
both risks when operating in combinations that trigger clashing patterns of thought.
Overall, this chapter provides fresh insights into the heavily under-researched study of
balancing conformity and deviation risks, offers a way to offset the downside risks of
different types of organizational cultures and accountability systems, and qualifies
prevalent notions that work contexts that prime the same psychological states are
beneficial (cf. Argyris, 1990; Locke et al., 1994; Wageman, 1995).
CULTURAL VALUES AND ACCOUNTABILITY SYSTEMS:
PUSHING TOWARDS AND AWAY FROM CONFORMITY AND DEVIATION
The Risks of Conformity and Deviation Biases
As briefly described above, decision makers who exhibit conformity and deviation
biases can incur large costs for themselves and their organizations. There are at least
three reasons why conformity biases—or tendencies to consistently preserve or maintain
the status quo—can be problematic. First, decision makers confront tasks whose
demands are constantly in flux due to rapid technological advancements, global
economic changes, and evolving consumer tastes. Sometimes it is difficult for established
practices and beliefs to update fast enough to keep pace with these fluctuating task
demands (Burns & Stalker, 1961; Leana & Barry, 2000). As such, employees who
continuously conform to the status quo risk adhering to flawed work process and
methods thereby dampening organizational functioning (Grant & Parker, 2009;
Morrison & Phelps, 1999). Second, decision makers confront tasks that are plagued with
uncertainty: there is low predictability among inputs, processes, and outcomes (Wall,
Cordery, & Clegg, 2002). As such, organizations are limited in their abilities to formalize
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work processes and methods for all possible situations that may arise (Murphy &
Jackson, 1999). Employees who exhibit conformity biases may miss opportunities to
utilize their own intuitions and unique capabilities to effectively cope with a given
situation (Griffin et al., 2007). Third, sometimes established practices and beliefs may be
simply flawed (Staw & Boettger, 1990). Some organizational members have a tendency to
adopt management fads and fashions that are popular but not always useful or effective
(Abrahamson, 1996). Employees who conform to these fads merely cause them to
persist.
But there is also the risk of the less-acknowledged deviation bias—or tendency to
continuously challenge or alter the status quo. Deviation biases can be just as costly. For
one, as argued in emerging “wisdom of the crowd” research, sometimes standard
practices and beliefs are simply more accurate than that which any one individual can
generate (Bonabeau, 2009; Page, 2007; Surowiecki, 2004). Individuals have bounded
cognitive capabilities (Simon, 1957)—and often fall prey to a host of well-documented
cognitive biases that can debilitate decision making (Kahneman, 1973, 2011). As such,
following the beliefs of the crowd can actually increase the reliability, predictability, and
accuracy of decision making—and those who deviate may do so at their own peril
(Sutcliffe & McNamara, 2001). Additionally, standard practices and beliefs can protect
decision makers in uncertain task environments (March & Simon, 1958). Sometimes
standard practices capture all key predictive regularities in the task environment
(Hammond, 1995). And deviating from these practices can result in futile attempts to
explain unexplainable variance (Arkes et al., 1986; Dean & Sharfman, 1996). Finally,
standard practices and beliefs can help organizations meet the demands of the various
stakeholders to whom they are accountable (O'Reilly, 1989; Tyler & Blader, 2005). For
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instance, standard practices can help managers signal to scrutinizers that they are in
compliance with broader socio-political values (Edelman, 1992; McEvoy, 2014).
How can work worlds be designed to enable decision makers to reduce the risks
of conformity and deviation biases? For the reasons noted at the onset of this chapter, I
focus on the interplay of organizational culture and accountability systems.
Organizational Culture and Conformity and Deviation Biases
Organizational culture captures the values and norms that bind people within a
collective, provide them with a lens through which they can interpret their surroundings,
and direct their actions (Schein, 1992a; Trice & Beyer, 1993). Culture shapes—and is
shaped by—how leaders lead (Schein, 2004), group members behave (Chatman &
Barsade, 1995), and employees are socialized (Hofstede et al., 1990). Organizational
psychologists have recognized the collectivism-individualism dimension as a central way
in which organizational cultures can be distinguished (e.g., Chatman & Jehn, 1994;
Earley, 1993; Goncalo & Staw, 2006). The collectivism-individualism dimension was
initially used to explain cultural variance across nations (e.g., Hofstede, 1980; Triandis,
1995). But scholars have noted that cultural frames are malleable: cultural values can be
primed by influential elements of an individual’s immediate situation. As such,
collectivist-individualist cultural patterns do not just exist at the national level
(Brockner, 2003). They can also exist at lower levels including at the level of the
organization or work group (e.g., Chatman & Jehn, 1994; Earley, 1993; Goncalo & Staw,
2006).
Research suggests that the degree to which an organization or work group is
collectivist or individualist can affect the degree to which people tend to conform or
deviate. In general, people in collectivist organizations promote communal goals,
interpersonal harmony, and group achievements (Chatman & Barsade, 1995)—and view
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themselves as inherently interdependent with one another (Gelfand et al., 2007). The
opposite is true for more individualist organizations. People in individualist
organizations promote individual goals, distinctiveness, and personal achievements—
and view themselves as inherently independent from one another (Earley & Gibson,
1998). As such, people in collectivist settings tend to stake more conformist stances so as
to not rock-the-boat and to avoid conflict whereas people in individualist settings tend to
stake more deviant stances to express their unique ideas (Bond & Smith, 1996; Kitayama,
Markus, & Lieberman, 1995). For these reasons, researchers have found that collectivist
groups tend to be less creative than individualist groups: people in collectivist groups
express a less diverse set of ideas and are less tolerant of competing viewpoints (Goncalo
& Staw, 2006).
We should therefore expect employees in collectivist organizations to be more
vulnerable to the risks of conformity biases and employees in individualist organizations
to be more vulnerable to the risks of deviation biases. But this hypothesis rests on the
assumption that culture in organizations works in isolation of other work contexts. I
propose that the effects of organizational culture on conformity and deviation biases can
be offset by the organization’s accountability system.
Offsetting the Effects of Organizational Culture via Accountability Systems
Accountability refers to the ways in which people are expected to justify or defend
their actions and behaviors (Frink & Klimoski, 2004; Tetlock, 1985). One prominent
distinction is between process versus outcome accountability (Patil, Vieider, & Tetlock,
2013; Pitesa & Thau, 2013; Simonson & Staw, 1992). People accountable for processes
are expected to justify and explain their thoughts, strategies, and efforts while making
their final decisions (de Langhe, van Osselaer, & Wierenga, 2011; Siegel-Jacobs & Yates,
1996; Slaughter, Bagger, & Li, 2006). People accountable for outcomes are only expected
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to justify the end quality, accuracy, or consequences of their final decisions (Brtek &
Motowidlo, 2002; Simonson & Staw, 1992). Intelligence agencies can place a greater
emphasis on what analysts considered when making forecasts versus on the accuracy of
their forecasts (Tetlock & Mellers, 2011b), hospitals, on how physicians made their
diagnoses versus on patient recovery rates (Rubin, Pronovost, & Diette, 2001), and
companies, on how salespeople go about making sales versus on final sales figures
(Anderson & Oliver, 1987).
Research suggests that employees cope differently when under process vs.
outcome systems. People accountable for processes do not have the luxury of defending
decisions by pointing to their positive outcomes; they have to ensure that how they go
about making their decisions will be judged as appropriate (Beu & Buckley, 2004). As
such, people accountable for processes tend to refrain from challenging shared practices
and beliefs (Patil et al., 2013; Tetlock, Skitka, & Boettger, 1989). Shared practices and
beliefs reflect widely-held notions about what is appropriate and legitimate (Feldman &
March, 1981; Langley, 1989)—and therefore there is a low risk of losing rewards and
status if employees conform to them (Parker et al., 2010).
By contrast, people accountable for outcomes are incentivized to maximize the
end returns of decisions (Siegel-Jacobs & Yates, 1996). For better or for worse, there is
little incentive to pay attention to how they go about actually delivering the results
(Schweitzer, Ordonez, & Douma, 2004). Standard practices and beliefs are meaningless
to employees under outcome systems to the extent that they do not offer them the means
to maximize outcomes. As such, decision makers accountable for outcomes are likely to
deviate from standard practices in search for better outcomes even when these practices
are appropriate for a given task (Arkes et al., 1986).
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This discussion suggests that individuals are likely to become more vulnerable to
the risks of conformity biases when operating under combinations of collectivist values
and process systems. Using the language of Lewinian force fields in social psychology
(Lewin, 1951), collectivist values and process systems are driving forces that push
individuals in the direction of conformity. But the risks of conformity biases should be
attenuated when process systems are replaced by outcome systems. Here, outcome
accountability serves as a restraining force against the conformity tendencies exhibited
under collectivist cultures. A similar pattern emerges for individualist norms. Individuals
are likely to become more vulnerable to the risks of deviation biases when individualist
values are coupled with outcome systems—both forces push individuals in the direction
of deviation. But the risks of deviation biases should be attenuated when process systems
are embedded in individualist settings instead. Now, process accountability counteracts
the deviation tendencies exhibited under individualist values.
Hypothesis 1: Accountability moderates the effects of cultural values on
vulnerabilities to the risks of conformity or deviation biases such that: (a) the
risks of conformity biases under collectivist values is exacerbated (attenuated)
when they are coupled with process (outcome) systems, and (b) the risks of
deviation biases under individualist values is exacerbated (attenuated) when
they are coupled with outcome (process) systems.
I tested Hypothesis 1 in a laboratory experiment. I chose a laboratory
methodology so I could reduce the post hoc ergo propter hoc fallacy: observers assume
what the right action should have been based on ex-post outcomes (Fischhoff, 1975). In
other words, if a decision maker conforms and returns a negative outcome, observers
tend to conclude that she should have deviated—and if a decision maker deviates and
returns a negative outcome, observers tend to conclude that she should have conformed.
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But we know that in the real world, task environments are stochastic. Stochastic
environments can punish decision makers who make the right decision—or reward
decision makers who make the wrong decision (Mauboussin, 2012). Thus, in hindsight,
we can draw erroneous conclusions about what should have been done (Bertrand &
Mullainathan, 2001). A laboratory methodology reduces this fallacy by enabling me to:
(a) control decision makers’ exposure to the risks of conformity and deviation biases, and
(b) determine ex-ante the extent to which better outcomes can or cannot be achieved
above and beyond what can be achieved via current group practices and beliefs.
STUDY 1: METHODS
Study 1 utilizes a multiple cue probability (MCPL) paradigm (Brunswik, 1943;
Hammond, 1955). The MCPL paradigm is widely used in studies of accountability
(Ashton, 1992; Hagafors & Brehmer, 1983), judgment and decision making (Brehmer,
1973; Mellers, 1980), and learning (Gluck & Bower, 1988; Knowlton, Squire, & Gluck,
1994). In this study, participants predicted the performance of applicants to their
university. The experiment was a 2 (Culture: collectivist vs. individualist) by 2
(Accountability: process vs. outcome) by 2 (Risk exposure: conformity vs. deviation bias)
between-subjects factorial design. Because of the limited research on balancing the risks
of conformity and deviation biases, I adopted a more controlled operationalization of
conformity and deviation as dichotomous and manipulated risk exposure in addition to
culture and accountability. Thus, there were two different experimental conditions: one
in which the correct response is to deviate according to some normative standard and the
other in which the correct response is to conform. I fully acknowledge that in the real
world, decision makers can be exposed to both risks at the same time and can adopt
some blend of conformity and deviation, but to begin establishing the groundwork for
studying conformity and deviation risks, I opted for experimental control.
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Sample, Design, and Procedures
Two hundred and nine students at a private East Coast university participated in
this study (64% female). They were recruited by the university’s behavioral lab in
exchange for $10. Participants were randomly assigned to one of the eight conditions in
which they were led to believe they would be helping their university’s admissions office
predict the performance of applicants to their university. For each applicant, they were
(a) provided ratings on three skill sets (Academic Performance, Extracurricular
Involvement, and Communication Skills), (b) asked to predict the applicant’s
performance, and (c) shown the applicant’s actual performance according to university
records.
Each of the three ratings (or cues) for each applicant were provided on a 9-point
scale, ranging from “very weak” (1) to “very strong” (9). The applicants were presented in
randomized order. Academic Performance and Extracurricular Involvement assumed
one of three values (1, 5, 9) and Communication Skills assumed one of two levels (1, 9).
These three skill sets were combined factorially and repeated three times with different
feedback (or criterion values) on repetitions based on whether participants were exposed
to the risks of conformity or deviation biases. This 3 x 3 x 2 factorial design repeated
three times generated 54 trials. I capped the number of trials at 54 because research
suggests that people’s cognitive performance tends to plateau around 50 trials (see
Hammond & Summers, 1972: 66). Participants made their performance predictions for
each of the 54 applicants on a 9-point scale ranging from “very low performance” (1) to
“very high performance” (9). Figure 2 maps the step-by-step procedures of this study and
the cue-criterion pairing.
Manipulations
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Culture manipulations. Participants were led to believe that they would be
presenting their predictions to two group members who were assigned to them. I
manipulated the culture of these fictitious groups in two steps. First, I told them that
their groups had the same values described in a fictitious Harvard Business Review
article I provided. The HBR article was presented as one in which an eminent
organizational psychologist explained three critical factors that distinguished successful
from unsuccessful groups. In the collectivist conditions, the HBR article, entitled “What
Makes Groups Successful? Loyalty, Cohesion, and Finding Common Ground” argued
that group members should accept norms, cooperate with each other, and protect the
interests of the group. In the individualist conditions, the article, entitled “What Makes
Groups Successful? Independence, Dissent, and Open Expression of the Individual,”
argued that group members should question norms, compete with each other, and
protect their own interests. Figure 3 displays these fictitious HBR articles.
Second, I asked participants to (a) describe three ways in which they could
exhibit the same values as their group members (adapted from Trafimow, Triandis, &
Goto, 1991), and (b) explain why it was important to exhibit each of these attributes
(adapted from Goncalo & Staw, 2006).
I created a three-item scale as part of the manipulation check, with lower
numbers reflecting collectivist norms and higher numbers, individualist norms.
Participants were asked to rate on an 8-point scale (“disagree strongly” to “agree
strongly”) the extent to which they thought their group members believed in (1)
“challenging group norms”; (2) “promoting group harmony” (reverse-coded); (3)
“protecting their own interests” (α = .99).
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Accountability manipulations. The process and outcome accountability
manipulations were consistent with previous studies (e.g., Brtek & Motowidlo, 2002; de
Langhe et al., 2011; Siegel-Jacobs & Yates, 1996; Simonson & Staw, 1992; Slaughter et
al., 2006). All participants were told that their $10 compensation for the study was
contingent on the researchers’ evaluation of their performance and were asked to sign a
consent form granting the researchers permission to interview them at the end of their
task. In the process accountability conditions, participants were told that that the
researchers would evaluate them based on how they went about making their decisions
(i.e., the strategies they used to combine information about applicants to arrive at their
final predictions) rather than on whether their predictions were ultimately accurate. In
the outcome accountability conditions, participants were told that they would be
evaluated only on the accuracy of their predictions rather than on how they went about
their decisions.
I created a four-item scale as part of the accountability manipulation check, with
lower numbers reflecting process accountability and higher numbers, outcome
accountability. Anchors for the 8-point bipolar rating scale were: (1) “I believe I will be
evaluated on the decision making strategies I utilized (and not on the accuracy of the
outcomes)” and “I believe I will be evaluated on the accuracy of our final predictions
(and not on the decision making strategies we utilized)”; (2) “The researchers will ask me
to explain the decision making strategy I used to make my final predictions” and “The
researchers will ask me to explain why my final predictions are right or wrong”; (3) “The
researchers are more concerned with how I made my decisions and the effectiveness of
my decision making strategies” and “The researchers are more concerned with whether
my predictions are ultimately right or wrong”; (4) “Even if my predictions are inaccurate,
I may still be evaluated favorably if I can defend the strategies that I used” and “Even if I
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can defend the strategies I used to make my decisions, I will still be evaluated
unfavorably if my final decisions are ultimately wrong” (α = .98).
Risk exposure manipulations. All participants were told that the decision
rules used by their group in the previous session were 50%, 50%, and 0% for Academic
Performance, Extracurricular Involvement, and Communication Skills, respectively (this
information defined “group practices”). In the conditions that exposed participants to
the risks of conformity biases, the group’s 50-50-0 weighting strategy was inadequate—
and the predictability of the environment was high (multiple correlation between cues
and criterion was .93). The optimal weighting strategy for this cue-criterion
configuration was 30%, 30%, and 40% (which was not disclosed to them). Thus,
participants who used the 50-50-0 strategy would perform worse than those who
deviated and learned the optimal 30-30-40 strategy. “Performance” was measured via
achievement scores, calculation of which will be explained in the next section.
In the conditions that exposed participants to the risks of deviation biases, the
50-50-0 weighting strategy was adequate—and the predictability of the environment was
lower (multiple correlation = .54). In other words, the 50-50-0 strategy allowed decision
makers to perform at the optimal forecasting frontier. No variance could be explained
beyond what this strategy captured. Thus, participants who conformed to the 50-50-0
strategy would perform better than those who deviated.
STUDY 1: RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
To test if the manipulations had the desired effects, I ran a 2 x 2 x 2 multivariate
analysis of variance (MANOVA) on the culture and accountability manipulation checks.
There was a significant effect of the culture manipulation on the cultural norms check, (F
(1, 209) = 17870.54, p < .001). The collectivist conditions differed from the individualist
conditions (M = 1.10 vs. M = 7.74), (t (101) = -134.35, p < .001). There was also a
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significant main effect of the accountability manipulation on the respective check, (F (1,
209) = 1801.98, p < .001). The process accountability conditions differed from the
outcome conditions (M = 1.23 vs. M = 7.28 = 1.34), (t (100) = -38.88, p < .01). No other
effects were significant.
To recap, Hypothesis 1 stated that group culture and accountability would
interact such that (a) combinations of collectivist values and process accountability
would exacerbate the risks of conformity biases but combinations of collectivist norms
and outcome accountability would attenuate the risks, and (b) combinations of
individualist values and outcome accountability would exacerbate the risks of deviation
biases but combinations of individualist norms and process accountability. I tested
Hypothesis 1 in three ways.
First, consistent with most MCPL studies (e.g., Hagafors & Brehmer, 1983), I
calculated participants’ achievement scores using the lens model (Brunswik, 1952). The
achievement score, ra, is the correlation between the subject’s responses and criterion
values. It is calculated as the product of three components: Re, the multiple correlation
between the cues and criterion, Rs, the multiple correlation between the cues and the
participants’ responses, and G, the matching index or the correlations between
predictions of the two models. Table 1 displays the means and standard deviations of
these measures.
I ran a 2 x 2 Accountability by Group Culture factorial ANOVA of achievement
scores for both environments (risk of conformity bias: F (1, 100) = 5.07, p < .05, η2 =
2

.05; risk of deviation bias: F (1, 101) = 4.31, p < .05, η = .04). Figure 4 plots these
interactions. When exposed to the risks of conformity biases, participants in collectivist
values/ process accountability had lower achievement scores than those in collectivist
values/ outcome accountability (M = .60 vs. M = .69), (F (1,100) = 15.73, p < .001).
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When exposed to the risks of deviation biases, participants in individualist values/
outcome accountability had lower achievement scores than those in individualist values/
process accountability (M = .14 vs. M = .23), (F (1,101) = 28.53, p < .001). Outcome
accountability offset the conformist tendencies under collectivist values—and process
accountability offset the deviant tendencies under individualist values.
Second, I looked more closely at the weighting strategies that participants used to
gain deeper insights into the extent to which they were conforming to or deviating from
the group’s 50-50-0 weighting strategy. Figures 5 and 6 show (a) mean predictions of
applicants constructed from the factorial design of Academic Performance (AP; levels 1,
5, 9) by Extracurricular Involvement (EI; levels 1, 5, 9) by Communication Skills (CS;
levels 1, 9), and (b) ideal predictions if participants used the optimal weights (grey lines
with no markers). Figures 5 and 6 refer to the conformity and deviation risk conditions,
respectively. In each panel, predictions are plotted as a function of AP and the slopes of
these lines reflect its weight. Each separate line reflects each level of EI and the spaces
between these lines reflect its weight. Intercept shifts from the left to right of each panel
show the weight of CS.
In Figure 5, we see that participants in collectivist values/ process accountability
overweighted AP (steeper slopes), overweighted EI (larger spaces between the lines), and
assigned minimal weight to CS (no upward shift from left to right) (Panel A). They barely
deviated from the group’s 50-50-0 weighting practice. Participants in the other
conditions were closer to the ideal 30-30-40 weighting strategy (Panels B-D). They
reduced the weight of AP (flatter slopes), reduced the weight of EI (smaller spaces
between the lines), and increased the weight of CS (upward intercept shift). In Figure 6,
we see that participants in individualist values/ outcome accountability underweighted
AP and EI (flatter slopes and smaller spaces) and overweighted CS (upward intercept
52

shifts) (Panel H). This time, these participants were less aligned with the ideal 50-50-0
strategy. All other participants in the remaining three conditions assigned greater weight
to AP and EI (steeper slopes and larger spaces) and minimal weight to CS (no upward
shift in lines) (Panels E-G).
To quantify these observations, I directly calculated participants’ cue-weighting
strategies by (a) regressing the cue structure against each participant’s predictions to
obtain the unstandardized coefficients and (b) converting these coefficients to
percentages by dividing each by the sum of the three. Figure 7 displays the percentages
across conditions with the upper and lower panels corresponding to the exposure to
conformity and deviation risk conditions, respectively. When exposed to the risks of
conformity biases, participants in collectivist values/ process accountability conformed
most closely to the 50-50-0 weighting strategy, giving CS a weight of only 10%. When
exposed to the risks of deviation biases, participants in individualist values/ outcome
accountability incorrectly deviated from the ideal 50-50-0 weighting strategy, giving CS
a weight of about 20%. But across both risk conditions, participants conformed when
appropriate—and deviated when appropriate—in conditions in which the accountability
system offset the risks of the cultural norms
Finally, I examined participants’ learning over the course of the randomized
trials. The trials were first re-sorted in the order the participant received the cuecriterion pairs. I then calculated the absolute difference between each participant’s
prediction and the ideal prediction for each of the 54 trials. Next, I averaged the absolute
differences within each experimental condition and plotted the differences as a function
of trials in Figure 8. The upper panel refers to the risk of conformity bias conditions—
and the lower panel, risk of deviation bias conditions.
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Looking at the upper panel, participants in collectivist values/ process
accountability fell between 1.0 and 1.6 deviations from the ideal. However, when exposed
to the risks of deviation biases (lower panel), participants in individualist values/
outcome accountability wildly fluctuated as they tried to explain unexplainable variance.
Their deviations from the ideal ranged anywhere from .9 to 2.1 points—and they never
quite closed the performance gap compared to the other conditions. But, again, across
both risk conditions, participants learned when to conform and when to deviate in
conditions in which the accountability system offset the risk of cultural values (i.e.,
collectivist values/ outcome accountability, individualist values/ process accountability).
In the upper panel, their deviations fell between .7 and 1.2 (collectivist values/ outcome
accountability) and .7 and 1.3 (individualist values/ process accountability). In the lower
panel, their deviations fell between .6 and 1.5 (collectivist values/ outcome
accountability) and .5 and 1.55 (individualist values/ process accountability).
In sum, analysis of participants’ achievement scores, weighting strategies, and
learning over time fully supported Hypothesis 1. Incongruent blends of accountability
systems offset the risks of cultural values. The risks of conformity biases were
exacerbated in blends of collectivist values and process accountability but the risks were
reduced when individuals operated instead under outcome accountability. On the other
end, the risks of deviation biases were exacerbated in blends of individualist values and
outcome accountability but the risks were dampened under process accountability.
In the next chapter, I will explore the cognitive processes underlying these blends
of cultural values and accountability systems which can explain why these blends have
these reported effects on conformity and deviation. I will also present a second
experiment that replicates Hypothesis 1, corrects for the weaknesses of Study 1, and tests
these additional hypotheses about cognition.
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CHAPTER 3
SHIFTING BETWEEN THE CONCRETE AND ABSTRACT

Research on cultural values (Oyserman & Lee, 2008; Schneider, Ehrhart, &
Macey, 2013) and accountability (Lerner & Tetlock, 1999; Tetlock, 1983a) suggests that
both contexts fundamentally shape what and how individuals think. Cognition,
therefore, may explain why different combinations of cultural and accountability systems
have different effects on employees’ conformity or deviation responses. Construal level
theory in social-cognitive psychology (CLT; Liberman & Trope, 1998; Trope & Liberman,
2003, 2010) offers relevant insights into these types of cognitions.
Construal Level Theory: A Brief Overview
CLT posits that decision makers can focus their attention on the more concrete or
more abstract aspects or elements of their decisions (Trope & Liberman, 2010). Note
that consistent with well-established research on the capacity limits on human attention
and on the amount of information people can process per unit of time (Kahneman,
1973), CLT scholars argue that is probably impossible for humans to focus on both
vantage points at the same time (Trope & Liberman, 2010). When decision makers focus
on the concrete aspects, they fixate on the “nitty-gritty” details—the trees that can only
be seen up close (Liberman, Trope, & Stephan, 2007b). Concrete frames include the
subordinate and incidental features—and component parts—of a decision (Liberman &
Trope, 2008). When decision makers focus on the abstract aspects, they focus on the
“big picture”—the forest that can only be seen from afar (Fiske & Taylor, 1991; Medin &
Smith, 1984). By contrast, abstract frames include the superordinate and central
features—or the primary gist of a decision (Smith & Trope, 2006). For example, Magee,
Milliken, and Lurie (2010) examined people’s reactions to the tragic events of 9/11.
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Concrete processors focused on the details of the victims and the number of emergency
respondents at the scene whereas abstract processors focused on national security,
macro-economic issues, and international relations.
Note that the differences between concrete and abstract processing do not
necessarily reflect differences in vagueness (Bar-Anan, Liberman, & Trope, 2006;
Liberman, Trope, & Stephan, 2007a). The abstract elements of a decision do tend to be
more simplistic and omit incidental, specific, and idiosyncratic details. But they also
contain additional information about the value of an object and its broader relation
among other stimuli (Trope & Liberman, 2010). For instance, when people abstractly
construe a “poodle” as a “mammal,” they place it in the larger context of living things and
thereby implicitly differentiate mammals from other life forms.
Cultural Values, Accountability Systems, and Concrete-Abstract Processing
As I argued in Hypothesis 1, people in collectivist settings are reluctant to “rock
the boat” because they see themselves as interdependent with one another and are
concerned with maintaining harmony (Bond & Smith, 1996; Goncalo & Staw, 2006; Lee
et al., 2000). Not rocking the boat involves a degree of vigilance. People have to carefully
monitor their behaviors to avoid social disapproval and fit in (Lalwani et al., 2009; Van
Baaren et al., 2003). They are also especially sensitive to their duties and obligations
(Cross et al., 2002). For these reasons, researchers have found that people in collectivist
settings tend to adopt prevention-of-losses mindsets: they are inspired by role models
who emphasize avoiding failures (Lockwood et al., 2005) and are more concerned with
minimizing losses than maximizing gains (Hamilton & Biehal, 2005).
Employees are likely to become more vigilant when they are in a collectivist
organization and also accountable for processes. People under process systems do not
have the luxury of defending their decisions by pointing to their positive outcomes; they
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have to ensure how they go about making their decisions will be judged as appropriate.
As such, researchers have argued that people accountable for processes tend to be more
risk averse and concerned with minimizing losses (Eisenhardt, 1985; Lerner & Tetlock,
1999; Pitesa & Thau, 2013). They are motivated to cross all their t’s and dot all their i’s.
Vigilant people in turn tend to process their information worlds more concretely
(Friedman & Förster, 2001; Lee & Higgins, 2009). Concrete processing enables vigilant
people to fulfill their goal of being prevention focused: focusing on the details and microlevel obstacles enables them to eliminate any threats to security and any potential for
losses (Förster & Higgins, 2005). As such, we would expect individuals operating in
blends of collectivist values and process accountability to be particularly focused on the
concrete aspects of their decisions.
The opposite patterns emerge in individualist settings. Because people in
individualist settings see themselves as independent and strive to be distinct, they are
more concerned with self-enhancement goals (Lalwani & Shavitt, 2009). A
preoccupation with self-enhancement goals causes them to be on the prowl for ways to
maximize potential gains (Lalwani et al., 2009). Reflective of promotion-of-gains
mindsets, people in individualist settings are more motivated by success than failure
feedback (Heine et al., 2001) and more sensitive to success-foregone events (not
winning) than failure-avoidance events (not losing) (Lee et al., 2000).
Employees are likely to be even more eager to maximize gains when operating in
an individualist organization that also holds its employees accountable for outcomes.
Outcome accountability can increase the boldness and risk-seeking propensities of
employees (Sitkin, See, Miller, Lawless, & Carton, 2011). For better or for worse,
outcome accountability inherently incentivizes maximization of outcomes (Siegel-Jacobs
& Yates, 1996). For these reasons, some have argued that outcome systems are
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advantageous for increasing innovation—outcome systems fire up employees to explore
the unexplored (Coyne, 1997; Simons, 2005; Tetlock & Mellers, 2011b). Some have also
argued that because outcome accountability increases propensities to take risks, people
under these systems are likelier to engage in behaviors that cross ethical lines (Ordóñez,
Schweitzer, Galinsky, & Bazerman, 2009; Pitesa & Thau, 2013; Schweitzer et al., 2004).
Eager, risk-seeking individuals in turn process their information worlds more
abstractly (Semin et al., 2005). Again, the type of processing aligns with the goals of the
individual. Abstract lenses that focus people on the big picture prevent them from being
bogged down by the details in their pursuit of maximizing gains (Förster & Higgins,
2005). Focusing on the concrete, micro details would only preclude them from achieving
their goals of growth and accomplishment. Based on these arguments, I expect decision
makers operating in blends of individualist values and outcome accountability to be
particularly focused on the abstract aspects of their decisions.
Up to this point, I have only discussed congruent combinations of cultural values
and accountability systems—those that fixate decision makers on either concrete or
abstract vantage points. But things become more complex under the incongruent
combinations: collectivist values / outcome accountability and individualist values /
process accountability. In these combinations, one system pushes decision makers
towards the concrete and the other, towards the abstract.
I introduce the construct, construal shifting, to describe the patterns of thought I
hypothesize will emerge under these incongruent combinations. Construal shifting refers
to the extent to which decision makers iterate between the concrete and abstract. Weak
construal shifters look only at the concrete or the abstract (as I predicted would
respectively occur under collectivist values / process accountability and individualist
values / outcome accountability). But strong construal shifters consider how the micro
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details of a decision fit into the bigger picture—and how the big picture puts the micro
details into context. For example, advertising executives who iterate between the
concrete and abstract see how the concrete details of their advertisements (e.g., the
actors they hire, the colors they use) help them satisfy global consumer demands—and
how satisfying global consumer demands shapes how they should go about
implementing the concrete details of their advertisements.
Note that the concept of construal shifting as I define it does not violate
assumptions about the limited ability of humans to simultaneously fixate on the concrete
and the abstract during a single point in time. As I discussed above, CLT scholars have
argued that it is probably impossible for humans for focus on both vantage points
(Trope & Liberman, 2010). By contrast, I define construal shifting as a cross-time
construct that requires shifting attentional focus—in a disciplined manner—over a
broader span of time.
Hypothesis 2. Accountability moderates the effects of cultural values on
construal shifting such that: (a) construal shifting is stronger (weaker) under
collectivist values when coupled with outcome (process) systems, and (b)
construal shifting is stronger (weaker) under individualist values when coupled
with process (outcome) systems.
Construal Shifting and the Risks of Conformity and Deviation Biases
The degree to which decision makers focus near-exclusively on the concrete or
the abstract can in turn affect their susceptibilities to conformity and deviation biases.
Essentially, weak construal shifters are likely to demonstrate rather monistic preferences
for either conforming or deviating. The more people process their information
concretely, the more they are made aware of potential obstacles (De Dreu,
Giacomantonio, Shalvi, & Sligte, 2009)—and the further risk-averse and vigilant they
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become. Much research suggests that prevention focused managers are especially
sensitive to negative deviations from the status quo (differences between “0” and “-1”)
(Herzenstein et al., 2007; Higgins & Tykocinski, 1992). In other words, they are more
attentive to the costs vs. pros of change—and thus would rather persist with nonnegative,
satisfactory current states than risk shifting from the status quo and incurring losses
(Chernev, 2004; Crowe & Higgins, 1997; Liberman et al., 1999). In general, stability
rather than change is more preferable for the prevention focused employee (Liberman et
al., 1999).
On the other end, the more people process information abstractly, the more eager
and risk-seeking they become. Concrete obstacles become largely inaccessible to people
who process their environments abstractly, so they become more and more obsessed
with maximizing gains (Henderson et al., 2006). Promotion focused individuals are
more sensitive to positive deviations from the status quo (differences between “0” and
“+1”) (Higgins, 2008). They are more attentive to the pros vs. cons of change. For the
promotion focused individual, the upside gains of challenging the status quo loom larger
than the downside risks of doing so (Crowe & Higgins, 1997). Hence, change rather than
stability is more preferable (Liberman et al., 2001).
Because of these single-minded preferences for change vs. stability, I expect that
congruent combinations of collectivist values / process accountability and individualist
values / outcome accountability will increase susceptibilities to conformity or deviation
biases, respectively, because they induce weaker levels of construal shifting.
However, strong construal shifters are in a unique position to wrestle with the
pros and cons of conforming or deviating—and are likely to take a more broad-minded
approach to making the decision. When people iterate between concrete and abstract
modes, the benefits of deviation that are otherwise inaccessible are now accessible. And
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when people shift from abstract to concrete modes, the benefits of conformity that are
otherwise inaccessible are now accessible. Essentially, whereas employees under
congruity are pushed into either zones of conformity or zones of deviation, employees
under incongruity more critically examine the opposing demands that they confront. A
more critical examination enables decision makers to grapple with conformity-deviation
tensions (Denison, Hooijberg, & Quinn, 1995; Lewis, 2000)—and thereby
simultaneously reduce both risks.
My hypothesis that clashing cognitions enhances people’s ability to flexibly cope
with competing demands has parallels to other research streams. For example, people
caught in “accountability cross-fire” more complexly shift between considering the
demands of each party—and exert high cognitive efforts to find an integrative solution
(Green et al., 2000). People who are exposed to foreign cultural environments that clash
with their domestic understandings integratively shift between the foreign and
indigenous cognitive schemas (Leung, Maddux, Galinsky, & Chiu, 2008). Finally, people
who experience conflicting negative and positive emotions (Fong, 2006)—or other
paradoxical cognitive frames (Miron-Spektor et al., 2011b)—flexibly consider competing
elements to resolve the conflict.
Hypothesis 3. Construal shifting mediates the interactive effects of cultural
values and accountability. Congruent combinations of collectivist values /
process accountability and individualist values / outcome accountability
exacerbate the risks of conformity and deviation biases because they trigger
weaker levels of construal shifting. Incongruent combinations of collectivist
values / outcome accountability and individualist values / process
accountability reduce the risks of conformity and deviation biases because they
trigger stronger levels of construal shifting.
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STUDY 2: METHODS
I tested all three hypotheses in a second study. Study 2 differs from Study 1 in two
fundamental ways. First, in addition to replicating Hypothesis 1, Study 2 examines why
incongruent combinations of cultural values and accountability systems enables decision
makers to bring down both risks. Second, Study 2 builds on the strengths but also
corrects for the weaknesses of Study 1. Study 1 presented participants with a series of 54
trials and after each trial they received feedback on their performance. Given the
presence of multiple trials and feedback, it is interesting that people in the congruent
combinations of collectivist values / process accountability and individualist values /
outcome accountability continued to conform or deviate, respectively, even in the face of
negative feedback. But, at the same time, people in the incongruent conditions were also
afforded the opportunity to learn what type of environment they were in over the series
of trials. In real world decision environments, managers are not always afforded such
luxuries—and often are forced to make single judgments. To correct for this limitation of
Study 1, Study 2 measures binary decisions to conform or deviate at single points in time
(with no feedback). Study 2 therefore offers a more conservative test of the proposed
hypotheses.
Sample, Design, and Procedures
Four hundred and one students at a private East Coast university participated in
this study (64% female). They were recruited by the university’s behavioral lab in
exchange for $10. Participants were randomly assigned to one of the eight conditions.
Four respondents were deleted from the study due to “gibberish” open-ended responses
for the construal shifting measure.
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Participants worked on decision making scenarios adapted from J.C. Penney’s
“Fair and Square” case study (Ofek & Avery, 2013). In this case study, former CEO Ron
Johnson fell prey to the risks of both conformity and deviation biases: (a) he deviated
from internal crowds that heavily criticized an initiative that would replace the
traditional practice of regular sales and discounts (“high-to-low” pricing) with an
everyday low pricing (ELP) strategy, and (b) he conformed to internal crowds that
supported the continuation of the ELP initiative despite negative initial results and
continued to invest in ELP. These deviation and conformity decisions, respectively, led to
Johnson being ousted from his position (Surowiecki, 2013). J.C. Penney has now
reversed the controversial “fair and square” strategy (TIME, May 2013).
The decision making scenarios that participants worked on mirrored the
decisions Johnson confronted. But the case was disguised as one that pertained to a local
university bookstore. Participants were led to believe that they would be making a series
of decisions for the bookstore and presenting these decisions to bookstore
representatives during the lab session. To control for familiarity with the outcomes of the
J.C. Penney case, all participants were asked to indicate on a 7-point scale the extent to
which they were familiar with the case (“not very familiar” to “very familiar”). All
analyses control for familiarity.
Manipulations
Culture manipulations. I manipulated group culture by manipulating the
values of the bookstore representatives to whom participants would be presenting their
decisions. There were three steps to the culture manipulation.
In the first step, I told participants that last month, the university bookstore
conducted a survey of their employees asking them to describe the organization’s culture.
In the collectivist conditions, I told them that the top three most frequently appearing
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items were maintaining harmonious relationships, assimilating with others, and
pursuing organizational goals. In the individualist conditions, I told them the top three
items were maintaining independence, being distinct from others, and pursuing personal
goals. In the second step, I asked them to read fictitious HBR articles that were slightly
adapted from Study 1 (see Figure 9). The article was presented as a recently published
one that highlighted how the bookstore’s values were beneficial for organizations. In the
third and final step, I asked them to describe three ways in which they could exhibit the
same attributes/values as the bookstore employees and why they would think it is
important to exhibit these values (Goncalo & Staw, 2006; Trafimow et al., 1991).
They completed a four-item manipulation check, with lower numbers reflecting
collectivist values and higher numbers, individualist. On 8-point bipolar scales, they
rated whether the bookstore representatives to whom they would be presenting their
decisions were more likely to value: (1) Cohesion or Independence; (2) Fitting In or
Standing Out; (3) Harmony or Dissent; (4) Collective Goals or Personal Goals (α = .99).
Accountability manipulations. The process and outcome accountability
manipulations were similar to those in Study 1 and consistent with past research (e.g.,
Brtek & Motowidlo, 2002; de Langhe et al., 2011; Siegel-Jacobs & Yates, 1996; Simonson
& Staw, 1992; Slaughter et al., 2006). Process-accountable participants were told that the
researchers would evaluate them based on how they went about making their decisions
(i.e., their thought processes, rationale, and reasoning) rather than on whether they
ultimately made the “right” or “wrong” decision. Outcome-accountable participants were
told that the researchers would evaluate them based on whether they ultimately made
the right or wrong decision based on decision-making research rather than on their
processes, rationale, and reasoning for making their decisions. All participants were told
that $10 compensation for the study was contingent on the researchers’ evaluation of
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their performance. To up the ante, I also offered eight cash prizes of $100 each for the
highest performers. All participants signed a consent form granting the researchers
permission to interview them at the end of their task.
I created a four-item manipulation check, with lower numbers reflecting process
accountability and higher numbers, outcome accountability. The anchors for the 8-point
rating scale were: (1) “I will be evaluated on the rationale behind my decisions (and not
on the correctness of my decisions)” and “I will be evaluated on the correctness of my
decisions (and not on the rationale behind my decisions)”; (2) “The researchers will ask
me to explain my thought processes in making my decisions” and “The researchers will
ask me to explain why my decisions are the right or wrong ones”; (3) “The researchers
are more concerned with how I went about making my decisions and the rationale for my
decisions” and “The researchers are more concerned with whether my decisions are
ultimately right or wrong”; (4) “Even if my decisions are incorrect, I may still be
evaluated favorably if I can successfully defend the rationale behind my decisions” and
“Even if I can defend the rationale behind my decisions, I will still be evaluated
unfavorably if my final decisions are ultimately incorrect” (α = 1.00).
Risk exposure manipulations. The stimulus materials differed depending on
whether participants were in the conditions that exposed them to the risks of conformity
or deviation biases. Reflective of the real-world decisions made by Johnson, the
materials differed in the time period in which participants were making their decisions.
(All stimulus information was kept as close to possible to that presented in the J.C.
Penney “Fair and Square” case study by Ofek and Avery (2013)).
In the conditions that exposed decision makers to the risks of deviation biases,
participants were told as an introduction:
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“The Drexel Bookstore, which caters to members of the Drexel, UPenn, and larger
Philadelphia communities, once enjoyed many years of steadily growing profits
until 2008. Since then, it has experienced rapid declines and is in desperate need
of a turnaround.”
They were then provided a fictitious graph of the bookstore’s declining net
income from 2008 to 2013 (1st quarter). They were then told that the bookstore is
currently facing three global pressures:
1. Declining customer visits. In-store customer visits to the bookstore have
declined. The UPenn Bookstores are taking away business from the high-end
consumer base. Second-hand specialty and student-operated bookselling
networks are taking away the low-end.
2. Competition from online retailers. Competition is increasing from online
retailing. The popularity of physical (“brick and mortar”) stores is declining. And
the Drexel Bookstore is unable to provide an attractive in-store consumer
experience. Whereas competitors are investing heavily in their e-commerce
operations, Drexel Bookstore’s investment has remained stagnant.
3. Lingering effects of 2008 economic recession. Bookstore consumers are still
feeling the effects of the economic recession. Consumers are increasingly frugal.
Following this, they were informed that there was a proposal on the table that
recommended that the bookstore entirely eliminate the traditional practice of regular
sales and discounts by implementing the following everyday low price (ELP) strategy:
1. Reduce all prices of books and merchandise by an average of 40% to offer
consumers everyday low prices.
2. Remove the words “sale” and “clearance” from any of its promotional
messaging in-store and out-of-store.
3. Replace the manufacturer’s suggested retail price on all book and merchandise
tags (which traditionally also display the sales price) with the everyday low price.
4. Break with the traditional retailing best-practice of ending all prices with .99,
and instead round up all prices to the nearest dollar to end with .00.
Finally, they were told that the majority of managers in the bookstore (including
the representatives to whom they would be presenting their decisions) did not support
implementing the ELP strategy. Thus, participants who chose to deviate from the
majority would be committing a deviation error.
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The conditions that exposed participants to the risks of conformity biases had
similar stimulus materials but they started at a different time. As an introduction, these
participants were told:
“The Drexel Bookstore, which caters to members of the Drexel, UPenn, and larger
Philadelphia communities, once enjoyed many years of steadily growing profits
until 2007. Since then, it has experienced rapid declines and is in desperate need
of a turnaround.”
They were then provided a fictitious graph of the bookstore’s declining net
income from 2007 to 2012. They were then told that the bookstore faced the three global
pressures that were described above. Following this, they were informed that the
bookstore decided to eliminate the traditional practice of regular sales and discounts and
implement the everyday low price (ELP) strategy. The four components of the ELP
strategy described above were provided to them. A point of departure from the
aforementioned conditions, these participants were told that the results of the ELP
strategy since the launch in November 2012 to March 2013 have been lower than
expected. Specifically, they were told that the bookstore incurred significant earnings
loss during the first quarter of 2013 due to plummeting sales revenues (-19%), gross
margin compression (from 40.5% to 37.6%), and decreasing customer conversion.
Finally, they were told that the majority of managers in the bookstore (including
the representatives to whom they would be presenting their decisions) did support
continuing the ELP strategy. Thus, participants who chose to conform to the majority
would be committing a conformity error.
Measures
Binary continue/implement decisions. In the conditions that exposed
participants to the risks of conformity biases, participants had to decide whether to
continue each of the four components of the ELP strategy. In the conditions that exposed
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participants to the risks of deviation biases, participants had to decide whether to
implement each of the four components. The choices were binary Yes vs. No. For each
participant, I tallied up the number of “Yes’s” across the four components.
Monetary allocation decisions. Participants also had to allocate a $500,000
bookstore budget towards continuing the ELP strategy vs. abandoning the ELP strategy
in the exposure to conformity risks conditions—or implementing the ELP strategy vs.
seeking out alternative proposals in the exposure to deviation risks conditions.
Construal shifting. After they made their decisions, participants were asked to
write down all their thoughts and reasoning while making their decisions. They were
given the prompt, “What came to mind? What did you consider? What did you think
about?”—and instructed to be as comprehensive and thorough as possible. Three coders
who were blind to the conditions were trained to rate the randomly-sorted open-ended
responses.
Construal shifting was rated on a 5-point scale provided in Table 2. A rating of 1
captured an exclusive concrete or abstract focus; a rating of 3, a focus shift from
concrete-to-abstract or abstract-to-concrete; and a rating of 5, a full iterative shift from
concrete-to-abstract and abstract-to-concrete. Ratings of 2 and 4 represent transitional
levels between these milestones. Specifically, a rating of 2 reflected a weak concrete-toabstract or abstract-to-concrete linkage, and a rating of 4 reflected a weak link in the full
iteration between the concrete and abstract. Note that similar to related constructs on
cognitive thought (e.g., see integrative complexity, Baker-Brown et al., 1992) coders were
specifically trained to focus on the conceptual structure of the participants’ reasoning
rather than on their subjective evaluation of the content of the participants’ response
(i.e., the rightness or wrongness of the responses).
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Of course, what constitutes “concrete” and “abstract” depends on the particular
decision context (Magee et al., 2010). For this decision context, the concrete micro
details were defined as the four specific components of the ELP strategy and the abstract
elements were defined as the global, environmental issues that the bookstore was facing
(declining customer visits, competition from online retailers, lingering effects of 2008
economic recession). This demarcation satisfies the subordination criterion for
distinguishing the concrete and abstract that is discussed in CLT research. The
subordination criterion suggests that the meaning of low-level, concrete aspects of a
decision depends more on high-level, abstract representations than vice versa (Burgoon,
Henderson, & Markman, 2013; Liberman et al., 2007b). In this study, the efficacy of the
ELP strategy is contingent on the environmental issues confronting the bookstore—and
is only one strategy out of many that can help to exacerbate or solve these issues. By
contrast, broad environmental issues are stable characteristics of the competitive space
in which the bookstore operates.
Figure 10 contains a schematic map of the coding scheme that was provided to
the coders during training sessions. Participants who focused only on the pros and cons
of the ELP strategy (e.g., whether prices should end in .99 or .00)—or on the global
issues of the bookstore (e.g., competition from online retailers)—received scores closer to
1. Participants who thought about how the ELP strategy helped or prevented the
bookstore from addressing the global issues—and provided concrete details on what the
bookstore could do to address the global issues—received scores closer to 5.
Reliability (ICC2 = .90, p < .001) and agreement (AD = .35) among the three
coders were high (LeBreton & Senter, 2008). As such, I averaged ratings into a single
construal shifting scale. Table 3 contains examples of participant responses for each level
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of the scale. Bold text in parentheses indicates key points in the conceptual structure of
the responses.
STUDY 2: RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
Table 4 shows means and standard deviations of the manipulation checks and
dependent variable measures by experimental condition. A 2 x 2 x 2 MANOVA revealed a
significant effect of the culture manipulation on the culture scale (F (1, 401) = 29611.14, p
< .001) and a significant effect of the accountability manipulation on the accountability
scale (F (1, 401) = 29267.63, p < .001). The collectivist conditions differed from the
individualist conditions (M = 1.08 vs. M = 7.78), (t (198) = -170.56, p < .001). The
process accountability conditions also differed from the outcome accountability
conditions (M = 1.06 vs. M = 7.90), (t (199) = -174.33, p < .001). No other effects were
significant. Thus, the manipulations had the desired effects.
To retest Hypothesis 1, the interactive effects of group culture and accountability
on conformity and deviation biases, I ran a 2 x 2 Culture by Accountability ANCOVA1 on
two scales: (a) the scale of binary decisions, calculated as the number of elements in the
ELP strategy that the participant marked as “Yes” to continue or implement (higher
numbers reflect greater support for continuing or implementing the ELP strategy), and
(b) the scale of investment decisions to continue or implement the ELP strategy. Figures
11 and 12 display plots of these analyses, respectively.

1

All analyses controlled for familiarity. Familiarity had a significant effect on the binary decision and
investment scales in the exposure to conformity risks conditions (b = -.10, s.e. = .04, β = -.19, t = -2.70, p <
.01; b = -14275.15, s.e. = 6003.45, β = -.17, t = -2.38, p < .05). But familiarity had only a marginally
significant effect on the binary decision scale and no significant effect on the investment scales in the
exposure to deviation risks condition (b = -.09, s.e. = .05, β = -.13, t = -1.84, p < .10; b = -8838.12, s.e. =
6799.46, β = -.09, t = -1.30, p > .10). A 2 x 2 Culture by Accountability ANOVA without familiarity as a
control yields a significant interaction for the binary scale (F(1, 197) = 5.34, p < .05) and investment scale
(F(1, 197) = 4.43, p < .05) in the risks of conformity bias conditions—and significant interaction for the
binary scale (F(1, 196) = 13.21, p < .001) and investment scale (F(1, 196) = 10.70, p = .001) in the risks of
deviation bias conditions.
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The ANCOVA on the binary decision scale revealed significant interaction effects
for both risk-exposure conditions (exposure to conformity risk: F (1, 201) = 4.75, p < .05,

η2 = .02; exposure to deviation risk: F (1, 200) = 12.10, p < .01, η2 = .06). When exposed
to the risks of conformity biases, participants in the congruent combination of collectivist
values / process accountability supported continuing more elements of the ELP strategy
than those in the incongruent combination of collectivist values / outcome accountability
(M = 2.10 vs. M = 1.44), (F(1, 197) = 10.06, p < .01). When exposed to the risks of
deviation biases, participants in the congruent combination of individualist values /
outcome accountability supported implementing more ELP elements than those in the
incongruent combination of individualist values / process accountability (M = 2.64 vs. M
= 1.80), (F(1, 196) = 12.36, p = .001).
Similar interactive patterns emerged in the ANCOVAs for the investment scale
2

(exposure to conformity risk: F (1, 201) = 4.27, p < .05, η = .02; exposure to deviation
2

risk: F (1, 200) = 9.97, p < .01, η = .05). When exposed to the risks of conformity biases,
participants in the congruent combination of collectivist values / process accountability
invested more in continuing the ELP strategy than those in the incongruent combination
of collectivist values / outcome accountability (M = $311,500 vs. M = $185,400),
(F(1,197)=16.4, p < .001). When exposed to the risks of deviation biases, participants in
the congruent combination of individualist values / outcome accountability invested
more in implementing the ELP strategy than those in the incongruent combination of
individualist values / process accountability (M=$362,800 vs. M=$235,460), (F(1,196) =
14.44, p < .001).
Hypothesis 1 was thus fully supported and replicated: accountability moderated
the effects of cultural values such that decision makers in the incongruent combinations
reduced the risks of both conformity and deviation biases.
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Hypotheses 2 and 3 proposed that the reasons why these culture by
accountability patterns emerge was that incongruity enhances construal shifting
(Hypothesis 2)—and construal shifting in turn enables people to reduce both risks
(Hypothesis 3).
To test Hypothesis 2, I ran a 2 x 2 Culture by Accountability ANCOVA on
construal shifting across both risk conditions. Figure 13 displays this plot. There was a
significant interaction effect, (F (1, 396) = 16.02, p < .01, η2 = .04). Participants in the
incongruent combination of individualist values / process accountability did engage in
higher levels of construal shifting than did those in the congruent combination of
individualist values / outcome accountability (M=2.10 vs. M=1.51), (F(1, 397) = 21.21, p
< .001). But participants in the incongruent combination of collectivist values / outcome
accountability did not engage in higher levels of construal shifting than did those in the
congruent combination of collectivist values / process accountability (M=1.76 vs.
M=1.61), (F(1, 397) = 1.33, p > .05). Hypothesis 2 was thus partially supported.
Finally, to test Hypothesis 3 (the full mediated-moderation model), I first
regressed construal shifting against the two dependent variables. In the exposure to the
risks of conformity biases conditions, construal shifting was a significant predictor of
binary decisions (b = -.67, s.e. = .08, β = -.52, t = -8.76, p < .001) and investment
decisions (b = -75129.28, s.e. = 13105.85, β = -.37, t = -5.73, p < .001). In the exposure to
the risks of deviation biases conditions, construal shifting was also significantly related
to the binary decision (b = -.46, s.e. = .09, β = -.36, t = -5.38, p < .001) and investment
scale (b = -65412.78, s.e. = 12167.29, β = -.36, t = -5.38, p < .001). All coefficients were
negative such that higher levels of construal shifting predicted a lower likelihood of
continuing/ launching the ELP initiative.
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Second, I examined the direct interactive effects of culture and accountability on
the dependent variables, controlling for construal shifting. In the exposure to conformity
risks conditions, the effects dropped to nonsignificance for each of the dependent
variables: binary decision scale (F (1, 195) = 1.69, p > .10, η2 = .00) and investment scale
(F (1, 195) = 1.96, p > .10, η2 = .01). In the exposure to deviation risk conditions, the
effects decreased but did not drop to nonsignificance for the binary decision scale (F (1,
194) = 5.34, p = .02, η2 = .03) and the investment scale (F (1, 194) = 3.99, p = .05, η2 =
.02). This suggests partial mediation.
Third, I calculated the indirect effect of the product of culture and accountability
on susceptibilities to the risks of conformity and deviation biases through construal
shifting. The effect was evaluated using a 95% confidence interval based on 5,000
bootstrap samples (using the PROCESS method, Hayes, 2013). The effect is significant if
the interval excludes zero (Edwards & Lambert, 2007). The effects were significant in the
conformity risks conditions: (a) binary decision scale (effect: .31, [.03, .60]); (b)
investment scale (effect: 32864.63, [1501.56, 64628.79]). The same was true for the
deviation risks conditions: (c) binary decision scale (effect: .42, [.17, .71]); (d) investment
scale (effect: 58071.25, [23498.34, 100276.34]). Hypothesis 3 was thus predominantly
supported. Incongruent combinations of cultural values and accountability systems
enabled decision makers to bring down the risks of both conformity and deviation biases
because they encouraged higher levels of construal shifting. The advantages of
incongruity were particularly apparent for the combination of individualist values /
process accountability.
GENERAL DISCUSSION
As I argued, organizational behavior scholars to date have focused nearexclusively on reducing the risks of conformity biases—but they have slighted the
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opposing risks of deviation biases. This oversight has left us with a grossly limited
understanding of how work contexts can be engineered to simultaneously reduce both
risks. My studies take a step towards filling this gap. Using a methodology that enabled
me to tightly control decision makers’ exposure to risks (while also constructing settings
with high degrees of psychological realism), I demonstrated how and why different types
of work contexts lead to different types of coping responses. I approached my research
question from an integrative organizational culture-accountability lens—and in so doing,
I offer a number theoretical contributions and open doors for a number of directions for
future research.
Theoretical Contributions
My studies make at least five distinct contributions. First, they qualify work on
the disadvantages of structural incongruity. Scholars across a variety of research
domains have championed the benefits of congruity—work contexts that send consistent
signals to employees about what behaviors are or are not appropriate. For example,
researchers have found that performance is enhanced when goal structures (e.g., group
vs. individual) match task structures (e.g., reciprocal vs. pool) (Saavedra et al., 1993),
goal structures (e.g., assigned, representative, or group) match socio-cultural structures
(Erez, 1986), value structures match reward structures when evaluative pressures are
high (Lee et al., 2004), and management cultural practices match national cultures
(Newman & Nollen, 1996). Scholars have also championed the benefits of congruity
within structures—e.g., conflicting goals (Locke et al., 1994) and hybrid incentives
(Quigley et al., 2007; Wageman, 1995) tend to debilitate performance. Researchers
studying the more macro, systems level of analysis have also argued that congruence
among organizational structures enhances performance (e.g., Cameron & Freeman, 1991;
Doty, Glick, & Huber, 1993; MacDuffie, 1995; Nadler & Tushman, 1980).
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These scholars have advanced a number of reasons explaining the benefits of
congruity. For one, due to cognitive limitations, people tend to focus on what is
encouraged or incentivized under one context at the expense of what is encouraged or
incentivized under the other (Barnes et al., 2011). Additionally, people tend to hold
consistent bundles of values, and incongruity inherently places them in value-conflicting
situations, causing lower satisfaction (O'Reilly et al., 1991). Finally, people can deem
incongruity to be procedurally unjust as it sends mixed signals about what is being
rewarded; and, procedural injustice can ignite defiance (Tetlock, 1999; Tyler, 1990).
These studies challenge these findings by highlighting the benefits of incongruity
in encouraging decision makers to shift into high-cognitive gear and cope with
competing demands. However, note that given the evidence of the debilitating effects of
incongruity, I do not attempt to make a broad-sweeping statement that incongruity is
unconditionally beneficial. I concur that incongruity has the potential to send employees
over the optimal stress point on the Yerkes-Dodson arousal performance curve (Yerkes &
Dodson, 1908). Coping with incongruity is not pleasant. My position instead is more
nuanced. When employees are at especially high risk of exhibiting conformity biases, it
may be advantageous to offset the risks by enacting individualist norms and outcome
systems. When employees are at especially high risk of exhibiting deviation biases, it
may be advantageous to offset the risks by enacting collectivist norms and process
systems. However, to the extent that organizational administrators cannot accurately
assess the types of risks to which their employees are exposed, incongruent combinations
of cultural norms and accountability systems may be able to shield employees.
Note that between the two incongruent conditions, I found that the combination
of individualist values / process accountability generated higher levels of construal
shifting. There are at least two reasons why the incongruent combination of collectivist
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values / outcome accountability did not trigger higher levels of construal shifting. First,
perhaps because I was working with a sample in the U.S., a more individualistic nation
(Markus & Kitayama, 1991), my collectivist manipulation was not strong enough to
produce the appropriate level of cognitive conflict. But, second, past research also gives
some clues. Researchers have found that relative to outcome systems, process systems
tend to prime more complex cognitions (e.g., Brtek & Motowidlo, 2002; De Dreu,
Beersma, Stroebe, & Euwema, 2006; Scholten, van Knippenberg, Nijstad, & De Dreu,
2007). Process systems inherently signal to decision makers that the “answer” lies in
how they think whereas outcome systems merely tell them to hit “home runs” (SiegelJacobs & Yates, 1996). In support of these notions, I did find that between the two
incongruent conditions, combinations of individualist values / process accountability
trigger more complex cognitions than did combinations of collectivist values / outcome
accountability. But I did also unveil an influential moderator of previous research that
suggests a link between process systems and complexity of thought: process systems
increase complexity of thought only when embedded in individualist values but not
collectivist values. Future research is needed to tease apart these two incongruent
conditions further, but this current research suggests that of the two incongruent
conditions, combinations of individualist values and process accountability may be more
beneficial in balancing opposing risks.
Second, these studies challenge the notion that the relationship between
conformity and deviation risks is hydraulic: when people reduce the risks of conformity
biases, they increase susceptibilities to the risks of deviation biases, and vice versa
(Levinthal & March, 1993). In other words, some scholars have argued that managers
can do no better than shift error-aversion priorities along a conformity-deviation
tradeoff curve (Adler et al., 1999; Lavie et al., 2010). My studies directly challenge these
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assertions by demonstrating the human capacity to simultaneously reduce both risks. As
I will further elaborate below, these findings spawn new research questions about the
boundary conditions under which incongruity does or does not reduce both risks. It also
answers fervent calls from macro scholars who study how organizations strike a balance
between exploitation (the use and development of current routines and capabilities) and
exploration (the search for new routines and capabilities) (Lavie et al., 2010; March,
1991). These scholars have called for organizational psychologists to examine how
individuals manage analogous tradeoffs so they can build stronger links between the
micro and macro levels (e.g., Gupta, Smith, & Shalley, 2006; Mom et al., 2009; Raisch,
Birkinshaw, Probst, & Tushman, 2009). This article lays the foundations on which these
micro-to-macro connections can be built.
Third, these studies help reconcile competing camps in both the organizational
culture and accountability literatures. In the organizational culture literature,
proponents of collectivist cultures (e.g., Chatman et al., 1998; Kaplan et al., 2009;
Wagner, 1995) are pitted against proponents of individualist cultures (e.g., Bond &
Smith, 1996; Kanter, 1988; Sutton, 2002b). Proponents of collectivist cultures point to
the benefits of increasing collaboration and interpersonal helping (Moorman & Blakely,
1995) whereas proponents of individualist cultures point to the benefits of increasing
creative thinking (Goncalo & Staw, 2006). There have also been disagreements about the
pros and cons of process versus outcome accountability (Patil et al., 2013; Tetlock et al.,
2013). Proponents of process accountability claim these systems reduce decision-making
stress, thereby enhancing cognitive functioning (e.g., Brtek & Motowidlo, 2002; De Dreu
et al., 2006; Schoemaker, 2011; Siegel-Jacobs & Yates, 1996). Proponents of outcome
accountability claim these systems promote discovery and innovation (Coyne, 1997;
Simons, 2005; Tetlock & Mellers, 2011b)—and that process systems frequently
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degenerate into bureaucratic ritualism (Cardinal, 2001; Meyer & Scott, 1983; Pfeffer,
1981a).
This article offers points of reconciliation for both camps in both literatures. I
demonstrate that the downside risks of organizational cultures and accountability
systems are accentuated when each are coupled with their congruent other—but
attenuated when coupled with the incongruent other. Collectivist values and process
systems send employees down conformist paths. Individualist norms and outcome
systems send employees down deviant paths. But mismatched combinations better
enable employees to cope with these competing demands.
Fourth, these studies advance the study of accountability in the field of
organizational behavior. Thus far, accountability research has primarily remained in the
domain of judgment and decision-making (Lerner & Tetlock, 1999). Since Tetlock’s
(1985) seminal article on accountability, researchers have predominantly focused on how
different types of accountability systems affect decision making (Fandt & Ferris, 1990;
Gordon & Stuecher, 1992; Simonson & Nye, 1992). But little attention has been given to
how accountability interacts with other organizational attributes to shape cognition.
Using the terminology of Heath and Sitkin (2001), accountability researchers have
predominantly adopted a “Contextualized-B” approach: they have identified a single
social context to explain individual behaviors.
A downside of “Contextualized-B” approaches is that researchers do not tap into
the unique phenomenon of organizing—or, the dynamism involved with aligning goals
and coordinating action. These studies help correct this gap by taking a more “Big-O”
approach to the study of accountability,. My studies propose that accountability systems
constitute a norm-enforcement mechanism within a broader cultural value system—and
I shed light on how two norm-enforcement systems dynamically interact to affect
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behaviors important to organizational survival. This “Big-O” approach thus expands the
applicability of accountability to organizational behavior research—and increases the
validity of drawing conclusions about its effects in organizational life.
Fifth, these studies make fundamental contributions to CLT in two ways. For one,
construal level theorists have called for studies on the contextual antecedents of
concrete-abstract processing modes (Trope & Liberman, 2003, 2010). My examination
of the roles of organizational culture and accountability heeds this call. But, perhaps even
more importantly, construal level theorists have empirically examined the effects of
adopting either a concrete or an abstract focus (Liberman et al., 2007b). They have not
acknowledged the capacity of humans to engage in construal shifting—and blend the
concrete and abstract. My conceptualization and empirical test of construal shifting
demonstrates that the capacity of construal shifting indeed exists—and that construal
shifting can tamp down the risks of exclusively focusing on either processing mode. It
thereby encourages CLT scholars to move beyond merely delineating the pros and cons
of exclusive concrete and abstract processing (the record of which is already quite
extensive), and towards examining whether and to what extent people can shift between
the two processing modes.
Future Directions
I identify three avenues for future research. First, future researchers could pursue
alternative perspectives to examining the conditions under which employees can better
balance the risks of conformity and deviation biases. In this article, I adopted a cognitive
perspective, examining how organizational cultures and accountability systems shape
ways of thinking. But this is only one perspective. Alternatively, future researchers can
adopt a motivational perspective. For example, optimal distinctiveness theorists posit
that people have simultaneous, albeit competing, needs to fit in and stand out (Brewer,
79

1991; Hornsey & Jetten, 2004). When employees feel that they are too assimilated in
their organizations, they may regain a sense of distinctiveness by excessively deviating.
When employees feel that they are too distinct from others, they may regain a sense of
similarity by excessively conforming. But when employees’ needs to fit in and stand out
are balanced, employees may be less motivated to move towards either extreme. A
motivational perspective will greatly complement the cognitive perspective presented
here by providing deeper insights about the conformity-deviation dialectic in
organizations and enhancing the generalizability of the findings in this article.
A motivational perspective may also shed light on the additional mechanisms
that are at play in my model. To recap, construal shifting only partially mediated the
interactive effects of organizational culture and accountability when participants were
exposed to the risks of deviation biases. The partial mediation suggests that other noncognitive variables could be influencing people’s decisions. One variable is perceptions of
interdependence-independence from people’s group members (Singelis, 1994)—or even
level of cooperation-competition with them (Grant & Dweck, 2003). In addition to
shifting between the concrete and abstract, people may feel a sense of both
interdependence and independence—and cooperation and competition—with their group
members that enables them to bring down the risks of conformity and deviation biases.
Second, future researchers could examine the boundary conditions of the link
between construal shifting and the reduction of both risks. My studies assumed that: (a)
decision makers sufficiently understood how to blend the concrete and abstract elements
of the decision such that they would arrive at the final decision to discontinue or not
invest in the ELP strategy, and (b) decision makers were operating at a high level of task
certainty. Future research should examine the extent to which people can develop and
fine-tune their abilities to accurately shift between the concrete and abstract across
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different types of decisions, across time, and across different levels of task predictability.
And they should examine the extent to which these abilities strengthen or dampen the
potential for employees to simultaneously bring down both risks.
Finally, given the studies that highlight the benefits of congruity vs. incongruity,
it would be helpful to begin drawing contingency models on when one is better than the
other. For example, dispositional variables may affect when one is better. Some may
thrive while others may freeze under incongruity. People who are integratively complex,
or more effective at linking different perspectives (Tetlock, Peterson, & Berry, 1993), may
better tolerate and cope with incongruity that those who are less so. The same may also
be true for those low in need for cognitive closure, or those who are motivated to
thoroughly process information (Kruglanski & Webster, 1996). Examining these
dispositional factors can help reconcile previous work on incongruity with my findings.
Practical Implications
These studies inform practitioners of the ways in which cultural values and
accountability systems can be engineered to appropriately manage the risks involved
with conformity-deviation decisions. I found that combinations of individualist values
and process systems resulted in the most complex cognitions. To reiterate, I advocate
incongruity only to the extent that practitioners are unable to assess the risks to which
their employees are exposed at any given point in time and cannot tolerate either set of
risks. When managers assess that the environment especially punishes conformity biases
and can absorb the risks of deviation biases, they can shift to congruent combinations of
individualist values and outcome systems. When managers assess that the environment
especially punishes deviation biases and can absorb the risks of conformity biases, they
can shift to congruent combinations of collectivist values and process systems. But once
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these assessments are unreliable and/or managers can no longer tolerate either risk,
incongruity can serve as a protective shield.
Furthermore, my studies draw attention to a type of thought process—construal
shifting—which has been largely unacknowledged in management research. Given the
advantages of construal shifting demonstrated in this paper, practitioners may benefit
from paying closer attention to how their employees shift between zooming into the
small details and zooming out to see the big picture.
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CHAPTER 4
BIASES IN EVALUATING CONFORMITY AND DEVIATION BIASES

In Chapters 1-3, I approached my core research question—how can work settings
be engineered to enable decisions makers to bring down the risks of conformity and
deviation biases—from the perspective of the employee. That is, I examined how
incongruity provided employees with the flexibility to decide when to conform and when
to deviate whereas congruity pushed employees to one of the response paths. This
examination suggested that conformity and deviation biases would persist in
organizations with congruent combinations of organizational cultures and accountability
systems. However, another way that congruity could exacerbate these risks is by
encouraging the managers of employees to tolerate (and even reward) those who exhibit
these biases. The risks of conformity and deviation biases can be simultaneously reduced
only if managers equally penalize both biases—or demonstrate no discernible preference
for either. And different combinations of organizational culture and accountability
systems can fundamentally shape these managerial preferences.
As I discussed in the previous chapters, managers in collectivist organizations
value harmony, interdependence, and not standing out (Goncalo & Staw, 2006). As such,
they are likely to actually be favorable to employees who exhibit conformity biases (as
conformity facilitates harmony)—and be particularly unfavorable to those who exhibit
deviation biases (which deters harmony) (Kim & Markus, 1999). These patterns are
likely to emerge especially when collectivist values are coupled with process systems.
Process systems inherently hold people accountable for their behaviors (Oliver &
Anderson, 1994). Managers are likely to favorably react to employees who conform to
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standard practices when they are operating in process systems—they should see
conformity as behaviors intended to benefit the organization and deviation. But
deviation should be seen as a harmful violation of behavioral standards.
By contrast, managers in individualist organizations value distinctiveness,
independence, and standing out (Chatman & Barsade, 1995). As such, they are likely to
tolerate employees who exhibit deviation biases (deviation signals willingness to be
unique) than employees who exhibit conformity biases (conformity signals lack of
uniqueness). And these effects are likely to be further exacerbated when individualist
norms are coupled with outcome systems. Outcome systems inherently encourage
employees to be innovative and go beyond standard practices to maximize outcomes
(Patil et al., 2013; Tetlock & Mellers, 2011b; Tetlock et al., 2013). For this reason, some
real-world executives such as that of 3M advocate outcome systems to unleash creativity
(Coyne, 1997). Under these systems, managers should thus see deviation as beneficial
(deviation indicates a willingness to be creative to increase outcomes) and conformity as
harmful (it indicates an unwillingness to be creative) for the organization.
But we should witness no discernible preferences or tolerances for either bias in
the incongruent combinations of organizational culture and accountability systems:
collectivist culture / outcome accountability and individualist culture / process
accountability. In conditions of incongruity, one system primes conformity values and
the other, deviation values. As such, managers under incongruity should hold more value
pluralistic rather than value monistic preferences (Tetlock, 1986; Tetlock, Peterson, &
Lerner, 1996)—and see both conflicting values as equally important.
Based on these arguments, I hypothesize:
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Hypothesis 1: Managers in congruent combinations of collectivist values /
process accountability would rate employees more favorably when they exhibit
conformity rather than deviation biases, and (b) managers in congruent
combinations of individualist values / outcome accountability would rate
employees more favorably when they exhibit deviation rather than conformity
biases.
STUDY 3: METHODS
Sample, Design, and Procedures
To test these two hypotheses, I surveyed a range of working managers from a
number of organizations using a scenario study. The study was a 2 (collectivist vs.
individualist organization) x 2 (process vs. outcome accountability) x 2 (conformity vs.
deviation bias) mixed factorial design. Organizational culture and accountability were
between-subjects and employee bias was within-subjects. Participants were randomly
assigned to one of the four conditions.
One hundred and fifty-seven managers (62% male) were recruited through
Amazon’s Mechanical Turk, an online subject pool representative of the U.S. population
(Buhrmester, Kwang, & Gosling, 2011). In order to participate in the study, they had to
be employed in the U.S. and manage or supervise at least one subordinate or employee at
their current place of employment. Participants on average managed 11 employees
(range = 1-230). They took part in the online study in exchange for $2.00.
Participants were asked to assume the role of a mid-level, supervising manager in
the sales unit of Synergy Systems International (SSI). They were told that as a manager,
they were directly responsible for overseeing a team of 10 salespeople—and that they
manage the salespeople on a day-to-day basis, are responsible for their overall
performance, and conduct their quarterly performance reviews. As part of the study, they
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were to make a series of performance ratings for two of their employees, one who
exhibited a conformity bias and other, a deviation bias.
Manipulations
Organizational culture manipulations. I manipulated organizational
culture by telling participants that last month, SSI conducted a survey of their employees
about the organization’s culture and I listed the three most frequently appearing items.
In the collectivist conditions, they read:
SSI organizational cultural values can best be described as collectivistic.
Last month, SSI conducted a survey of their employees about the
organization’s culture. Employees were asked to list what employees
valued. The three most frequently appearing items were:




Maintaining harmonious relationships
Assimilating with others
Pursuing organizational goals

These items suggest that people at SSI generally value interdependence,
harmony, and finding common ground. A representative quote from one
employee at SSI states: “Everyone cares about what ‘we’ can achieve
together – not what ‘I’ can achieve alone. We operate as one.”
In the individualist conditions, they read:
SSI organizational cultural values can best be described as individualistic.
Last month, SSI conducted a survey of their employees about the
organization’s culture. Employees were asked to list what employees
valued. The three most frequently appearing items were:




Maintaining independence
Being distinct from others
Pursuing personal goals

These items suggest that people at SSI generally value independence,
dissent, and individual expression. A representative quote from one
employee at SSI states: “Everyone cares about what ‘I’ can achieve alone –
not what ‘we’ can achieve together. We operate as individuals.”
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As a manipulation check, I included four items that participants rated on a 7point Likert scale. The items started with “People at SSI generally value…” and followed
with: (a) Cohesion-Independence; (b) Fitting In-Standing Out; (c) Harmony-Dissent; (d)
Collective Goals-Personal Goals (α = .94). Lower numbers reflect collectivist norms and
higher numbers, individualist norms.
Accountability manipulations. I manipulated accountability by providing
participants with evaluation forms of SSI salespeople adapted from real-world evaluation
forms described by Behrman and Perreault (1982) (see Figure 14). The evaluation forms
for the process accountability conditions had items that captured sales behaviors (e.g.,
providing information; using technological knowledge; making sales presentations;
controlling expenses). The evaluation forms for the outcome accountability condition
had items that purely captured end sales outcomes (e.g., high market share, high level of
dollar sales, exceeds sales targets).
They were told that supervisors have to complete these forms for each of their
salespeople at the end of the sales quarter and that these ratings were on a 5-point scale
from 1 “needs improvement” to 5 “outstanding.” The introductions to these forms varied
depending on the condition.
The process accountability condition began with the text:
SSI monitors the behaviors of their salespeople rather than the monetary
value that they bring to SSI at the end of the evaluation period.
The outcome accountability condition began with the text:
SSI monitors the final monetary value that they bring to SSI at the end of
the evaluation period rather than the behaviors of their salespeople.
I included three items as a manipulation check which they had to rate on a 7point Likert scale. The prompt was “SSI…” and the items were: (a) Holds salespeople
87

accountable for process-Holds salespeople accountable for bottomline results; (b) Values
standard decision procedures and protocols-Devalues standard decision procedures and
protocols; (c) Evaluates how salespeople go about doing their jobs-Evaluates the end
outcomes of salespeople (α = .84). Lower numbers reflect process accountability and
higher numbers, outcome accountability.
Employee bias. Participants were told that they were getting ready to complete
evaluation forms for two employees. They were asked to read notes that they had
collected for each of the employees; these were notes collected from co-workers as well
as other managers who had observed the employees’ behaviors. There were two
employees: Toby Ryans who exhibited conformity biases and Frank Wolfe who exhibited
deviation biases. The order of the employees was counterbalanced.
For Toby Ryans, they read the following notes:
You are generally satisfied with Toby’s performance. But you have noticed
that Toby almost always uses the same standard selling strategies that his
colleagues have been using for years and that have become pretty widely
accepted at SSI. Sometimes you think it would be more beneficial if he
deviated from these practices.
For example, Toby was recently interacting with a new client. Instead of
“thinking outside the box” and thinking of creative ways in which SSI
could cater to the unique needs of this new client, Toby just stuck to the
same wining and dining venues, product pitching techniques, and client
presentation rituals that SSI salespeople have been using for traditional
clients. You think that Toby could have got much more business from the
new client if he adapted some strategies to better serve the client.
For Frank Wolfe, they read the following notes:
You are generally satisfied with Frank’s performance. But you have
noticed that Frank almost always deviates from the standard selling
strategies that his colleagues have been using for years and that have
become pretty widely accepted at SSI. Sometimes you think it would be
more beneficial if he actually conformed to these practices.
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For example, Frank was recently interacting with a new client. Instead of
just following what people have already tested in the company and what
has already proven to work, Frank chose totally different wining and
dining venues, product pitching techniques, and client presentation
rituals that SSI salespeople have never used before for its clients. You
think that Frank could have got much more business from the new client
if he just stuck to the standard strategies to better serve the client.
Measures
Participants filled out the following measures for both employees.
Performance ratings. I had two sets of performance ratings. The first was a
measure of overall performance adapted from Burris (2012). The measure consisted for
three items: (a) How would you rate [employee’s] performance based on what you
know?; (b) If a position were available, I’d recommend [employee] for a promotion; (c) If
[employee] was promoted, I would expect him to perform in the new position (α = .80
for conformity bias employee; α = .86 for deviation bias employee). The first item was
rated on a 7-point scale (weak performance-strong performance) and the last two items
were rated on a 7-point scale (strongly disagree-strongly agree).
The second measure was one of a composite of general managerial decisions. This
measure consisted of 6 items that participants rated on a 7-point bipolar scale: (a)
Decrease [employee’s] salary-increase [employee’s] salary; (b) Demote [employee]Promote [employee]; (c) Decrease [employee’s] responsibilities at SSI-Increase
[employee’s] responsibilities at SSI; (d) Reassign [employee] to one of your less
important projects-Assign [employee] to one of your more important projects; (e) Very
likely to prevent [employee] from receiving a prestigious company award-Very likely to
nominate [employee] for a prestigious company award; (f) Very likely to fire [employee]Very likely to retain [employee] (α = .81 for conformity bias employee; α = .89 for
deviation bias employee).
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Promotion decision. Participants were then told that they were only allowed
to promote one of the employees, Toby Ryans or Frank Wolfe. They were asked to select
whether they would promote Toby, Frank, or neither of the employees.
Pro-organizational motivation. As another way to measure favorability, I
also measured pro-organizational motivation using six items adapted from Burris
(2012). Items were rated on a 7-point scale (strongly disagree-strongly agree). The
items were: (a) The organization’s needs are important to [employee]; (b) [Employee]
really looks out for what is important to this organization; (c) [Employee] will go out of
his way to benefit the organization; (d) [Employee] is very concerned about improving
the organization; (e) [Employee] is committed to the organization; (f) [Employee] is
emotionally attached to the organization (α = .92 for conformity bias employee; α = .95
for deviation bias employee).
STUDY 3: RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
Table 5 contains means and standard deviations for all measures organized by
experimental condition. To check if my manipulations had the desired effects, I ran a 2 x
2 MANOVA. The organizational culture manipulation had a significant effect on the
respective manipulation check (F (1, 153) = 161.49, p < .01). The collectivist conditions
significantly differed from the individualist conditions (M = 2.43 vs. M = 5.22). The
accountability manipulation had a significant effect on the respective manipulation
check (F (1, 153) = 94.87, p < .01). The process accountability conditions significantly
differed from the outcome accountability conditions (M = 2.75 vs. M = 5.04). No other
effects were significant.
To recap, Hypothesis 1 stated that managers in the congruent conditions would
rate the two employees differently such that managers in the collectivist culture / process
accountability conditions would demonstrate a preference for the employee who exhibits
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a conformity bias and managers in the individualist culture / outcome accountability
conditions would prefer the employee who exhibits a deviation bias. However, those in
the incongruent conditions would not rate these two employees differently.
To test Hypothesis 1, I compared the means of performance ratings for both
employees for each combination of organizational culture and accountability system.
Figure 15 displays the results for the overall performance ratings. As expected, managers
in the collectivist organization / process accountability combinations rated the
conforming employee higher than the deviating employee (M = 4.56 vs. M = 3.26), (t (41)
= 5.13, p < .01). Managers in the individualist organization / outcome accountability
combinations rated the deviating employee higher than the conforming employee (M =
4.59 vs. M = 4.09), (t (35) = -2.01, p = .05). But managers in the incongruent
combinations demonstrated no significant difference in ratings of the conforming and
deviating employees [(M = 4.15 vs. M = 3.99), (t (38) = .63, p > .10) for collectivist
organization / outcome accountability and (M = 4.18 vs. M = 3.99), (t (39) = .40, p > .10)
for individualist organization / process accountability].
Similar patterns emerged for the composite of general managerial decisions (see
Figure 16). Managers in the collectivist organization / process accountability
combinations made more favorable decisions for the conforming vs. deviating employee
(M = 4.54 vs. M = 3.58, t(41) = 4.53, p < .01). Managers in the individualist organization
/ outcome accountability combinations made more favorable decisions for the deviating
vs. conforming employee (M = 4.47 vs. M = 4.07, t(35) = -2.14, p < .05). But, again,
managers in the incongruent combinations were equally (un)favorable to both
employees [(M = 4.27 vs. M = 4.17), (t (38) = .55, p > .10) for collectivist norms /
outcome accountability and (M = 4.25 vs. M = 4.09), (t (39) = .86, p > .10) for
individualist norms / process accountability].
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Next, I looked at the counts for the managers’ promotion decisions. I ran
nonparametric binomial tests to see if the percentage of managers who chose to promote
the employee who exhibited conformity biases vs. the employee who exhibit the
deviation biases significantly differed (test proportion = .50). Table 6 displays the
results. As we can see here, there was a significant difference in preferences in the
collectivist organization / process accountability conditions. These managers chose the
conforming employee over the deviating employee (48.28% vs. 20.69%, p < .05). There
was a marginally significant difference in preferences in the individualist norms /
outcome accountability conditions. These managers chose the deviating employee over
the conforming employee (29.33% vs. 56.00%, p = .10). A chi-square test revealed a
significant difference in the proportion of participants who supported the deviating
employee (chi-square = 7.87, d.f. = 1, p < .01). But there was no significant difference in
preferences for the incongruent conditions [(34.57% vs. 44.44%, p > .10 in the
collectivist norms / outcome accountability conditions) and (31.33% vs. 31.33%, p > .10
in the individualist norms / process accountability conditions].
I ran a similar analysis for pro-organizational motives, comparing the means for
each of the four combinations. Figure 17 graphs the results. I found that managers in the
collectivist organization / process accountability conditions viewed the employee who
exhibited conformity biases as more pro-organizational than the employee who exhibited
deviation biases (M = 4.53 vs. M = 3.63, t(41) = 3.20, p < .01). The opposite was true for
managers in the individualist organization / outcome accountability conditions. These
managers thought the employees who exhibited deviation biases were more proorganizational (M = 4.45 vs. M = 3.94, t(35) = -2.00, p = .05). However, yet again, we see
no significant differences in assessments in the incongruent conditions [(M = 4.27 vs. M
= 4.02), (t (38) = .91, p > .10) for collectivist organization / outcome accountability and
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(M = 4.15 vs. M = 3.82), (t (39) = 1.38, p > .10) for individualist organization / process
accountability].
These findings cumulatively suggest that Hypothesis 1 was largely supported.
GENERAL DISCUSSION
This study demonstrated the potential for incongruity to prevent managers from
exhibiting biases in evaluating conformity and deviation biases. Managers in incongruity
favored neither bias. However, future research should tease apart whether those in the
incongruent combinations are either penalizing both biases equally (i.e., they are
intolerant of both) or rewarding both biases equally (i.e., they are simply indifferent to
both). In Table 6, there was an unexpectedly high proportion of managers who chose
between the two employees rather than choosing neither of the employees (32 / 39
managers in the collectivist organization/ outcome accountability conditions and 26 / 40
in the individualist organization / process accountability conditions). The data are thus
currently insufficient to draw any definitive conclusions: managers under incongruity
may show no preference between the biases but it is unclear whether they regard both
these biases more positively or negatively.
Nevertheless, this study takes a step towards making at least three distinct
theoretical contributions. First, most research on values and value preferences has taken
a dispositional approach (e.g., Grant & Rothbard, 2014; Schwartz & Bilsky, 1987;
Tetlock, 1986). This study looks at how value preferences can be shaped by work
contexts. Second, past research suggests that because people in collectivist settings are
more concerned with fostering relationships than are people in individualist settings
(Hui et al., 1991), they tend to be more generous in evaluating others (assuming the
targets of evaluation are in their in-group, Gómez et al., 2000). My study qualifies this
notion by pointing out that managers in collectivist organizations are tolerant only to the
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extent that employees exhibit values that are consistent with collectivism. Managers
were not afraid to penalize employees who exhibited deviation biases. Finally, scholars
have noted that some organizations do not necessarily want or value creativity (Staw,
1995). This study identifies this type of organization whose managers are likely to not
tolerate deviant endeavors: those with strong collectivist values and process-oriented
systems.
In addition to deciphering whether managers in incongruent conditions are
equally tolerant or intolerant of employees who exhibit conformity or deviation biases,
future research can examine the mediating mechanisms that explain why the patterns I
found in this study emerged. For example, managers under combinations of collectivist
organizations/ process accountability may find conforming employees more competent
or even likable whereas managers under combinations of individualist organizations/
outcome accountability may find deviating employees to be more so. Alternatively,
managers could purely be making cost-benefit analyzes: managers under collectivist
organizations/ process accountability incur socio-political costs when employees
excessively deviate and managers under individualist organizations/ outcome
accountability incur similar costs when employees excessively conform.
Future research should also supplement this scenario study with a field study
that increases the external validity of my findings. A multi-unit organization that has
variability in performance/ accountability metrics and subunit cultures would be ideal.
Researchers can obtain objective or subjective measures of accountability and culture
and promotion/ performance evaluation decisions can be tracked over time. We should
see a disproportionate number of conformist employees or deviant employees being
evaluated favorably in the congruent combinations.
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CONCLUSION
One of the main objectives of my dissertation was to demonstrate the importance
of shedding insights into the conformity-deviation balancing act that employees confront
in organizations. During the dissertation process, I learned that scholarship is in and of
itself a balancing act on a number of dimensions. For one, strong theoretical
contributions stem from blending diverse theories but powerful contributions also tend
to be precise and parsimonious. My initial drafts of my dissertation during the proposal
phase attempted to integrate a multitude of theories; I explained a wide range of
employee behaviors that loosely related to under- and over-adapting the status quo.
Although the theoretical models were comprehensive, the lack of precision diluted my
arguments and obscured the logic of my arguments. It was not until the later phases that
I narrowed down my phenomenon of interest to the decisions that employees often have
to make to conform to or deviate from the status quo. Starting with this phenomenon, I
began generating the idea of incongruity to explain the conditions under which
employees would make better conformity-deviation decisions. At this stage, I began
receiving feedback that I was contributing to the field.
Empirical testing is also a balancing act. I had to design experiments that were
rich in terms of creating a psychologically realistic setting but also elegant and simplistic
enough to explain to an audience. My initial runs of the J.C. Penney experiment were
filled with extraneous information and details that not only weakened the internal
validity of the experiments but also made it difficult for the participants themselves to
process the information. Conducting experiments that work requires enormous
perspective-taking and the ability to think like the participant, but it is also necessary to
get accurate and realistic measures of the variables of interest. I was attempting to
measure construal shifting (a fairly demanding form of cognition), and I needed variance
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in this measure. It took a while for me to adjust the experiments to bring the cognitive
load for the participants to an appropriate level while also getting reliable measures of
cognition.
Taking a step back, I also realized that the entire research process requires
shifting between the abstract and concrete—and balancing the need to be creative while
also practical. Idea generation requires looking at the big picture, integrating multiple
theories, and seeing where your arguments fit into the larger literature but execution of
studies requires acute attention to detail, patience, and perseverance. And after the
results are generated, it is also necessary to see how the results support—or fail to
support—the theoretical arguments you are trying to make and identify ways in which
the theory can be strengthened to explain the findings. Although the research process is
cognitively demanding, it is highly rewarding to be able to find answers to questions that
spark your curiosity.
There are at least three different directions I want to take my research. The first is
to study some of the ideas presented here in the field. As I discussed in Chapter 2, I
chose to test my hypotheses using a laboratory methodology so that I could decrease the
hindsight bias. Of course, laboratory experiments increase the internal validity of my
findings but they also come at the cost of external validity. As such, to bolster the
external validity of my tests, I plan to study the effects of construal shifting on real-world
decisions to conform to or deviate from the status quo. Of note, I am currently in the
process of studying the decisions of Army Intelligence officers who have to participate in
training simulations as part of their recertification requirements. These intelligence
officers have to make decisions whether to conform to or deviate from standard
protocols based on a host of factors including the level of threat, government
relationships, the terrain, and weather conditions. I am particularly interested in digging
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deeper into the construct of construal shifting by examining whether people blend or
shift between the concrete and abstract, how frequently they shift between the two
vantage points, and when they decide to move from one point to the other. The types of
decisions these intelligence officers have to make—and the type of information they have
to process—enable me to study construal shifting under a more microscopic lens.
Second, I would like to study construal shifting at the team level. In particular, I
would like to examine how the composition of teams—i.e., whether they are primarily
composed of abstract thinkers, concrete thinkers, or a blend of both—affects the team’s
ability to balance opposing risks. I could study conformity-deviation decisions as the
dependent variable, but I could also study other conflicting demands. For example,
innovation is a two-step process requiring novel idea generation (thinking outside-thebox) and implementation and execution of the idea (conforming to current bureaucratic
realities) (Miron-Spektor, Erez, & Naveh, 2011a). Similar to Bunderson and Sutcliffe’s
(2002) distinction between interpersonal and intrapersonal functional diversity, I can
also examine whether teams better balance conflicting demands if they are composed of
equal numbers of abstract and concrete processors or composed of people who are
strong construal shifters. Finally, I can examine team members’ expertise as a moderator
of the link between construal shifting and balancing conflicting demands. Competing
arguments can be made with respect to the effects of expertise. One argument is that
construal shifting provides little added benefit to balancing conflicting demands for
people who are experts—overpracticed people tend to respond habitually or “mindlessly”
to their tasks (Dane, 2010; Langer & Imber, 1979). The other argument, however, is that
people who are novices will not be able to effectively blend the concrete and abstract to
extract the benefits of construal shifting (Vallacher & Wegner, 1987). Given these
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competing arguments, there is likely an inverted U-curve in which the benefits of
construal shifting peak at moderate levels of expertise.
Third, I want to explore other ways to generate incongruity in the workplace. In
this dissertation, I examined combinations of organizational cultures and distributivejustice rules and organizational cultures and accountability systems. However, there are
other ways in which incongruity can be created. For example, I am interested in
examining how the extent to which leaders engage in protectionist or paternalistic
behaviors interacts with the extent to which leaders grant autonomy to shape employees’
susceptibilities to conformity or deviation biases. Protectionist or paternalistic behaviors
refer to the degree to which leaders shield employees from harm and nurture their wellbeing (Gelfand et al., 2007; Ouchi, 1981; Pellegrini & Scandura, 2008). Autonomy refers
to the degree to which leaders provide employees with the freedom and discretion to
determine what, how, and when to perform their work activities (Hackman & Oldham,
1976; Morgeson & Humphrey, 2006).
I predict that managers who feel protected but experience low autonomy are
likely to exhibit strong conformity biases. Employees under paternalistic leaders tend to
demonstrate loyalty to sacred practices in the organization in return for the protection
they are receiving (Aycan et al., 2000; Pellegrini & Scandura, 2006). Having low
discretion in determining how to conduct work activities further exacerbates these
effects. On the opposing end, I hypothesize that employees who have high degrees of
autonomy but experience low degrees of protection are likely to exhibit strong deviation
biases. This combination can liberate employees but it also leaves them without a “safety
net” in the event of failure, causing them to desperately search for practices that will
enable them to perform well. However, I suspect that employees are better positioned to
bring down both risks when they experience high degrees of autonomy and protection.
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At this point, employees achieve optimal distinctiveness (Brewer & Roccas, 2001;
Brewer, 1991): they feel assimilated with and distinct from their organizations and
leaders.
I am also interested in examining how incongruous combinations of self-reliant
and prosocial norms can optimize help-seeking and help-giving dynamics within an
organization. Integrating theories on adult attachment (Bartholomew & Horowitz, 1991)
and self-reliance and giving (Nadler & Chernyak-Hai, 2014), I hypothesize that
employees in (a) combinations of high prosocial norms/ low self-reliance norms are
likely to engage in excessive help-giving and have an excessive dependency on helptaking; (b) combinations of low prosocial norms/ high self-reliance norms are likely to
withdraw help-giving and engage in counterproductive rejection of help; (c)
combinations of high prosocial norms/ high self-reliance norms are likely to strike an
optimal dynamic between help-giving and help-taking such that they feel both secure
and autonomous in their relationships.
In sum, I hope to launch a portfolio of research that examines (a) the different
ways in which incongruity can be more or less beneficial to balancing competing
demands, and (b) the underlying cognitive and motivational processes that enable
managers and employees to bring down these opposing sets of risks.
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TABLE 1: Means and Standard Deviations (Study 1)

Condition

Collectivist, process
accountability, conformity risk
(n = 28)
Collectivist, outcome
accountability, conformity risk
(n = 26)
Individualist, process
accountability, conformity risk
(n = 28)
Individualist, outcome
accountability, conformity risk
(n = 22)
Collectivist, process
accountability, deviation risk
(n = 25)
Collectivist, outcome
accountability, deviation risk
(n = 28)
Individualist, process
accountability, deviation risk
(n = 27)
Individualist, outcome
accountability, deviation risk
(n = 25)

CollectivismIndividualism
(α = .99)
1.19
(.32)

Process-Outcome
Accountability
(α = .98)
1.39
(1.07)

Achievement
Score
(ra)
.60
(.07)

Task
Predictability
(Re)
.93
(.00)

Consistency
(Rs)

Correlation
(G)

.96
(.05)

.68
(.10)

1.05
(.15)

6.88
(1.71)

.69
(.08)

.93
(.00)

.91
(.04)

.81
(.08)

7.74
(.40)

1.18
(.48)

.67
(.09)

.93
(.00)

.94
(.05)

.77
(.11)

7.60
(.55)

7.55
(.74)

.69
(.09)

.93
(.00)

.90
(.05)

.81
(.07)

1.13
(.33)

1.28
(.74)

.24
(.07)

.54
(.00)

.91
(.12)

.47
(.11)

1.05
(.15)

7.11
(1.7)

.20
(.06)

.54
(.00)

.84
(.09)

.44
(.11)

7.75
(.47)

1.07
(.27)

.23
(.05)

.54
(.00)

.91
(.08)

.46
(.07)

7.84
(.33)

7.64
(.70)

.14
(.06)

.54
(.00)

.78
(.12)

.32
(.11)

Note. Standard deviations are in parentheses.
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TABLE 2: Construal Shifting Coding Scheme (Study 2)
Rating

5
(High)

4

3
(Moderate)

2

1
(Low)

Conceptual Description
Participant considers how concrete aspects of the
decision affect abstract aspects AND how abstract
aspects should shape concrete details. Both concrete-toabstract and abstract-to-concrete links are strong.

Study-Relevant Description
Participant considers whether the everyday low pricing strategy is meeting, or failing to
meet, the global issues the bookstore faces, declining customer visits, competition from
online retailers, and lingering effects of the 2008 economic recession AND considers
what these abstract issues indicate that the bookstore could do besides the everyday
low pricing strategy. Both these links are strong.

Participant considers how concrete aspects of the
decision affect abstract aspects AND how abstract
aspects should shape concrete details. Both concrete-toabstract and abstract-to-concrete links are strong. But
either one or both the concrete-to-abstract or abstractto-concrete links are weak.

Participant considers whether the everyday low pricing strategy is meeting, or failing to
meet, the global issues the bookstore faces, declining customer visits, competition from
online retailers, and lingering effects of the 2008 economic recession AND considers
what these abstract issues indicate that the bookstore could do besides the everyday
low pricing strategy. But either one or both the links are weak.

Participant considers how concrete aspects of the
decision affect abstract aspects OR how abstract aspects
should shape concrete details. The concrete-to-abstract
or abstract-to-concrete link is strong.

Participant considers whether the everyday low pricing strategy is meeting, or failing to
meet, the global issues the bookstore faces, declining customer visits, competition from
online retailers, and lingering effects of the 2008 economic recession OR considers
what these abstract issues indicate that the bookstore could do besides the everyday
low pricing strategy. The link that is chosen is strong.

Participant considers how concrete aspects of the
decision affect abstract aspects OR how abstract aspects
should shape concrete details. But the concrete-toabstract or abstract-to-concrete link is weak.

Participant considers whether the everyday low pricing strategy is meeting, or failing to
meet, the global issues the bookstore faces, declining customer visits, competition from
online retailers, and lingering effects of the 2008 economic recession OR considers
what these abstract issues indicate that the bookstore could do besides the everyday
low pricing strategy. But the link that is chosen is weak.

Participant only considers the concrete aspects of the
decision OR the abstract aspects. Participant response
demonstrates little to no signs of shifting from the
concrete to abstract or abstract to concrete.

Participant only considers the pros and cons of the everyday low pricing strategy OR
the global issues the bookstore faces, declining customer visits, competition from
online retailers, and lingering effects of the 2008 economic recession.
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TABLE 3: Examples of Construal Shifting Ratings (Study 2)
Rating

5
(High)

4

3
(Moderate)

Everyday low pricing is not addressing the largest problems the bookstore faces. It seems the bookstore's main consumer base came from the
success of previous pricing strategy and that was not what needed to be changed, since now that that has been changed the bookstore has declined
in performance and lost its main consumer base. [concrete abstract] The bookstore needs to maintain its previous pricing strategy to keep its
current consumer base, but to improve its performance and increase customer visits, compete with online retailers, and remain a competitive place
for those that are frugal, [abstract issues] I believe the bookstore should put a lot of its money into improving the store's inside appearance,
perhaps remodeling, redecorating, including a cafe where students will visit the bookstore to study and eat as well as purchase books and
merchandise, and so forth [concrete ways to address abstract issues]. Additionally, the store should continue reducing prices to be low, to be
competitive with online retailers and remain appealing to those frugal from the recession, but include the marketing strategies of sales, high low
pricing and ending prices in .99, so as not to make consumers believe they are being cheated of cheaper items. While it may hurt the bookstore in
the beginning to continue high-low pricing marketing strategies but have low prices, and to put a lot of money into inside appearance
improvement, the changes will have long term positive effects that will make the changes worthwhile. (rating: 5.00)
This solution does not seem to directly address the problem. Online retailers like Amazon have consistently lower prices than bookstores, and
trying to compete with them will not ultimately work. People would rather order low-price books online than go to a store to buy low-priced
books. It may help get the customers feeling more frugal in, but only if they already prefer the experience of shopping in a store. [concrete
abstract] So it comes back to: they need to increase the in-store experience. [abstract issue] Reducing prices only works if you can get
customers into the store; the words "sale" and "clearance" clearly get people into the store (as seen when other college bookstores attempted this
strategy; students love sales). The pricing seems gimmicky (dollar-store-like), though that's just because as consumers we are used to .99 rather
than .00. Not showing the suggested retail price may seem more honest, as the list is partly fictional, but consumers don't know that, and telling
them they're getting low prices but not allowing them to compare seems like a not good idea (less "transparency"). [explains how ELP strategy
addresses abstract issue but doesn’t propose anything new] Ultimately, if the team of employees does not agree, this plan will not be
implemented and integrated well into the bookstore community, which seems to be one of the major things the store has going for it. (rating:
4.00)
If the bookstore was to lower their prices by 40 percent all around, they would still probably not beat some of the prices online [identifies
abstract issue: online competition]. For example, you can save a lot of money on Amazon.com. Moreover, even if they do people use online
buying because it is so much more convenient. Furthermore, the reason most people go in a lot of stores is because they see the clearance or sale
sign outside the door and want to go in and buy something or browse. Normally, browsing leads to buying. I do not think eliminating sales would
help bring customers into the stores. Maybe if they opened a coffee shop in the store, or offered special deals once a month to customers or to
school students would be a better idea [identifies concrete ways to address abstract issue]. If they sold textbooks at 40 percent lower, however,
that would be another story. Or if they had a company where you could buy and then sell back fairly easy. (rating: 3.33)
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2

1
(Low)

The current decline in the Drexel bookstore is not exceptional. We have seen many book stores begin to fade as online sellers have become more
popular and the advent of nooks and iPads where consumers can simply read their information digitally. [identifies abstract issue] I believe that
continuing with the everyday low price is a good option but that this does not mean necessarily removing the words "sale" and "clearance"
because a 40% discount is most definitely a sale. Seeing these words coupled with the higher manufacturing price listed on the books will make
students/customers actually feel as if they are getting a deal and that is really what counts. The article from the student newspaper, showed that
students were "pissed off" because they felt like they were no longer getting deals when in actuality they may have been coming out better than
before. Returning the "sale" signs may reignite a bit of consumer confidence in the bookstore. I am unsure regarding the switch from .99 to .00
as ending prices. I truly don't think it matters that much. I've never been super excited by seeing .99 at the end of a price because I'm sure that
once I pay taxes, that .99 will become irrelevant. I don't think that ending prices are really that important in making consumers want to buy
things. [identifies how concrete issues address abstract issue] (rating: 2.33)
I think that the messaging should remain the same, because it does tell people that there is a change "Everyday Low pricing" is a smart move.
However, people need to actually see such a sale change on a daily basis and that would need to include a level of showing price comparison of
some caliber. If that means, visibly showing them the price change that is being made to product with the 40% reduction, go for it. It is a whole
lot smarter than just simply putting a price down. Also, the rounding to the 0 does show a very visible choice in not trying to rip people off which
is also helpful. [purely concrete] (rating: 1.00)
It is evident that the current and traditional strategies are not working. The data shows decline and without change, it is unlikely that Drexel will
be able to make a turn around. While the new proposal is bold, it is refreshing and completely changes the "playing field". It distinguishes itself
from other bookstores through these "subtle" tactics and may help increase customer visits even if other factors such as decor or amenities are not
as competitive as nearby bookstores. [purely abstract] (rating: 1.00)
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TABLE 4: Means and Standard Deviations (Study 2)
Condition

CollectivismIndividualism
(α = .99)

Process-Outcome
Accountability
(α = 1.00)

Decision to
Continue/ Launch
ELP Strategy
(out of 4 binary
decisions)
2.10
(.95)

Investment to
Continue/Launch
ELP Strategy
(out of $500,000)

1.08
1.02
$311,500.00
Collectivist, process accountability,
(.24)
(.14)
(141,050.18)
conformity risk
(n = 50)
1.04
7.85
1.44
$185,400.00
Collectivist, outcome
(.18)
(.64)
(1.09)
(172,853.72)
accountability, conformity risk
(n = 50)
7.78
1.02
1.42
$178,400.00
Individualist, process
(.46)
(.14)
(1.05)
(158,939.21)
accountability, conformity risk
(n = 50)
7.91
7.98
1.41
$144,705.88
Individualist, outcome
(.23)
(.14)
(1.06)
(148,220.82)
accountability, conformity risk
(n = 51)
1.17
1.09
1.61
$198,367.35
Collectivist, process accountability,
(.38)
(.30)
(1.26)
(173,016.70)
deviation risk
(n = 49)
1.05
7.90
1.22
$169,900.00
Collectivist, outcome
(.22)
(.47)
(1.30)
(179,695.01)
accountability, deviation risk
(n = 50)
7.62
1.13
1.80
$235,460.78
Individualist, process
(.67)
(.39)
(1.11)
(169,751.78)
accountability, deviation risk
(n = 51)
7.82
7.88
2.64
$362,800.00
Individualist, outcome
(.47)
(.59)
(1.10)
(149,670.25)
accountability, deviation risk
(n = 50)
Notes. Standard deviations are in parentheses. “ELP” stands for everyday low pricing.
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Construal Shifting
(ICC = .90)

1.44
(.46)
1.67
(.91)
1.80
(1.00)
1.56
(.81)
1.79
(.87)
1.85
(1.12)
2.38
(1.13)
1.46
(.56)

TABLE 5: Means and Standard Deviations (Study 3)
Condition

CollectivismIndividualism
(α = .94)

ProcessOutcome
Accountabilit
y
(α = .84)

Overall
Performance
~ Conformity
Bias ~
(α = .80)

General
Managerial
Decisions
~ Conformity
Bias ~
(α = .81)

Prosocial
Motivation
~ Conformity
Bias ~
(α = .92)

Overall
Performance
~ Deviation
Bias ~
(α = .86)

General
Managerial
Decisions
~ Deviation
Bias ~
(α = .89)

Prosocial
Motivation
~ Deviation
Bias ~
(α = .95)

Collectivist
organization,
process
accountability
(n = 42)

2.22
(1.44)

2.46
(1.43)

4.56
(1.02)

4.54
(.85)

4.53
(1.16)

3.26
(1.16)

3.58
(.93)

3.64
(1.26)

Collectivist
organization,
outcome
accountability
(n = 39)

2.66
(1.17)

4.97
(1.31)

4.15
(.89)

4.27
(.58)

4.26
(.82)

3.99
(1.25)

4.17
(1.03)

4.02
(1.27)

Individualist
organization,
process
accountability
(n = 40)

5.08
(1.27)

3.06
(1.42)

4.18
(.86)

4.25
(.63)

4.15
(1.03)

4.08
(1.09)

4.10
(.93)

3.82
(1.26)

Individualist
organization,
outcome
accountability
(n = 36)

5.39
(1.59)

5.04
(1.61)

4.09
(1.08)

4.07
(.76)

3.94
(1.15)

4.59
(.95)

4.47
(.80)

4.45
(1.08)

Note. Standard deviations are in parentheses.
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TABLE 6: Promotion Decisions (Study 3)

Employee
who exhibits
conformity
bias

Employee
who exhibits
deviation
bias

Collectivist
Organization /
Process Accountability

Collectivist
Organization /
Outcome Accountability

Individualist
Organization /
Process Accountability

Individualist
Organization /
Outcome Accountability

21 (48.28%)

14 (34.57%)

13 (31.33%)

11 (29.33%)

p < .05

p > .10

9 (20.69%)

18 (44.44%)

13 (31.33%)

21 (56.00%)

12 (27.59%)

7 (17.28%)

14 (33.73%)

4 (10.67%)

p > .10

p = .10

Neither
employee
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FIGURE 1: Distributive Justice and Organizational Cultural Systems and Risks of Conformity and Deviation Biases
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FIGURE 2: Organizational Cultural Systems and Vulnerabilities to Conformity and Deviation Biases
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FIGURE 3: Group Cultural Values Manipulations (Study 1)
Individualist Values

Collectivist Values

109

FIGURE 4: Estimated Marginal Means of Achievement Scores (ra) (Study 1)
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FIGURE 5: Participant vs. Ideal Predictions (Exposure to Risk of Conformity Bias) (Study 1)

A

C

B

D
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FIGURE 6: Participant vs. Ideal Predictions (Exposure to Risk of Deviation Bias) (Study 1)
E

G

F

H
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FIGURE 7: Participant Weighting Strategies (Relative Regression Coefficients) (Study 1)

Ideal Weights

Collectivist Group /
Process Accountability

Collectivist Group /
Outcome Accountability

Individualist Group /
Process Accountability

Individualist Group /
Outcome Accountability

Ideal Weights

Collectivist Group /
Process Accountability

Collectivist Group /
Outcome Accountability

Individualist Group /
Process Accountability

Individualist Group /
Outcome Accountability
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Academic Performance (AP), Extracurricular Involvement (EI), Communication Skills
(CS)

FIGURE 8: Absolute Difference from Ideal Predictions over Trials (i.e., Learning over Time) (Study 1)
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FIGURE 9: Cultural Values Manipulations (Study 2)
Individualist Values

Collectivist Values
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FIGURE 10: Schematic Map of Construal Shifting Coding Scheme (Study 2)
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FIGURE 11: Estimated Marginal Means, Decisions to Continue / Launch Components of ELP Strategy (Study 2)

Exposure to Risk of Deviation Bias

Exposure to Risk of Conformity Bias
2.80
Number of ELP Strategy Components to
Launch

Number of ELP Strategy Components to
Continue

2.20

2.00

1.80

Process
Accountability
Outcome
Accountability

1.60

1.40

2.60
2.40

2.20
2.00

Process
Accountability

1.80

Outcome
Accountability

1.60
1.40
1.20
1.00

1.20
Collectivist
Group

Collectivist
Group

Individualist
Group

117

Individualist
Group

FIGURE 12: Monetary Investments to Continue or Launch ELP Strategy (Study 2)

Exposure to Risk of Conformity Bias
Trap

Exposure to Risk of Deviation Bias
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FIGURE 13: Estimated Marginal Means, Cultural Values by Accountability on Construal Shifting (Study 2)

2.20
2.10

Construal Shifting

2.00
1.90

1.80

Process
Accountability

1.70

Outcome
Accountability

1.60
1.50
1.40
Collectivist
Group

Individualist
Group
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FIGURE 14: Salespeople Evaluation Forms for Accountability Manipulations (Study 3)
Outcome Accountability

Process Accountability
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FIGURE 15: Overall Performance Ratings (Study 3)

121

FIGURE 16: General Managerial Decisions (Study 3)
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FIGURE 17: Pro-organizational Motives (Study 3)

123

BIBLIOGRAPHY
Abrahamson, E. 1996. Management fashion. Academy of Management Review,
21(1): 254-285.
Adler, P. S., Benner, M., Brunner, D. J., MacDuffie, J. P., Osono, E., Staats, B. R.,
Takeuchi, H., Tushman, M. L., & Winter, S. G. 2009. Perspectives on the
productivity dilemma. Journal of Operations Management, 27: 99-113.
Adler, P. S., Goldoftas, B., & Levine, D. I. 1999. Flexibility versus efficiency? A case study
of model changeovers in the Toyota production system. Organization
Science, 10(1): 43-68.
Amabile, T. 1996. Creativity in context. Boulder, CO: Westview.
Amabile, T. M., Fisher, C. M., & Pillemer, J. 2014. IDEO's culture of helping. Harvard
Business Review.
Anderson, C., & Berdahl, J. L. 2002. The experience of power: Examining the effects of
power on approach and inhibition tendencies. Journal of Personality and
Social Psychology, 83(6): 1362-1377.
Anderson, E., & Oliver, R. L. 1987. Perspectives on behavior-based verus outcome-based
salesforce control systems. Journal of Marketing, 51: 76-88.
Argyris, C. 1982. Reasoning, learning, and action: Individual and
organizational. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass
Argyris, C. 1990. Overcoming organizational defenses: Facilitating
organizational learning. Boston: Allyn & Bacon.
Arkes, H. R., Dawes, R. M., & Christensen, C. 1986. Factors influencing the use of a
decision rule in a probabilistic task. Organizational Behavior and Human
Decision Processes, 37(1): 93-110.
Asch, S. E. 1951. Effects of group pressures upon the modification and distortion of
judgments. In H. Guetzkow (Ed.), Groups, leadership, and men. Pittsburgh,
PA: Carnegie Press.
Asch, S. E. 1956. Studies of independence and conformity: A minority of one against a
unanimous majority. Psychological Monographs: General and Applied,
70(9): 1-70.
Ashforth, B. E., & Mael, F. 1989. Social identity theory and the organization. Academy
of Management Review, 14(1): 20-39.
124

Ashton, R. H. 1992. Effects of justification and a mechanical aid on judgment
performance. Organizational Behavior and Human Decision
Processes, 52(2): 292-306.
Aycan, Z., Kanungo, R. N., Mendonca, M., Yu, K., Deller, J., Stahl, G., & al., e. 2000.
Impact of culture on human resource management practices: A 10-country
comparison. Applied Psychology: An International Review, 49: 192-221.
Baer, M., Leenders, R., Oldham, G. R., & Vadera, A. K. 2010. Win or lose the battle for
creativity: The power and perils of intergroup competition. Academy of
Management Journal, 53(4): 827-845.
Baker-Brown, G., Ballard, E. J., Bluck, S., De Vries, B., Suedfeld, P., & Tetlock, P. E.
1992. The conceptual/ integrative complexity scoring manual, Motivation and
personality: Handbook of thematic content analysis: 401-418.
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Bar-Anan, Y., Liberman, N., & Trope, Y. 2006. The association between psychological
distance and construal level: Evidence from an implicit association test. Journal
of Experimental Psychology: General, 135(4): 609-622.
Barley, S. R., & Kunda, G. 1992. Design and devotion: Surges of rational and normative
ideologies of control in managerial discourse. Administrative Science
Quarterly, 37: 363-399.
Barnes, C. M., Hollenbeck, J. R., Jundt, D. K., DeRue, D. S., & Harmon, S. J. 2011.
Mixing individual incentives and group incentives: Best of both worlds or social
dilemma? Journal of Management, 37(6): 1611-1635.
Bartholomew, K., & Horowitz, L. M. 1991. Attachment styles among young adults: A test
of a four-category model. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology,
61(2): 226-244.
Beer, M., & Eisenstat, R. A. 2000. The silent killers of strategy implementation and
learning. Sloan Management Review, 41(4): 29-40.
Behrman, D. N., & Perreault, W. D. 1982. Measuring the performance of industrial
salespersons. Journal of Business Research, 10(3): 355-370.
Bell, N. E., & Staw, B. M. 1989. People as sculptors versus sculptures: The roles of
personality and personal control in organizations. In M. B. Arthur, & D. T. Hall
(Eds.), Handbook of career theory: 232-251. New York: Cambridge
University Press.
125

Bertrand, M., & Mullainathan, S. 2001. Are CEOs rewarded for luck? The ones without
principals are. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 116(3): 901-932.
Beu, D. S., & Buckley, M. R. 2004. Using accountability to create a more ethical climate.
Human Resource Management Review, 14(1): 67-83.
Bhagat, R. S., Kedia, B. L., Harveston, P. D., & Triandis, H. C. 2002. Cultural variations
in the cross-border transfer of organizational knowledge: An integrative
framework. Academy of Management Review, 27(2): 204-221.
Bonabeau, E. 2009. Decisions 2.0: The power of collective intelligence. MIT Sloan
Management Review, 50(2): 45-52.
Bond, M. H., Leung, K., & Wan, K. C. 1982. How does cultural collectivism operate? The
impact of task and maintenance contributions on reward distribution. Journal
of Cross-Cultural Psychology, 13(2): 186-200.
Bond, R., & Smith, P. B. 1996. Culture and conformity: A meta-analysis of studies using
Asch's (1952b, 1956) line judgment task. Psychological Bulletin, 119(1): 111137.
Brehmer, B. 1973. Single-cue probability learning as a function of the sign and
magnitude of the correlation between cue and criterion. Organizational
Behavior and Human Performance, 9(3): 377-395.
Brewer, M., & Roccas, S. 2001. IndividuaI vaIues, sociaI Identity, and optimaI
distinctiveness. In C. Sedikides, & M. B. Brewer (Eds.), Individual self,
relational self, collective self: 219-237. Ann Arbor: Psychology Press.
Brewer, M. B. 1991. The social self: On being the same and different at the same time.
Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 17(5): 475-482.
Brewer, M. B. 1993. The role of distinctiveness in social identity and group behaviour. In
M. Hogg, & D. Abrams (Eds.), Group motivation: Social psychological
perspectives: 1-16. Hertfordshire: Harvester Wheatsheaf.
Brewer, M. B., & Gardner, W. 1996. Who is this" We"? Levels of collective identity and
self representations. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 71(1):
83-93.
Brockner, J. 2003. Unpacking country effects: On the need to operationalize the
psychological determinants of cross-national differences. In R. M. Kramer, & B.
M. Staw (Eds.), Research in organizational behavior, Vol. 25: 333-367.
Kidlington, Oxford: Elsevier.
126

Brockner, J., & Higgins, E. T. 2001. Regulatory focus theory: Implications for the study
of emotions at work. Organizational Behavior and Human Decision
Processes, 86(1): 35-66.
Brtek, M. D., & Motowidlo, S. J. 2002. Effects of procedure and outcome accountability
on interview validity. Journal of Applied Psychology, 87(1): 185-191.
Brunswik, E. 1943. Organismic achievement and environmental probability.
Psychological Review, 50: 255-272.
Brunswik, E. 1952. The conceptual framework of psychology. Chicago: University
of Chicago Press.
Budner, S. 1962. Intolerance of ambiguity as a personality variable. Journal of
Personality, 30(1): 29-50.
Buhrmester, M., Kwang, T., & Gosling, S. D. 2011. Amazon's Mechanical Turk: A new
source of inexpensive, yet high-quality, data? Perspectives on Psychological
Science, 6(1): 3-5.
Bunderson, J. S., & Sutcliffe, K. M. 2002. Comparing alternative conceptualizations of
functional diversity in management teams: Process and performance effects.
Academy of Management Journal, 45(5): 875-893.
Bunderson, J. S., & Sutcliffe, K. M. 2003. Management team learning orientation and
business unit performance. Journal of Applied Psychology, 88(3): 552-560.
Burgoon, E. M., Henderson, M. D., & Markman, A. B. 2013. There are many ways to see
the forest for the trees: A tour guide for abstraction. Perspectives on
Psychological Science, 8(5): 501-520.
Burns, T. Y. S., & Stalker, G. M. 1961. The management of innovation. London:
Travistock Publishing.
Burris, E. R. 2012. The risks and rewards of speaking up: Managerial responses to
employee voice. Academy of Management Journal, 55(4): 851-875.
Cameron, K. S., & Freeman, S. J. 1991. Cultural congruence, strength, and type:
Relationships to effectiveness. Research in Organizational Change and
Development, 5: 23-58.
Canales, R. 2014. Weaving straw into gold: Managing organizational tensions between
standardization and flexibility in microfinance. Organization Science: 1-28.

127

Cardinal, L. B. 2001. Technological innovation in the pharmaceutical industry: The use
of organizational control in managing research and development.
Organization Science, 12(1): 19-36.
Casciaro, T., & Lobo, M. S. 2005. Competent jerks, lovable fools, and the formation of
social networks. Harvard Business Review, 83(6): 92-99.
Castilla, E. J., & Benard, S. 2010. The paradox of meritocracy in organizations.
Administrative Science Quarterly, 55(4): 543-676.
Chang, E. C., Asakawa, K., & Sanna, L. J. 2001. Cultural variations in optimistic and
pessimistic bias: Do Easterners really expect the worst and Westerners really
expect the best when predicting future life events? Journal of Personality
and Social Psychology, 81(3): 476-491.
Chatman, J. A., & Barsade, S. G. 1995. Personality, organizational culture, and
cooperation: Evidence from a business simulation. Administrative Science
Quarterly, 40: 423-443.
Chatman, J. A., & Jehn, K. A. 1994. Assessing the relationship between industry
characteristics and organizational culture: How different can you be? Academy
of Management Journal, 37(3): 522-553.
Chatman, J. A., Polzer, J. T., Barsade, S. G., & Neale, M. A. 1998. Being different yet
feeling similar: The influence of demographic composition and organizational
culture on work processes and outcomes. Administrative Science
Quarterly, 43: 749-780.
Chen, C. C., Meindl, J. R., & Hui, H. 1998. Deciding on equity or parity: A test of
situational, cultural, and individual factors. Journal of Organizational
Behavior, 19(2): 115-129.
Chen, C. C., Meindl, J. R., & Hunt, R. G. 1997. Testing the effects of vertical and
horizontal collectivism: A study of reward allocation preferences in China.
Journal of Cross-Cultural Psychology, 28(1): 44-70.
Chernev, A. 2004. Goal orientation and consumer preference for the status quo.
Journal of Consumer Research, 31(3): 557-565.
Chin, M. K., Hambrick, D. C., & Trevino, L. K. 2013. Political ideologies of CEOs: The
influence of executives' values on corporate social responsibility
Administrative Science Quarterly, 58(2): 197-232.

128

Choi, I., Nisbett, R. E., & Norenzayan, A. 1999. Causal attribution across cultures:
Variation and universality. Psychological Bulletin, 125(1): 47-63.
Coyne, W. 1997. 3M (Minnesota Mining and Manufacturing Company). In R. Kanter, J.
Kao, & F. Wiersema (Eds.), Innovation. Breakthrough at 3M, Du Pont,
GE, Pfizer, and Rubbermaid. New York: Harper Business.
Cross, S. E., Morris, M. L., & Gore, J. S. 2002. Thinking about oneself and others: the
relational-interdependent self-construal and social cognition. Journal of
Personality and Social Psychology, 82(3): 399-418.
Crowe, E., & Higgins, E. T. 1997. Regulatory focus and strategic inclinations: Promotion
and prevention in decision-making. Organizational Behavior and Human
Decision Processes, 69(2): 117-132.
Crowne, D. P., & Marlowe, D. 1964. The approval motive: Studies in evaluative
dependence. New York: Wiley
Cutcher-Gershenfeld, J., & Kochan, T. A. 1997. Dispute resolution and team-based work
systems. In S. Gleason (Ed.), Workplace dispute resolution. Lansing, MI:
Michigan State University Press.
Dane, E. 2010. Reconsidering the trade-off between expertise and flexibility: A cognitive
entrenchment perspective. Academy of Management Review, 35(4): 579603.
De Dreu, C. K. W., Beersma, B., Stroebe, K., & Euwema, M. C. 2006. Motivated
information processing, strategic choice, and the quality of negotiated agreement.
Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 90(6): 927-943.
De Dreu, C. K. W., Giacomantonio, M., Shalvi, S., & Sligte, D. 2009. Getting stuck or
stepping back: Effects of obstacles and construal level in the negotiation of
creative solutions. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 45(3):
542-548.
de Langhe, B., van Osselaer, S. M. J., & Wierenga, B. 2011. The effects of process and
outcome accountability on judgment process and performance.
Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, 115: 238252.
Dean, J. W., & Sharfman, M. P. 1993. Procedural rationality in the strategic decisionmaking process. Journal of Management Studies, 30(4): 587-610.

129

Dean, J. W., & Sharfman, M. P. 1996. Does decision process matter? A study of strategic
decision-making effectiveness. Academy of Management Journal, 39(2):
368-396.
Denison, D. R., Hooijberg, R., & Quinn, R. E. 1995. Paradox and performance: Toward a
theory of behavioral complexity in managerial leadership. Organization
Science, 6(5): 524-540.
Detert, J. R., & Burris, E. R. 2007. Leadership behavior and employee voice: Is the door
really open? Academy of Management Journal, 50(4): 869-884.
Deutsch, M. 1975. Equity, equality, and need: What determines which value will be used
as the basis of distributive justice? Journal of Social Issues, 31(3): 137-149.
Deutsch, M. 1985. Distributive justice, a social psychological perspective. New
Haven: Yale University Press.
Deutsch, M., & Gerard, H. B. 1955. A study of normative and informational social
influences upon individual judgment. Journal of Abnormal and Social
Psychology, 51(3): 629-636.
Doty, D. H., Glick, W. H., & Huber, G. P. 1993. Fit, equifinality, and organizational
effectiveness: A test of two configurational theories. Academy of
Management Journal, 36(6): 1196-1250.
Earley, P. C. 1993. East meets West meets Mideast: Further explorations of collectivistic
and individualistic work groups. Academy of Management Journal, 36(2):
319-348.
Earley, P. C. 1994. Self or group? Cultural effects of training on self-efficacy and
performance. Administrative Science Quarterly, 39(1): 89-117.
Earley, P. C., & Gibson, C. B. 1998. Taking stock in our progress on individualismcollectivism: 100 years of solidarity and community. Journal of
Management, 24(3): 265-304.
Edelman, L. B. 1992. Legal ambiguity and symbolic structures: Organizational mediation
of civil rights law. American Journal of Sociology, 97(6): 1531-1576.
Edmondson, A. C. 2008. The competitive imperative of learning. Harvard Business
Review, 86(7): 1-10.
Edwards, J. R., & Lambert, L. S. 2007. Methods for integrating moderation and
mediation: a general analytical framework using moderated path analysis.
Psychological Methods, 12(1): 1-22.
130

Ehrhart, M. G., & Naumann, S. E. 2004. Organizational Citizenship Behavior in Work
Groups: A Group Norms Approach. Journal of Applied Psychology, 89(6):
960-974.
Eichenwald, K. 2012. Microsoft's lost decade, Vanity Fair.
Eisenhardt, K. M. 1985. Control: Organizational and economic approaches.
Management Science: 134-149.
Elliot, A. J., Chirkov, V. I., Kim, Y., & Sheldon, K. M. 2001. A cross-cultural analysis of
avoidance (relative to approach) personal goals. Psychological Science, 12(6):
505-510.
Erez, M. 1986. The congruence of goal-setting strategies with socio-cultural values and
its effect on performance. Journal of Management, 12(4): 585-592.
Erez, M. 1997. A culture based model of work motivation. In P. C. Earley, & M. Erez
(Eds.), New perspectives on international industrial and
organizational psychology: 193-242. San Francisco: Lexington Press.
Erez, M., & Earley, P. C. 1987. Comparative analysis of goal-setting strategies across
cultures. Journal of Applied Psychology, 72(4): 658-665.
Erez, M., Gopher, D., & Arazi, N. 1990. Effects of self-set goals and monetary rewards on
dual task performance. Organizational Behavior and Human Decision
Processes, 47: 247-269.
Fandt, P. M., & Ferris, G. R. 1990. The management of information and impressions:
When employees behave opportunistically. Organizational Behavior and
Human Decision Processes, 45(1): 140-158.
Farjoun, M. 2010. Beyond dualism: Stability and change as a duality. Academy of
Management Review, 35(2): 202-225.
Feldman, M. S., & March, J. G. 1981. Information in organizations as signal and symbol.
Administrative Science Quarterly, 26: 171-186.
Fiedler, F. 1967. A theory of leadership effectiveness. New York: McGraw-Hill.
Fischhoff, B. 1975. Hindsight is not equal to foresight: The effect of outcome knowledge
on judgment under uncertainty. Journal of Experimental Psychology:
Human Perception and Performance, 1(3): 288-299.
Fiske, S. T., & Taylor, S. E. 1991. Social cognition: Mcgraw-Hill.
Flynn, F. J., & Chatman, J. A. 2001. Strong cultures and innovation: Oxymoron or
opportunity. In C. Cooper, S. Cartwright, & P. Earley (Eds.), International
131

handbook of organizational culture and climate: 263-287. New York:
John Wiley.
Fong, C. T. 2006. The effects of emotional ambivalence on creativity. Academy of
Management Journal, 49: 1016-1030.
Förster, J., & Higgins, E. T. 2005. How global versus local perception fits regulatory
focus. Psychological Science, 16(8): 631-636.
Frese, M., & Fay, D. 2001. Personal initiative: An active performance concept for work in
the 21st century. In B. M. Staw, & R. I. Sutton (Eds.), Research in
organizational behavior, Vol. 23: 133-188.
Friedman, R. S., & Förster, J. 2001. The effects of promotion and prevention cues on
creativity. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 81(6): 1001.
Frink, D. D., & Klimoski, R. J. 2004. Advancing accountability theory and practice:
Introduction to the human resource management review special edition.
Human Resource Management Review, 14(1): 1-17.
Galbraith, J. R. 1971. Matric organization design. Business Horizons, 14(1): 29-40.
Galinsky, A. D., Magee, J. C., Gruenfeld, D. H., Whitson, J. A., & Liljenquist, K. A. 2008.
Power reduces the press of the situation: Implications for creativity, conformity,
and dissonance. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 95(6):
1450-1466.
Galinsky, A. D., Magee, J. C., Inesi, M. E., & Gruenfeld, D. H. 2006. Power and
perspectives not taken. Psychological Science, 17(12): 1068-1074.
Gardner, W. L., Gabriel, S., & Lee, A. Y. 1999. “I” value freedom, but “we” value
relationships: Self-construal priming mirrors cultural differences in judgment.
Psychological Science, 10(4): 321-326.
Gelfand, M. J., Erez, M., & Aycan, Z. 2007. Cross-cultural organizational behavior.
Annual Review of Psychology, 58: 479-514.
Gelfand, M. J., Lim, B. C., & Raver, J. L. 2004. Culture and accountability in
organizations: Variations in forms of social control across cultures. Human
Resource Management Review, 14(1): 135-160.
Gibson, C. B., & Birkinshaw, J. 2004. The antecedents, consequences, and mediating
role of organizational ambidexterity. Academy of Management Journal, 47:
209-226.

132

Gluck, M. A., & Bower, G. H. 1988. From conditioning to category learning: An adaptive
network model. Journal of Experimental Psychology: General, 117(3):
227.
Gómez, C., Kirkman, B. L., & Shapiro, D. L. 2000. The impact of collectivism and ingroup/out-group membership on the evaluation generosity of team members.
Academy of Management Journal, 43(6): 1097-1106.
Goncalo, J. A., & Kim, S. H. 2010. Distributive justice beliefs and group idea generation:
Does a belief in equity facilitate productivity? Journal of Experimental
Social Psychology, 46(5): 836-840.
Goncalo, J. A., & Staw, B. M. 2006. Individualism-collectivism and group creativity.
Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, 100(1): 96109.
Gordon, F. M., Welch, K. R., Offringa, G., & Katz, N. 2000. The complexity of social
outcomes from cooperative, competitive, and individualistic reward systems.
Social Justice Research, 13(3): 237-269.
Gordon, R. A., & Stuecher, U. 1992. The effect of anonymity and increased accountability
on the linguistic complexity of teaching evaluations. Journal of Psychology,
126: 639-649.
Graham, J., Haidt, J., & Nosek, B. A. 2009. Liberals and conservatives rely on different
sets of moral foundations. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology,
96(5): 1029-1046.
Grant, A. M. 2007. Relational job design and the motivation to make a prosocial
difference. Academy of Management Review, 32(2): 393-417.
Grant, A. M., & Ashford, S. J. 2008. The dynamics of proactivity at work. In B. M. Staw,
& R. Sutton (Eds.), Research in organizational behavior, Vol. 28: 3-34.
Greenwich, CT: JAI.
Grant, A. M., & Parker, S. K. 2009. Redesigning work design theories: The rise of
relational and proactive perspectives. Academy of Management Annals,
3(1): 317-375.
Grant, A. M., & Patil, S. V. 2012. Challenging the norm of self-interest: Minority
influence and transitions to helping norms in work units. Academy of
Management Review, 37(4): 547-568.

133

Grant, A. M., & Rothbard, N. P. 2014. When in doubt, seize the day? Security values,
prosocial values, and proactivity under ambiguity. Journal of Applied
Psychology.
Grant, H., & Dweck, C. S. 2003. Clarifying achievement goals and their impact. Journal
of Personality and Social Psychology, 85(3): 541-553.
Grant, H., & Higgins, E. T. 2003. Optimism, promotion pride, and prevention pride as
predictors of quality of life. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin,
29(12): 1521-1532.
Green, M. C., Visser, P. S., & Tetlock, P. E. 2000. Coping with accountability crosspressures: Low-effort evasive tactics and high-effort quests for complex
compromises. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 26(11): 13801391.
Griffin, M. A., Neal, A., & Parker, S. K. 2007. A new model of work role performance:
Positive behavior in uncertain and interdependent contexts. Academy of
Management Journal, 50(2): 327-347.
Gruenfeld, D. H., Inesi, M. E., Magee, J. C., & Galinsky, A. D. 2008. Power and the
objectification of social targets. Journal of Personality and Social
Psychology, 95(1): 111-127.
Gulati, R., & Puranam, P. 2009. Renewal through reorganization: The value of
inconsistencies between formal and informal organization. Organization
Science, 20(2): 422-440.
Gupta, A. K., Smith, K. G., & Shalley, C. E. 2006. The interplay between exploration and
exploitation. Academy of Management Journal, 49(4): 693-706.
Hackman, J. R., & Oldham, G. R. 1976. Motivation through the design of work: Test of a
theory. Organizational Behavior and Human Performance, 16(2): 250279.
Hackman, J. R., & Wageman, R. 1995. Total quality management: Empirical, conceptual,
and practical issues. Administrative Science Quarterly, 40: 309-342.
Hagafors, R., & Brehmer, B. 1983. Does having to justify one's judgments change the
nature of the judgment process? Organizational Behavior and Human
Process, 31: 223-232.
Haidt, J. 2007. The new synthesis in moral psychology. Science, 316(5827): 998-1002.

134

Hamilton, R. W., & Biehal, G. J. 2005. Achieving your goals or protecting their future?
The effects of self-view on goals and choices. Journal of Consumer
Research, 32(2): 277-283.
Hammond, K. 1955. Probabilistic functioning and the clinical method. Psychological
Review, 62: 255-262.
Hammond, K. 1995. Human judgment and social policy: Irreducible
uncertainty, inevitable error, unavoidable injustice. New York: Oxford
University Press.
Hammond, K. R., & Summers, D. A. 1972. Cognitive control. Psychological Review,
79(1): 58-67.
Hannan, M. T., Pólos, L., & Carroll, G. R. 2003. Cascading organizational change.
Organization Science, 14(5): 463-482.
Hayes, A. F. 2013. Introduction to mediation, moderation, and conditional
process analysis: A regression-based approach: Guilford Press.
Hazlett, A., Molden, D. C., & Sackett, A. M. 2011. Hoping for the best or preparing for the
worst? Regulatory focus and preferences for optimism and pessimism in
predicting personal outcomes. Social Cognition, 29(1): 74-96.
Heath, C., Larrick, R. P., & Klayman, J. 1998. Cognitive repairs: How organizational
practices can compensate for individual shortcomings, Research in
organizational behavior, Vol. 20: 1-37: JAI Press.
Heath, C., & Sitkin, S. B. 2001. Big-B versus Big-O: What is organizational about
organizational behavior? Journal of Organizational Behavior, 22(1): 4358.
Heine, S. J., Kitayama, S., Lehman, D. R., Takata, T., Ide, E., Leung, C., & Matsumoto, H.
2001. Divergent consequences of success and failure in japan and north america:
an investigation of self-improving motivations and malleable selves. Journal of
Personality and Social Psychology, 81(4): 599-615.
Heine, S. J., & Lehman, D. R. 1995. Cultural variation in unrealistic optimism: Does the
West feel more vulnerable than the East? Journal of Personality and Social
Psychology, 68(4): 595-607.
Heine, S. J., & Lehman, D. R. 1999. Culture, self-discrepancies, and self-satisfaction.
Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 25(8): 915-925.

135

Heine, S. J., Lehman, D. R., Markus, H. R., & Kitayama, S. 1999. Is there a universal
need for positive self-regard? Psychological review, 106(4): 766-794.
Henderson, M. D., Trope, Y., & Carnevale, P. J. 2006. Negotiation from a near and
distant time perspective. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology,
91(4): 712-729.
Herzenstein, M., Posavac, S. S., & Brakus, J. J. 2007. Adoption of new and really new
products: the effects of self-regulation systems and risk salience. Journal of
Marketing Research, 44(2): 251-260.
Higgins, E. T. 1997. Beyond pleasure and pain. American Psychologist, 52(12): 1280.
Higgins, E. T. 1998. Promotion and prevention: Regulatory focus as a motivational
principle. Advances in Experimental Social Psychology, 30: 1-46.
Higgins, E. T. 2008. Culture and personality: Variability across universal motives as the
missing link. Social and Personality Psychology Compass, 2(2): 608634.
Higgins, E. T. 2011. Beyond pleasure and pain: How motivation works. New
York: Oxford.
Higgins, E. T., & Tykocinski, O. 1992. Self-discrepancies and biographical memory:
Personality and cognition at the level of psychological situation. Personality
and Social Psychology Bulletin, 18(5): 527-535.
Hofstede, G. 1980. Culture's consequences: International differences in workrelated values. Beverly Hills, CA: Sage.
Hofstede, G., Neuijen, B., Ohayv, D. D., & Sanders, G. 1990. Measuring organizational
cultures: A qualitative and quantitative study across twenty cases.
Administrative Science Quarterly, 35: 286-316.
Hollander, E. 1958. Conformity, status, and idiosyncracy credit. Psychological
Review, 65: 117-127.
Hornsey, M. J., & Jetten, J. 2004. The individual within the group: Balancing the need to
belong with the need to be different. Personality and Social Psychology
Review, 8(3): 248-264.
Hui, C. H., Triandis, H. C., & Yee, C. 1991. Cultural differences in reward allocation: Is
collectivism the explanation? British Journal of Social Psychology, 30(2):
145-157.

136

Jackson, S. E., & Dutton, J. E. 1988. Discerning threats and opportunities.
Administrative Science Quarterly, 33: 370-387.
Johns, G. 2006. The essential impact of context on organizational behavior. Academy
of Management Review, 31(2): 386-408.
Jost, J. T., Blount, S., Pfeffer, J., & Hunyady, G. 2003. Fair market ideology: Its
cognitive-motivational underpinnings. Research in organizational
behavior, 25: 53-92.
Kabanoff, B. 1991. Equity, equality, power, and conflict. Academy of Management
Review, 16(2): 416-441.
Kabanoff, B., Waldersee, R., & Cohen, M. 1995. Espoused values and organizational
change themes. Academy of Management Journal, 38(4): 1075-1104.
Kahn, R. L., Wolfe, D. M., Quinn, R. P., Snoek, J. D., & Rosenthal, R. A. 1964.
Organizational stress: Studies in role conflict and ambiguity. Oxford,
England: John Wiley.
Kahneman, D. 1973. Attention and effort. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall.
Kahneman, D. 2011. Thinking, fast and slow. New York: Farrar Straus & Giroux.
Kahneman, D., & Renshon, J. 2007. Why hawks win. Foreign Policy(158): 34-38.
Kahneman, D., & Tversky, A. 1979. Prospect theory: An analysis of decision under risk.
Econometrica, 47: 263-291.
Kanter, R. M. 1983. The change masters. New York: Simon & Schuster.
Kanter, R. M. 1988. When a thousand flowers bloom: Structural, collective and social
conditions for innovation in organizations. In B. M. Staw, & L. L. Cummings
(Eds.), Research in organizational behavior, Vol. 10: 169-211. Greenwich,
CT: JAI Press.
Kaplan, S., Brooks-Shesler, L., King, E. B., & Zaccaro, S. 2009. Thinking inside the box:
How conformity promotes creativity and innovation. In E. A. Mannix, J. A.
Goncalo, & M. A. Neale (Eds.), Creativity in Groups, Vol. 12: 229-265:
Emerald Group Publishing Limited.
Katz, D., & Kahn, R. L. 1966. The social psychology of organizations. New York:
Wiley.
Katz, D., & Kahn, R. L. 1978. The social psychology of organizations. New York,
NY: Wiley.

137

Keltner, D., Gruenfeld, D. H., & Anderson, C. 2003. Power, approach, and inhibition.
Psychological Review, 110(2): 265-284.
Kim, H., & Markus, H. R. 1999. Deviance or uniquencess, harmony or conformity: A
cultural analysis. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 77: 785800.
Kim, K. I., Park, H., & Suzuki, N. 1990. Reward allocations in the United States, Japan,
and Korea: A comparison of individualistic and collectivistic cultures. Academy
of Management Journal, 33(1): 188-198.
Kipnis, D. 1972. Does power corrupt? Journal of Personality and Social
Psychology, 24(1): 33-41.
Kipnis, D. 1976. The powerholders. Oxford, England: University of Chicago Press.
Kitayama, S., Markus, H. R., & Lieberman, C. 1995. The collective construction of self
esteem: Implications for culture, self, and emotion. In J. A. Russell, J. M.
Fernández-Dols, A. S. R. Manstead, & J. C. Wellenkamp (Eds.), Everyday
conceptions of emotion: An introduction to the psychology,
anthropology and linguistics of emotion, Vol. 81: 523-550. New York:
Kluwer Academic.
Kitayama, S., Markus, H. R., Matsumoto, H., & Norasakkunkit, V. 1997. Individual and
collective processes in the construction of the self: Self-enhancement in the
United States and self-criticism in Japan. Journal of Personality and Social
Psychology, 72(6): 1245-1267.
Kluger, A. N., Stephan, E., Ganzach, Y., & Hershkovitz, M. 2004. The effect of regulatory
focus on the shape of probability-weighting function: Evidence from a crossmodality matching method. Organizational Behavior and Human
Decision Processes, 95(1): 20-39.
Knowlton, B. J., Squire, L. R., & Gluck, M. A. 1994. Probabilistic classification learning in
amnesia. Learning & Memory, 1(2): 106.
Kotter, J. P. 1980. An integrative model of organizational dynamics. In E. E. Lawler, D.
A. Nadler, & C. Cammann (Eds.), Organizational assessment:
Perspectives on the measurement of organizational behavior and the
quality of working life. New York: Wiley.
Kruglanski, A. W., & Webster, D. M. 1996. Motivated closing of the mind: "Seizing" and"
freezing". Psychological Review, 103(2): 263.
138

Kunda, Z. 1999. Social cognition: Making sense of people. Psychological Bulletin,
108: 480-498.
Lalwani, A. K., & Shavitt, S. 2009. The “me” I claim to be: Cultural self-construal elicits
self-presentational goal pursuit. Journal of Personality and Social
Psychology, 97(1): 88-102.
Lalwani, A. K., Shrum, L. J., & Chiu, C. Y. 2009. Motivated Response styles: The role of
cultural values, regulatory focus, and self-consciousness in socially desirable
responding. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 96(4): 870882.
Langer, E. J., & Imber, L. G. 1979. When practice makes imperfect: debilitating effects of
overlearning. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 37(11):
2014-2024.
Langley, A. 1989. In search of rationality: The purposes behind the use of formal analysis
in organizations. Administrative Science Quarterly, 34: 598-631.
Lavie, D., Stettner, U., & Tushman, M. L. 2010. Exploration and exploitation within and
across organizations. Academy of Management Annals, 4(1): 109-155.
Leana, C. R., & Barry, B. 2000. Stability and change as simultaneous experiences in
organizational life. Academy of Management Review, 25(4): 753-759.
LeBreton, J. M., & Senter, J. L. 2008. Answers to 20 questions about interrater
reliability and interrater agreement. Organizational Research Methods,
11(4): 815-852.
Lee, A. Y., Aaker, J. L., & Gardner, W. L. 2000. The pleasures and pains of distinct selfconstruals: The role of interdependence in regulatory focus. Journal of
Personality and Social Psychology, 78(6): 1122-1134.
Lee, A. Y., & Higgins, E. T. 2009. The persuasive power of regulatory fit. In M. Wanke
(Ed.), Social psychology of consumer behavior: 319-334. New York:
Psychology Press.
Lee, F., Edmondson, A. C., Thomke, S., & Worline, M. 2004. The mixed effects of
inconsistency on experimentation in organizations. Organization Science,
15(3): 310-326.
Lee, F., & Tiedens, L. Z. 2001. Is it lonely at the top?: The independence and
interdependence of power holders. In B. Staw, & R. Sutton (Eds.), Research in
organizational behavior, Vol. 23: 43-91.
139

Leiter, M. P., & Maslach, C. 1988. The impact of interpersonal environment on burnout
and organizational commitment. Journal of Organizational Behavior,
9(4): 297-308.
Lerner, J. S., & Tetlock, P. E. 1999. Accounting for the effects of accountability.
Psychological Bulletin, 125(2): 255-275.
Leung, A. K., Maddux, W. W., Galinsky, A. D., & Chiu, C. 2008. Multicultural experience
enhances creativity: The when and how. American Psychologist, 63(3): 169181.
Levinthal, D. A., & March, J. G. 1993. The myopia of learning. Strategic
Management Journal, 14: 95-112.
Levitt, B., & March, J. G. 1988. Organizational learning. Annual Review of
Sociology, 14: 319-340.
Lewin, K. 1951. Field theory in social sciences. New York: Harper.
Lewis, M. W. 2000. Exploring paradox: Toward a more comprehensive guide.
Academy of Management Review, 25(4): 760-776.
Liberman, N., Idson, L. C., Camacho, C. J., & Higgins, E. T. 1999. Promotion and
prevention choices between stability and change. Journal of Personality and
Social Psychology, 77(6): 1135-1145.
Liberman, N., Molden, D. C., Idson, L. C., & Higgins, E. T. 2001. Promotion and
prevention focus on alternative hypotheses: Implications for attributional
functions. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 80(1): 5.
Liberman, N., & Trope, Y. 1998. The role of feasibility and desirability considerations in
near and distant future decisions: A test of temporal construal theory. Journal
of Personality and Social Psychology, 75(1): 5-18.
Liberman, N., & Trope, Y. 2008. The psychology of transcending the here and now.
Science, 322: 1201-1205.
Liberman, N., Trope, Y., & Stephan, E. 2007a. Psychological distance. In A. Kruglanski
(Ed.), Social Psychology: Handbook of Basic Principles (2nd Edition)
353-381. New York, NY: Guilford Press.
Liberman, N., Trope, Y., & Stephan, E. 2007b. Psychological distance. In A. Kruglanski
(Ed.), Social psychology: Handbook of basic principles, 2 ed.: 353-381.
New York, NY: Guilford Press.

140

Lind, E. A., & Tyler, T. 1988. The social psychology of procedural justice. New
York: Plenum Press.
Locke, E. A., Smith, K., Erez, M., Chah, D., & Schaffer, A. 1994. The effects of intraindividual goal conflict on performance. Journal of Management, 20: 67-91.
Lockwood, P., Marshall, T. C., & Sadler, P. 2005. Promoting success or preventing
failure: Cultural differences in motivation by positive and negative role models.
Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 31(3): 379-392.
MacDuffie, J. P. 1995. Human resource bundles and manufacturing performance:
Organizational logic and flexible production systems in the world auto industry.
Industrial Labor Relations Review, 48(2): 197-221.
Magee, J. C., & Galinsky, A. D. 2008. Social hierarchy: The self-reinforcing nature of
power and status. Academy of Management Annals, 2(1): 351-398.
Magee, J. C., Milliken, F. J., & Lurie, A. R. 2010. Power differences in the construal of a
crisis: The immediate aftermath of September 11, 2001. Personality and
Social Psychology Bulletin, 36(3): 354-370.
Mainemelis, C. 2010. Stealing fire: Creative deviance in the evolution of new ideas.
Academy of Management Review, 35(4): 558-578.
Mannix, E. A., Neale, M. A., & Northcraft, G. B. 1995. Equity, equality, or need? The
effects of organizational culture on the allocation of benefits and burdens.
Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, 63(3): 276286.
March, J. G. 1991. Exploration and exploitation in organizational learning.
Organization Science, 2: 71-86.
March, J. G., & Olsen, J. P. 1976. Ambiguity and choice in organizations. Bergen:
Universitetsforlaget.
March, J. G., & Shapira, Z. 1987. Managerial perspectives on risk and risk taking.
Management Science, 33(11): 1404-1418.
March, J. G., & Simon, H. A. 1958. Organizations. Oxford, England: Wiley.
Markus, H. R., & Kitayama, S. 1991. Culture and the self: Implications for cognition,
emotion, and motivation. Psychological Review, 98(2): 224-253.
Martin, R. L. 2010. The execution trap. Harvard Business Review, 88(7): 64.

141

Mauboussin, M. 2012. The success equation: Untangling success and luck in
business, sports, and investing. Cambridge: Harvard Business Review
Press.
McCrae, R. R., & Costa, P. T. 1985. Openness to experience. In R. Hogan, & W. H. Jones
(Eds.), Perspectives in personality, Vol. 1: 145-172. Greenwich, CT: JAI
Press.
McEvoy, V. 2014. Why 'metrics' overload is bad medicine: Doctors must focus on lists
and box-checking rather than patients, Wall Street Journal: Opinion. New
York:
http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424052702303293604579253971
350304330?mod=trending_now_4.
Medin, D. L., & Smith, E. E. 1984. Concepts and concept formation. Annual Review of
Psychology, 35(1): 113-138.
Meindl, J. R. 1989. Managing to be fair: An exploration of values, motives, and
leadership. Administrative Science Quarterly, 34: 252-276.
Mellers, B. A. 1980. Configurality in multiple-cue probability learning. American
Journal of Psychology, 93(3): 429-443.
Meyer, A. D. 1982. Adapting to environmental jolts. Administrative Science
Quarterly, 27: 515-537.
Meyer, A. D., Tsui, A. S., & Hinings, C. R. 1993. Configurational approaches to
organizational analysis. Academy of Management Journal, 36(6): 11751195.
Meyer, J. W., & Rowan, B. 1977. Institutionalized organizations: Formal structure as
myth and ceremony. American Journal of Sociology, 83: 340-363.
Meyer, J. W., & Scott, W. R. 1983. Organizational environments: Ritual and
rationality.
Meyerson, D. E., & Scully, M. A. 1995. Crossroads tempered radicalism and the politics
of ambivalence and change. Organization Science, 6(5): 585-600.
Mezulis, A. H., Abramson, L. Y., Hyde, J. S., & Hankin, B. L. 2004. Is there a universal
positivity bias in attributions? A meta-analytic review of individual,
developmental, and cultural differences in the self-serving attributional bias.
Psychological Bulletin, 130(5): 711-747.

142

Miller, J. G. 1984. Culture and the development of everyday social explanation. Journal
of Personality and Social Psychology, 46(5): 961-978.
Mintzberg, H. 1984. Power and organization life cycles. Academy of Management
Review, 9(2): 207-224.
Miron-Spektor, E., Erez, M., & Naveh, E. 2011a. The effect of conformist and attentiveto-detail members on team innovation: Reconciling the innovation paradox.
Academy of Management Journal, 54(4): 740-760.
Miron-Spektor, E., Gino, F., & Argote, L. 2011b. Paradoxical frames and creative sparks:
Enhancing individual creativity through conflict and integration.
Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, 116(2): 229240.
Mitchell, G., Tetlock, P. E., Mellers, B. A., & Ordonez, L. D. 1993. Judgments of social
justice: Compromises between equality and efficiency. Journal of Personality
and Social Psychology, 65: 629-629.
Molden, D. C., & Higgins, E. T. 2008. How preferences for eager versus vigilant
judgment strategies affect self-serving conclusions. Journal of Experimental
Social Psychology, 44(5): 1219-1228.
Mom, T. J. M., Van Den Bosch, F. A. J., & Volberda, H. W. 2009. Understanding
variation in managers' ambidexterity: Investigating direct and interaction effects
of formal structural and personal coordination mechanisms. Organization
Science, 20(4): 812-828.
Moorman, R. H., & Blakely, G. L. 1995. Individualism-collectivism as an individual
difference predictor of organizational citizenship behavior. Journal of
Organizational Behavior, 16(2): 127-142.
Morgeson, F. P., & Humphrey, S. E. 2006. The Work Design Questionnaire (WDQ):
Developing and validating a comprehensive measure for assessing job design and
the nature of work. Journal of Applied Psychology, 91(6): 1321-1339.
Morris, M. W., & Peng, K. 1994. Culture and cause: American and Chinese attributions
for social and physical events. Journal of Personality and Social
Psychology, 67(6): 949-971.
Morrison, E. W. 2006. Doing the job well: An investigation of pro-social rule breaking.
Journal of Management, 32(1): 5-28.

143

Morrison, E. W., & Phelps, C. C. 1999. Taking charge at work: Extrarole efforts to initiate
workplace change. Academy of Management Journal, 42(4): 403-419.
Murphy, P. R., & Jackson, S. E. 1999. Managing work-role performance: Challenges for
21st century organizations and employees. In D. R. Ilgen, & E. D. Pulakos (Eds.),
The changing nature of work performance: 325-365. San Francisco:
Jossey-Bass.
Nadler, A., & Chernyak-Hai, L. 2014. Helping them stay where they are: Status effects on
dependency/autonomy-oriented helping. Journal of Personality and Social
Psychology, 106(1): 58-72.
Nadler, D. A., & Tushman, M. L. 1980. A model for diagnosing organizational behavior.
Organizational Dynamics, 9(2): 35-51.
Nelson, R. R., & Winter, S. G. 1982. An evolutionary theory of economic change:
Belknap press.
Nemeth, C. J., & Staw, B. M. 1989. The tradeoffs of social control and innovation in
groups and organizations. Advances in Experimental Social Psychology,
22: 175-210.
Newman, K. L., & Nollen, S. D. 1996. Culture and congruence: The fit between
management practices and national culture. Journal of International
Business Studies: 753-779.
Newman, L. S. 1993. How individualists interpret behavior: Idiocentrism and
spontaneous trait inference. Social Cognition, 11(2): 243-269.
Ng, K. Y., & Van Dyne, L. 2001. Individualism-collectivism as a boundary condition for
effectiveness of minority influence in decision making. Organizational
Behavior and Human Decision Processes, 84(2): 198-225.
Nickerson, J. A., & Zenger, T. R. 2002. Being efficiently fickle: A dynamic theory of
organizational choice. Organization Science, 13(5): 547-566.
Nijstad, B. A., & De Dreu, C. K. W. 2012. Motivated information processing in
organizational teams: Progress, puzzles, and prospects. In A. P. Brief, & B. M.
Staw (Eds.), Research in organizational behavior. Greenwich: Elsevier.
Nisbett, R. E., Zukier, H., & Lemley, R. E. 1981. The dilution effect: Nondiagnostic
information weakens the implications of diagnostic information. Cognitive
Psychology, 13(2): 248-277.

144

O'Reilly, C. A. 1989. Corporations, culture, and commitment: Motivation and social
control in organizations. California Management Review

31(4): 9-25.

O'Reilly, C. A., Chatman, J., & Caldwell, D. F. 1991. People and organizational culture: A
profile comparison approach to assessing person-organization fit. Academy of
Management Journal, 34(3): 487-516.
O'Reilly, C. A., & Chatman, J. A. 1996. Culture as social control: Corporations, cults, and
commitment. Research in organizational behavior, 18.
Ofek, E., & Avery, J. 2013. J.C. Penney's "Fair and square" pricing strategy, Harvard
Business School Case Study 9-513-036. Boston, MA: Harvard Business
School Publishing.
Oishi, S., Schimmack, U., Diener, E., & Suh, E. M. 1998. The measurement of values and
individualism-collectivism. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin,
24(11): 1177-1189.
Oliver, R. L., & Anderson, E. 1994. An empirical test of the consequences of behavior-and
outcome-based sales control systems. Journal of Marketing, 58: 53-67.
Ordóñez, L. D., Schweitzer, M. E., Galinsky, A. D., & Bazerman, M. H. 2009. Goals gone
wild: The systematic side effects of overprescribing goal setting. Academy of
Management Perspectives, 23(1): 6-16.
Ouchi, W. 1981. Theory Z: How American business can meet the Japanese challenge.
Business Horizons, 24(6): 82-83.
Overbeck, J. R., & Park, B. 2001. When power does not corrupt: Superior individuation
processes among powerful perceivers. Journal of Personality and Social
Psychology, 81(4): 549.
Overbeck, J. R., & Park, B. 2006. Powerful perceivers, powerless objects: Flexibility of
powerholders’ social attention. Organizational Behavior and Human
Decision Processes, 99(2): 227-243.
Oyserman, D., Coon, H. M., & Kemmelmeier, M. 2002. Rethinking individualism and
collectivism: Evaluation of theoretical assumptions and meta-analyses.
Psychological Bulletin, 128(1): 3-72.
Oyserman, D., & Lee, S. W. S. 2008. Does culture influence what and how we think?
Effects of priming individualism and collectivism. Psychological Bulletin,
134(2): 311-342.

145

Page, S. E. 2007. Making the difference: Applying a logic of diversity. Academy of
Management Perspectives, 21(4): 6-20.
Parker, S. K., Bindl, U. K., & Strauss, K. 2010. Making things happen: A model of
proactive motivation. Journal of Management, 36(4): 827-856.
Parker, S. K., & Collins, C. G. 2010. Taking stock: Integrating and differentiating multiple
proactive behaviors. Journal of Management, 36(3): 633-662.
Parker, S. K., & Sprigg, C. A. 1999. Minimizing strain and maximizing learning: The role
of job demands, job control, and proactive personality. Journal of Applied
Psychology, 84(6): 925.
Patil, S. V., Vieider, F., & Tetlock, P. E. 2013. Process and outcome accountability. In M.
Bovens, R. E. Goodin, & T. Schillemans (Eds.), Oxford Handbook of Public
Accountability. New York: Oxford University Press.
Pellegrini, E. K., & Scandura, T. A. 2006. Leader-member exchange (LMX), paternalism
and delegation in the Turkish business culture: An empirical investigation.
Journal of International Business Studies, 37(2): 264-279.
Pellegrini, E. K., & Scandura, T. A. 2008. Paternalistic leadership: A review and agenda
for future research. Journal of Management, 34(3): 566-593.
Peterson, R. S., & Nemeth, C. J. 1996. Focus versus flexibility majority and minority
influence can both improve performance. Personality and Social
Psychology Bulletin, 22(1): 14-23.
Pfeffer, J. 1981a. Management as symbolic action: The creation and maintenance of
organizational paradigms. In L. Cummings, & B. Shaw (Eds.), Research in
organizational behavior, Vol. 3: 1-52. Greenwich, CT: JAI Press.
Pfeffer, J. 1981b. Power in Organizations: Pitman Publishing.
Pfeffer, J., & Langton, N. 1988. Wage inequality and the organization of work: The case
of academic departments. Administrative Science Quarterly, 33: 588-606.
Pitesa, M., & Thau, S. 2013. Masters of the universe: How power and accountability
influence self-serving decisions under moral hazard. Journal of Applied
Psychology, doi: 10.1037/a0031697.
Prokesch, S. 1986. People Express: A case study; Can Don Burr go back to the future?,
The New York Times. New York.

146

Pulakos, E. D., Arad, S., Donovan, M. A., & Plamondon, K. E. 2000. Adaptability in the
workplace: Development of a taxonomy of adaptive performance. Journal of
Applied Psychology, 85(4): 612-624.
Quigley, N., Tesluk, P., Locke, E. A., & Bortol, K. 2007. A multilevel investigation of the
motivational mechanisms underlying knowledge sharing and performance.
Organization Science, 18: 71-88.
Quinn, R. E., & Hall, R. H. 1983. Environments, organizations, and policymakers:
Toward an integrative framework. In R. H. Hall, & R. E. Quinn (Eds.),
Organizational theory and public policy. Beverly Hills: Sage.
Raisch, S., Birkinshaw, J., Probst, G., & Tushman, M. L. 2009. Organizational
ambidexterity: Balancing exploitation and exploration for sustained
performance. Organization Science, 20(4): 685-695.
Roberts, J. 2004. The modern firm: Organizational design for performance
and growth. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Rosenzweig, P. 2014. Left brain, right stuff: How leaders make winning
decisions. New York: PublicAffairs.
Ross, J., & Staw, B. M. 1993. Organizational escalation and exit: Lessons from the
Shoreham nuclear power plant. Academy of Management Journal, 36(4):
701-732.
Rubin, H. R., Pronovost, P., & Diette, G. B. 2001. The advantages and disadvantages of
process based measures of health care quality. International Journal for
Quality in Health Care, 13(6): 469.
Saavedra, R., Earley, P. C., & Van Dyne, L. 1993. Complex interdependence in taskperforming groups. Journal of Applied Psychology, 78(1): 61-72.
Schein, E. 1992a. Organizational Culture and Leadership (2nd ed.). San
Francisco: Jossey-Bass.
Schein, E. H. 1983. The role of the founder in creating organizational culture.
Organizational Dynamics, 12(1): 13-28.
Schein, E. H. 1992b. What is culture? In P. J. Frost, L. F. Moore, M. R. Louis, C. C.
Lundberg, & J. Martin (Eds.), Reframing organizational culture: 243-253.
Newbury Park: Sage.
Schein, E. H. 2004. Organizational culture and leadership. San Francisco, CA:
Jossey-Bass.
147

Schneider, B., Ehrhart, M. G., & Macey, W. H. 2013. Organizational climate and culture.
Annual review of psychology, 64: 361-388.
Schneider, B., Goldstein, H. W., & Smith, D. B. 1995. The ASA framework: An update.
Personnel Psychology, 48(4): 747-773.
Schneider, B., Smith, D. B., Taylor, S., & Fleenor, J. 1998. Personality and organizations:
A test of the homogeneity of personality hypothesis. Journal of Applied
Psychology, 83(3): 462-470.
Schoemaker, P. J. H. 2011. Brilliant mistakes: Finding success on the far side of
failure. Philadelphia, PA: Wharton Digital Press.
Scholer, A. A., & Higgins, E. T. 2008. Distinguishing levels of approach and avoidance:
An analysis using regulatory focus theory. In A. J. Elliot (Ed.), Handbook of
approach and avoidance motivation: 664. New York: Psychology Press.
Scholer, A. A., & Higgins, E. T. 2012. Too much of a good thing? Trade-offs in promotion
and prevention focus. In R. M. Ryan (Ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Human
Motivation: 65-84. New York: Oxford University Press.
Scholten, L., van Knippenberg, D., Nijstad, B. A., & De Dreu, C. K. W. 2007. Motivated
information processing and group decision-making: Effects of process
accountability on information processing and decision quality. Journal of
Experimental Social Psychology, 43(4): 539-552.
Schwartz, S. H. 1990. Individualism-collectivism critique and proposed refinements.
Journal of Cross-Cultural Psychology, 21(2): 139-157.
Schwartz, S. H., & Bilsky, W. 1987. Toward a universal psychological structure of human
values. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 53(3): 550-562.
Schwarz, N. 1990. Feelings as information: Information and motivational functions of
affective states. In R. Sorrentino, & E. T. Higgins (Eds.), Handbook of
motivation and cognition, Vol. 2: 527-561. New York: Guilford Press.
Schweitzer, M. E., Ordonez, L., & Douma, B. 2004. Goal setting as a motivator of
unethical behavior. Academy of Management Journal, 47(3): 422-432.
Scott, S. G., & Bruce, R. A. 1994. Determinants of innovative behavior: A path model of
individual innovation in the workplace. Academy of Management Journal,
37(3): 580-607.
Sedikides, C., & Brewer, M. B. 2001. Individual self, relational self, collective
self. Philadelphia: Psychology Press.
148

Semin, G. R., Higgins, T., de Montes, L. G., Estourget, Y., & Valencia, J. F. 2005.
Linguistic signatures of regulatory focus: How abstraction fits promotion more
than prevention. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 89(1):
36-45.
Shah, J., Higgins, T., & Friedman, R. S. 1998. Performance incentives and means: How
regulatory focus influences goal attainment. Journal of Personality and
Social Psychology, 74(2): 285-293.
Shalley, C. E., Zhou, J., & Oldham, G. R. 2004. The effects of personal and contextual
characteristics on creativity: Where should we go from here? Journal of
Management, 30(6): 933-958.
Shavitt, S., Lalwani, A. K., Zhang, J., & Torelli, C. J. 2006. The horizontal/vertical
distinction in cross-cultural consumer research. Journal of Consumer
Psychology, 16(4): 325-342.
Siegel-Jacobs, K., & Yates, J. F. 1996. Effects of procedural and outcome accountability
on judgment quality. Organizational Behavior and Human Decision
Processes, 65(1): 1-17.
Simon, H. 1947. Administrative behavior: A study of decision-making
processes in administrative organizations. Chicago, IL: Macmillan.
Simon, H. A. 1957. Models of man; social and rational. Oxford, England: Wiley.
Simons, R. 2005. Levers of organization design: How managers use
accountability systems for greater performance and commitment.
Boston, MA: Harvard Business School Press.
Simonson, I., & Nye, P. 1992. The effect of accountability on susceptibility to decision
errors. Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, 51(3):
416-446.
Simonson, I., & Staw, B. M. 1992. Deescalation strategies: A comparison of techniques
for reducing commitment to losing courses of action. Journal of Applied
Psychology, 77(4): 419-426.
Singelis, T. M. 1994. The measurement of independent and interdependent selfconstruals. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 20(5): 580-591.
Singelis, T. M., Triandis, H. C., Bhawuk, D. P. S., & Gelfand, M. J. 1995. Horizontal and
vertical dimensions of individualism and collectivism: A theoretical and
measurement refinement. Cross-Cultural Research, 29: 240-275.
149

Sitkin, S. B., See, K. E., Miller, C. C., Lawless, M. W., & Carton, A. M. 2011. The paradox
of stretch goals: Organizations in pursuit of the seemingly impossible. Academy
of Management Review, 36(3): 544-566.
Skitka, L. J., & Tetlock, P. E. 1992. Allocating scarce resources: A contingency model of
distributive justice. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 28(6):
491-522.
Slaughter, J. E., Bagger, J., & Li, A. 2006. Context effects on group-based employee
selection decisions. Organizational Behavior and Human Decision
Processes, 100(1): 47-59.
Smith, P. K., & Trope, Y. 2006. You focus on the forest when you're in charge of the
trees: Power priming and abstract information processing. Journal of
Personality and Social Psychology, 90(4): 578.
Smith, W. K., & Lewis, M. W. 2011. Toward a theory of paradox: A dynamic equilibrium
model of organizing. Academy of Management Review, 36(2): 381-403.
Smith, W. K., & Tushman, M. L. 2005. Managing strategic contradictions: A top
management model for managing innovation streams. Organization Science,
16(5): 522-536.
Staw, B. M. 1995. Why no one really wants creativity. In C. Ford, & D. Gioia (Eds.),
Creative action in organizations: 162-166: Sage Publications.
Staw, B. M., & Boettger, R. D. 1990. Task revision: A neglected form of work
performance. Academy of Management Journal, 33(3): 534-559.
Staw, B. M., Sandelands, L. E., & Dutton, J. E. 1981. Threat rigidity effects in
organizational behavior: A multilevel analysis. Administrative Science
Quarterly, 26: 501-524.
Surowiecki, J. 2004. The wisdom of crowds: Why the many are smarter than
the few and how collective wisdom shapes business economies,
societies and nations. New York: Random House.
Surowiecki, J. 2013. The turnaround trap. The New Yorker:
http://www.newyorker.com/talk/financial/2013/2003/2025/130325ta_talk_sur
owiecki?mbid=gnep.
Sutcliffe, K. M., & McNamara, G. 2001. Controlling decision-making practice in
organizations. Organization Science, 12(4): 484-501.
Sutton, R. I. 2002a. Weird ideas that work. New York: Free Press.
150

Sutton, R. I. 2002b. Weird ideas that work: 11 1/2 practices for promoting,
managing, and sustaining innovation. New York: Free Press.
Sutton, R. I., & Hargadon, A. 1996. Brainstorming groups in context: Effectiveness in a
product design firm. Administrative Science Quarterly, 41: 685-718.
Taleb, N. N. 2010. The black swan: The impact of the highly improbable. New
York: Random House, Inc.
Taleb, N. N., Goldstein, D. G., & Spitznagel, M. W. 2009. The six mistakes executives
make in risk management. Harvard Business Review: 1-4.
Tetlock, P. E. 1983a. Accountability and complexity of thought. Journal of
Personality and Social Psychology, 45(1): 74-83.
Tetlock, P. E. 1983b. Cognitive style and political ideology. Journal of Personality
and Social Psychology, 45(1): 118-126.
Tetlock, P. E. 1985. Accountability: The neglected social context of judgment and choice.
In A. Brief, & B. Staw (Eds.), Research in organizational behavior, Vol. 7:
297-332. Stamford: JAI Press.
Tetlock, P. E. 1986. A value pluralism model of ideological reasoning. Journal of
Personality and Social Psychology, 50(4): 819-827.
Tetlock, P. E. 1989. Structure and function in political belief systems. In A. R. Pratkanis,
S. J. breckler, & A. G. Greenwald (Eds.), Attitute structure and function:
129-152. Hillsdale: Lawrence Erlbaum Associated.
Tetlock, P. E. 1992. The impact of accountability on judgment and choice: Toward a
social contingency model. Advances in Experimental Social Psychology,
25(3): 331–376.
Tetlock, P. E. 1999. Accountability theory: Mixing properties of human agents with
properties of social systems. In L. L. Thompson, J. M. Levine, & D. M. Messick
(Eds.), Shared cognition in organizations: The management of
knowledge. Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates.
Tetlock, P. E. 2000. Cognitive biases and organizational correctives: Do both disease and
cure depend on the politics of the beholder? Administrative Science
Quarterly, 45: 293-326.
Tetlock, P. E. 2005. Expert political judgment: How good is it? How can we
know? Princeton: Princeton University Press.

151

Tetlock, P. E., Armor, D., & Peterson, R. S. 1994. The slavery debate in antebellum
America: Cognitive style, value conflict, and the limits of compromise. Journal
of Personality and Social Psychology, 66: 115-115.
Tetlock, P. E., & Boettger, R. 1989. Accountability: A social magnifier of the dilution
effect. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 57: 388-398.
Tetlock, P. E., & Mellers, B. A. 2011a. Intelligent management of intelligence agencies:
Beyond accountability ping-pong. American Psychologist: 1-13.
Tetlock, P. E., & Mellers, B. A. 2011b. Structuring accountability systems in
organizations: Key trade-offs and critical unknowns. In B. Fischhoff, & C.
Chauvin (Eds.), Intelligence Analysis: Behavioral and Social Scientific
Foundations: 249-270. Washington, DC: National Academies Press.
Tetlock, P. E., Peterson, R. S., & Berry, J. M. 1993. Flattering and unflattering personality
portraits of integratively simple and complex managers. Journal of
Personality and Social Psychology, 64: 500-500.
Tetlock, P. E., Peterson, R. S., & Lerner, J. S. 1996. Revising the value pluralism model:
Incorporating social content and context postulates. In C. Seligman, J. Olson, &
M. Zanna (Eds.), Ontario Symposium on Social and Personality
Psychology: Values. Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum.
Tetlock, P. E., Skitka, L., & Boettger, R. 1989. Social and cognitive strategies for coping
with accountability: Conformity, complexity, and bolstering. Journal of
Personality and Social Psychology, 57(4): 632-640.
Tetlock, P. E., Vieider, F., Patil, S. V., & Grant, A. M. 2013. Accountability and ideology:
When left looks right and right looks left. Organization Behavior and
Human Decision Processes, 122(1): 22-35.
Tost, L. 2011. An integrative model of legitimacy judgments. Academy of
Management Review, 36(4): 686-710.
Trafimow, D., Triandis, H. C., & Goto, S. G. 1991. Some tests of the distinction between
the private self and the collective self. Journal of Personality and Social
Psychology, 60(5): 649-655.
Triandis, H. C. 1995. Individualism & Collectivism. Boulder, CO: Westview Press.
Triandis, H. C. 2001. Individualism and collectivism: Past, present, and future. In D.
Matsumoto (Ed.), The handbook of culture and psychology. New York:
Oxford University Press.
152

Triandis, H. C., Chen, X. P., & Chan, D. 1998. Scenarios for the measurement of
collectivism and individualism. Journal of Cross-Cultural Psychology,
29(2): 275-289.
Triandis, H. C., & Gelfand, M. J. 1998. Converging measurement of horizontal and
vertical individualism and collectivism. Journal of Personality and Social
Psychology, 74(1): 118-128.
Triandis, H. C., & Suh, E. M. 2002. Cultural influences on personality. Annual Review
of Psychology, 53(1): 133-160.
Trice, H. M., & Beyer, J. M. 1993. The cultures of work organizations. Englewood
Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall.
Trope, Y., & Liberman, N. 2003. Temporal construal. Psychological Review, 110(3):
403-421.
Trope, Y., & Liberman, N. 2010. Construal-level theory of psychological distance.
Psychological Review, 117(2): 440-463.
Tyler, T. 1990. Why people obey the law. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.
Tyler, T., & Blader, S. 2005. Can businesses effectively regulate employee conduct? The
antecedents of rule following in work settings. Academy of Management
Journal, 48(6): 1143-1158.
Tyler, T. R. 1997. The psychology of legitimacy: A relational perspective on voluntary
deference to authorities. Personality and Social Psychology Review, 1(4):
323-345.
Vallacher, R. R., & Wegner, D. M. 1987. What do people think they're doing? Action
identification and human behavior. Psychological Review, 94(1): 3-15.
Van-Dijk, D., & Kluger, A. N. 2004. Feedback sign effect on motivation: Is it moderated
by regulatory focus? Applied Psychology, 53(1): 113-135.
Van Baaren, R. B., Holland, R. W., Steenaert, B., & van Knippenberg, A. 2003. Mimicry
for money: Behavioral consequences of imitation. Journal of Experimental
Social Psychology, 39(4): 393-398.
Vandello, J. A., & Cohen, D. 1999. Patterns of individualism and collectivism across the
United States. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 77(2): 279292.
Vroom, V. H. 1964. Work and motivation. New York: Wiley.

153

Wageman, R. 1995. Interdependence and group effectiveness. Administrative
Science Quarterly, 40: 145-180.
Wageman, R., & Gordon, F. M. 2005. As the twig is bent: How group values shape
emergent task interdependence in groups. Organization Science, 16(6): 687700.
Wagner, J. A. 1995. Studies of individualism-collectivism: Effects on cooperation in
groups. Academy of Management Journal, 38(1): 152-172.
Wall, T. D., Cordery, J. L., & Clegg, C. W. 2002. Empowerment, performance, and
operational uncertainty: A theoretical integration. Applied Psychology, 51(1):
146-169.
Weick, K. E. 1984. Small wins: Redefining the scale of social problems. American
Psychologist, 39(1): 40-49.
Woolley, A. W. 2011. Playing offense vs. defense: The effects of team strategic orientation
on team process in competitive environments. Organization Science, 22(6):
1384-1398.
Wright, P. M., & Snell, S. A. 1998. Toward a unifying framework for exploring fit and
flexibility in strategic human resource management. Academy of
Management Review, 23(4): 756-772.
Yerkes, R. M., & Dodson, J. D. 1908. The relation of strength of stimulus to rapidity of
habit formation. Journal of Comparative and Neurological Psychology,
18: 459-482.
Zajac, E. J., Kraatz, M. S., & Bresser, R. K. F. 2000. Modeling the dynamics of strategic
fit: A normative approach to strategic change. Strategic Management
Journal, 21(4): 429-453.
Zhang, Y., & Mittal, V. 2007. The attractiveness of enriched and impoverished options
culture, self-construal, and regulatory focus. Personality and Social
Psychology Bulletin, 33(4): 588-598.

154

